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INDUCTIVE SOCIOLOGY

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

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INDUCTIVE SOCIOLOGY

A SYLLABUS

OF

METHODS, ANALYSES AND CLASSIFICATIONS,
AND PROVISIONALLY FORMULATED LAWS

BY

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TO

The Memory of H. H. Scott

PRINCIPAL OF THE GREAT BARRINGTON, MASS., HIGH SCHOOL

1872-1877

Teacher, Friend, and Comrade in Philosophy



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"ALTHOUGH we may not have been moved toward a thing by any affect, yet, if it is like ourselves, whenever we imagine it to be affected by any affect, we are therefore affected by the same. . . . If, therefore, the nature of the external body be like that of our body, then the idea of the external body which we imagine will involve an affection of our body like that of the external body. Therefore, if we imagine anyone who is like ourselves to be affected with any affect, this imagination will express an affection of our body like that affect; and, therefore, we shall be affected with a similar affect ourselves, because we imagine something like us to be affected with the same." — SPINOZA, *The Ethic*, Part III, Prop. xxvii.

"WHEN I compare the modern with the ancient world, I am assured as to the future of man. I am far from denying that legislation and political changes have been the direct means of great good, but every good change in legislation or in government has been preceded or brought about by an increase of intelligence, of reasonableness, or of brotherly kindness on the part of the people at large. . . . Congeniality or similarity of manners is what has drawn social lines ever since man began to consort with his fellows. . . . Birds of a feather have flocked together since civilization began, and probably will do so till it perishes." — E. L. GODKIN, *Social Classes in the Republic*.

"THE course of scientific measurement has generally been to take first a rough observation of a quantity, such as the distance of the sun, the thickness of a stratum, the atomic weight of an element, the specific gravity of a substance; then, as information accumulated, as the precision of instruments increased and methods were better adapted, to make the measurement gradually more and more accurate. It is important to appreciate this development, for in the present state of our knowledge, many statistical measurements cannot be made with precision for want of data, and a critic is inclined to say that for this reason preliminary estimates are valueless; but from the scientific point of view this criticism is wrong, for a faulty measurement made on logical principles is better than none, and may lead to others with progressive improvement." — ARTHUR L. BOWLEY, *Elements of Statistics*.

PREFACE

THE object of this book is to present a scheme of inductive method, a somewhat detailed analysis and classification of social facts, and a tentative formulation of the more obvious laws of social activity, — all as a basis for further inductive studies. If such studies shall confirm this preliminary work, or if they shall show that it must be corrected, its purpose will in either case be accomplished. I hope, therefore, that the book may be useful, not only in the college class-room and in the university seminar, but also, by way of helpful suggestion, to scholars engaged in statistical research or in constructive historical investigation.

The tabular forms and the problems have slowly taken shape, step by step with the prosecution of numerous inductive studies of both rural and urban communities, which have been carried on under my direction by fellows and other graduate students of Columbia University, and which, I expect, will from time to time appear in printed form.

Under such conditions the book has grown out of a briefer Syllabus, published in 1897, with the title "The Theory of Socialization"; a pamphlet which contained no development of method, and which was otherwise incomplete.

Only one-half of the field of General Sociology is here described. Studies of the historical evolution of society and of the deeper problems of causation are not included.

Within this limited field these pages contain much material, and many developments of theoretical detail, not given in my earlier books.

I am under obligations to Professor Richmond Mayo-Smith for many suggestions of great value, and to Miss E. J. Hulbert for assistance in reading proofs.

VAN DEUSEN, MASS.,
September, 1901.

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BOOK I

THE ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL THEORY

INDUCTIVE SOCIOLOGY

CHAPTER I

SOCIAL PHENOMENA

Resemblance and Grouping

IN the world of external things objects which are so much alike that, in our thought of them, we conceive them as a "kind" or "class," are seldom scattered in a wholly random distribution. Usually they are more or less grouped, or "segregated," in space.

Especially is this true of living organisms. The various species of plants and of animals have their "areas of characterization," and, within these, their well-known habitats or haunts. Vegetal organisms of any given kind are more or less closely massed in particular places, and animal organisms are commonly found in swarms, bands, or flocks. Human beings for the most part live in aggregations.

Among the resemblances that may be observed in any normal aggregation of vegetal, or of animal, organisms, including human beings, are morphological and physiological similarities associated with phenomena of common descent and interbreeding. These similarities are variously known as degrees of kinship or as racial characteristics.

Psychical Resemblance

Of great practical importance in each of the higher animal species, and above all in the human race, are similarities of nervous organization and functioning. Under like circumstances two or more animals, or human individuals, of like nervous organization, behave in like ways. In the language of psychology, they respond in like ways to the same stimulus, or to like stimuli.

Habitual like response to like stimuli constitutes a mental and practical resemblance.

Mental and moral similarities are sometimes closely associated with degrees of kinship, and sometimes not.

Throughout the animal kingdom mental reactions and practical activities are organized in instincts, which, in many species, are delicate and exceedingly complex. Mental and practical resemblance among animals is chiefly a similarity of instincts and of instinctive conduct.

There is reason to believe that in all animal species, except the lowest, mental and practical resemblance is sympathetically felt, but not intellectually perceived, by the resembling individuals themselves.

Among human beings, individuals in a good degree alike in physical traits and in mental qualities, and dwelling together in a common habitat, not only feel their resemblances and differences, but also distinctly perceive them: they intellectually apprehend them.

Resembling individuals who are sympathetically or intellectually aware of their resemblances find pleasure in companionship. Those who intellectually, as well as sympathetically, know their similarity, find pleasure in an active interchange of ideas, and in a systematic cultivation of acquaintance.

Resembling individuals who are thus aware of their

resemblances, and find pleasure in acquaintance, discover that they can work together for common ends. It is possible for them to have similar purposes in life, to agree upon the best means of achieving them, to understand one another, and therefore to coöperate sympathetically and with success.

The total mental and practical resemblance of any plural number of individuals, including the original similarities, the consciousness of resemblances and differences, and the agreeing will to act together, may be called like-mindedness.

Like-minded individuals find satisfaction in their agreements and try to minimize their disagreements. When brought into contact with individuals who in thought or conduct differ from themselves, they commonly try to convince, persuade, or convert those who differ, and thereby to extend like-mindedness.

Society

The interchange of ideas and sympathies by resembling individuals, their cultivation of acquaintance and like-mindedness, their comradeship and coöperation, are Social Phenomena.

The dwelling together in a common habitat of a plural number of organisms of the same variety or species may be called a Sub-Social Grouping. Sub-social grouping is a condition of great importance in its relation to the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest.¹

Any group of animals of the same variety or species, dwelling together in a common habitat, and instinctively or sympathetically coöperating, may be called an Animal Society.²

¹ See "The Economic Ages," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. XVI, No. 2, June, 1901, pp. 193-221.

² See "The Psychology of Society," *Science*, New Series, Vol. IX, No. 210, January 6, 1899. This paper can be found also in "Democracy and Empire," pp. 29-41.

Any group of human beings, sufficiently alike and acquainted for sympathetic coöperation, and dwelling together in a geographical area that can be fairly well defined, may be called a Social Population.

Any group or number of human individuals who cultivate acquaintance and mental agreement, and who, knowing and enjoying their own like-mindedness, are able to work together for common ends, is a Human Society.

An entire social population that is, or that tends to become, a single social group may be called a Natural Society.

A natural society which is large enough to carry on every known kind of social activity and coöperation, and which, independently of any other society, maintains control over the territory that it occupies, may be called an Integral Society.

Within each integral society are to be found social groups that in many respects, but not in all, are complete and independent. Each of these groups, if left to itself, could maintain its existence and perfect a social life, but in fact each is subordinate in certain matters to the larger society which includes it. Such social groups — families, hamlets, towns, provinces, commonwealths, or petty kingdoms, united in great states or empires — by combination make up the integral society, and may therefore be called Component Societies.

Within each integral society, and within most of the component societies, are associations that have been artificially formed for achieving various purposes. Societies of this kind — political parties, business corporations, churches, and so on — carry on the work of the community by a division of labour, and are not independent of one another. Together they make up or constitute the social organization of the integral society. They may, therefore, be called Constituent Societies.

In its relation to the struggle for existence, society is a fact yet more important than sub-social grouping. It is through the mediation of society that the survival of the fit becomes the survival of the best.

CHAPTER II

SOCIOLOGY

The Scientific Study of Society

SOCIOLOGY is a scientific study of society. It aims to become a complete scientific description and history of society, and as nearly as possible a complete explanation of society in terms of simpler phenomena.¹

Since the phenomena of a social population are chiefly mental and moral, the elements of social description and explanation are for the most part psychological concepts and laws. Sociology presupposes psychology as psychology presupposes biology, and as biology presupposes the sciences of inorganic phenomena.

Psychology is the science of the elements and of the genesis of mental phenomena, as determined by physical and organic relations, and as presented in any normal individual mind. Sociology is the science of mental phenomena in some of their higher complications and reactions, as presented by a plural number of interacting minds, and of the constructive evolution of a social medium, through which the adaptations of life and its environment become reciprocal.

In their philosophical relations, therefore, biology, psychology, and sociology are sciences corresponding to a gradation of phenomena. Biology is the general science of life, but it surrenders to psychology a study of the wider adjustments of the organism in space and in time, through the evolution of mind. Psychology is the general science of mind, but, in its turn, it surrenders to sociology a study of the interaction of minds, and of the reciprocal adjustments of life and its environment through the evolution of a social medium.

¹ See "Democracy and Empire," Chapter iv, "The Mind of the Many."

Sociology may be divided into General, or Fundamental, Sociology, and Special Sociology.

General Sociology is a study of the universal and fundamental phenomena of societies. It investigates only the facts and correlations found in all societies, the types of society, the stages of social development, the general laws of social evolution. Special Sociology consists of a group of social sciences, each dealing minutely with some one phase of social organization, social activity, or social development. Among these sciences are various studies concerned with culture, economics, jurisprudence, and politics.

The present Syllabus deals only with the methods and with a portion of the investigations and conclusions of General Sociology.

Sociology and History

To a great and increasing extent the field of the sociologist is the same as that of the historian. The correspondence, however, is not exact, and the differences between sociology and history, as history is usually conceived, should be understood.

It is often said that "History repeats itself." Nevertheless, — and this also has often been remarked, — while many essential facts in the social organization and career of any people are to be found in the organization and career of every people, there are differences marking off each nation and each epoch from every other, and giving to each an individual character. The individual or personal elements in history and the distinctive quality of events are not repeated.

Whatever is repeated — in human affairs as in physical things — can be studied by scientific methods. Statistical countings, comparisons, and classifications can be made, and, in the course of time, inductions of law and of cause.

Accordingly, the constant element in history has been made the subject-matter of various sciences, for example, comparative folklore, comparative religion, comparative political economy, comparative jurisprudence, and comparative constitutional law.

The historian has seldom attempted to dissociate the constant elements in history from the unique, the individual, the personal. On the contrary, he very properly has tried to grasp history in its concrete entirety, and, in recording the life of any people or age, to

make clear the vital connection between those things that are universal and those that are peculiar or distinguishing. On the strictly scientific side his work may have suffered by such inclusiveness, but on the descriptive and narrative side, and in human interest, it has gained.

The sociologist confines his studies to those universal or constant portions of ever repeated history that admit of examination by scientific methods. His field, therefore, is less broad, and at the same time less detailed and less concrete, than that of the historian.

Sociology, then, in its relation to history, may accurately be described as a study of the constant elements in history, by the relatively exact methods of the statistician, and an interpretation or explanation of history in terms of the concepts and laws of psychology as developed into a social psychology.

In recent years it has been the ambition of many historians to be scientific in their work, and not a few of them have argued that history may be conceived as a science, or developed into a science. To the extent that the historian is scientific, he is a sociologist.

The Unit of Investigation

The scientific description of any object or group of facts must start from that imperfect discrimination which common knowledge has already made of the object itself from all other things.

But just because the scientific mind is dissatisfied with off-hand knowledge, it begins its systematic classifying of things by trying to make its preliminary observations as exact as possible. This is done by stripping away from the subject of investigation all irrelevant, accidental, and occasional facts, and looking for what is simple, elementary, and persistent. The simplest form of the subject-matter of a science is called the Unit of Investigation.

In its simplest form, society exists whenever an individual has a companion or associate. The Socius, then, is the unit of any social group or society; and his conduct is the unit of social activity.

Every human being is at once an animal, a conscious individual mind, and a socius. As an animal he is studied by the anatomist and the physiologist; as a conscious mind he is studied by the psychologist; as a socius, loving and seeking acquaintance, forming friendships and alliances with other socii like himself, imitating them and setting examples for them, teaching them and learning from them, and engaging with them in many forms of common activity,—he is studied by the sociologist.

The unit of investigation, then, in sociology is the socius—that is to say, the individual who is not only an animal and a conscious mind, but also a companion, a learner, a teacher, and co-worker.

Sociology studies the nature of the socius, his habits and his activities. Whether there are different kinds or classes of socii, how socii influence one another, how they combine and separate, what groups they form,—all these questions also are questions of sociology.

Methods

Sociology legitimately uses all known methods of scientific research, inductive and deductive. Its chief reliance, however, is necessarily upon inductive method.

CHAPTER III

INDUCTIVE METHOD

Induction

INDUCTION is a systematic observation and recording of Resemblances and Differences.

Mill's definition is: "Induction, properly so called, . . . may, then, be summarily defined as Generalization from Experience. It consists in inferring from some individual instances in which a phenomenon is observed to occur, that it occurs in all instances of a certain class; namely, in all which *resemble* the former, in what are regarded as the material circumstances."¹

Venn describes the task of inductively investigating nature as consisting of "a gradual accumulation of individual instances, as marked out from one another by various points of distinction, and connected with one another by points of resemblance."²

This thought is further developed in mathematical terms by Pearson.³

Not many objects, or persons, or acts, or events, resemble one another in a large number of details, or "points." Usually one, or two, or three points of resemblance may be observed, and all else is difference.

A point of resemblance may be some feature, or quality, or composition, of the things themselves, or of the persons themselves, or of the acts or events themselves, that are compared; or it may be nothing more than some circumstance or accident of association. Thus, the only resemblance that can be affirmed of two events may

¹ "Logic," Book III, chapter iii, § 1. Cf. also Book III, Chapter i, § 2.

² "The Logic of Chance," Part II, Chapter ix, § 3. Cf. also §§ 29, 30.

³ "The Grammar of Science," revised edition, Chapter x, § 5.

lie in the external circumstance that they happen to occur at the same moment of time, while the resemblance of one vertebrate to another lies in their similarity of internal structure.

In common speech we use the word "association," rather than the word "resemblance," for such similarities as those of like occurrence in time or in space. If, however, we ask ourselves the psychological question, What do we mean by the "association" of two or more things in time or in space? we discover that what really happens in consciousness is a recognition of similar time elements or "marks," or of similar space elements or "marks," in our complex perception of the two or more things.¹ We say that things are associated in time if their time "marks" are alike, or that they are associated in space if their space "marks" are alike.

Categories of Resemblance

An analysis of his own conscious experience will satisfy the inquirer that every possible mode of resemblance which the mind can apprehend can be found in one or another of the following categories:—

1. Resemblances of Occurrence in Time.
2. Resemblances of Position in Space.
3. Resemblances of Form, Colour, Habit, State, or Condition.
4. Resemblances of Correlation and Interdependence (Structure and Function).
5. Resemblances of Occurrence in a Series (Genesis).
6. Resemblances of Magnitude (of Mass, Number, Rate, or Power).

Systematic observations of resemblances, within these categories, constitute the method that Mill called the Method of Agreement.²

Possibilities of Induction

By the method of agreement we can make inductions of *Fact*, *Class*, *Generalization*, *Scientific Law*, and *Condition*.

¹ See James, "Psychology," Vol. I, p. 631; Vol. II, p. 167.

² John Stuart Mill, "Logic," Book III, Chapter viii.

A *Fact*, in the scientific sense of the word, is the close agreement of many observations or measurements of the same phenomenon.

If, as a scientific fact, the height of a certain point of land above sea level can be recorded as 1259 feet, it is because repeated measurements, made by the same and by different surveyors, agree within a difference, or "error," of less than twelve inches. If the density of oxygen — air being unity — can be set down in a scientific treatise as 1.10561, it is because thousands of delicate measurements have agreed to within an error of less than one-thousandth of a unit.

The difference between any one count, or measurement, or weighing, of a certain number, space, or mass, and the average of all counts, measurements, or weighings, of the same number, space, or mass, is called a "variation" or "error." The average of all variations or errors is called the "mean variation" or "mean error." The test of the scientific validity of an alleged fact is the smallness of the mean error of the observations, or measurements, by which that alleged fact has been established.¹

A *Class*, in the scientific sense of the word, is a plural number of facts that resemble one another in some given point or number of points.

A *Generalization*, in the scientific sense of the word, is an affirmation that a constant relation exists between an unvarying class of facts and some unvarying fact not in the class, or between one unvarying class of facts and some other unvarying class.

Thus Kepler's law, so called, that all planets move about the sun in elliptical orbits, is a generalization. Planets are a class. Elliptical orbits are a class. A constant relation between these two classes is affirmed.

A *Law*, in the scientific sense of the word, is an affirmation of a constant relation between a fact of variation and

¹ A simple arithmetical method of determining mean error is explained in Scripture's "The New Psychology," pp. 47, 48. More delicate methods are described in mathematical works, in Bowley's "Elements of Statistics," and in similar treatises.

some other fact of variation, or between a fact of variation and a class of variations, or between a class of variations and some other class of variations.

Thus, the law of gravitation is the affirmation that bodies attract each other directly as their masses, and inversely as the squares of their distances; that is, that as masses vary gravitation increases or decreases, the progression being arithmetical; that as distances vary gravitation increases or decreases, the progression being geometrical. The law of multiple proportions in chemistry is the affirmation that the proportion by weight in which any element combines with any other element is a multiple of the proportion by weight in which it combines with any yet other element.

Condition. — The method of agreement applied to problems of causation affords inductions of *necessary antecedent*, that is of *Condition*.

Cause. — For induction of *Cause*, it is necessary to employ not only the Method of Agreement, but also the Method of Difference.¹

We must ask whether a necessary antecedent or some combination of necessary antecedents is *sufficient* to produce the observed effect. This we must determine by observing the differences of effect produced by different antecedents or combinations of antecedents.

The combined methods of agreement and difference we may apply by making all possible classes called for in the problem, and by ascertaining what fact, event, or individual is found in all the classes.


The practical use of the combined method of agreement and difference, through the formation of a sufficient number of classes of resembling facts, is well illustrated in the familiar case of an attempt to discover, from circumstantial evidence, the individual who has committed a crime. Let us suppose that the only positive evidence connecting a suspected person with a murder is a revolver of a given make and caliber, containing five loaded chambers and one empty chamber, and known to be the property and in the possession of the defendant, together with certain ascertained facts about men who

¹ Mill, "Logic," Book III, Chapter viii.

were in the vicinity of the murder on the day when it was committed. Our case, then, is made up by constituting the following classes of persons: (1) Men sufficiently near the scene of fatal shooting. (2) Men sufficiently near the scene of shooting at time of shooting. (3) Men with motive to attack. (4) Men with motive to kill. (5) Men possessing revolvers of the given make and caliber. (6) Men possessing revolvers of the given make and caliber, with one chamber empty.

In this case we have no classes falling under category 5 (Genesis, or Occurrence in a Series), but all the other categories are represented. Men with motive to attack, men with motive to kill, and men possessing revolvers, are classes under the category of State or Condition. The sub-class, revolvers of a given make, falls within the category Structure. The class, men with motive to kill (as distinguished from men with motive to attack), the sub-class, revolvers of a given caliber, and the sub-class, revolvers with one chamber empty, fall within the category of Magnitude.

It may happen that only one person of all the persons found in these various six classes can be shown to belong in all the six; if so, that one person is undoubtedly the criminal. If more than one person is found in all six of these classes, the search for the true criminal must be continued until, by forming successive classes, only one person remains who is found in all classes. The relations of such classes to one another may be shown graphically by a series of intersecting circles, thus:—



- (1) Men sufficiently near the scene of fatal shooting.
- (2) Men sufficiently near the scene of shooting at time of shooting.
- (3) Men with motive to attack.
- (4) Men with motive to kill.
- (5) Men possessing revolvers of a given make and caliber.
- (6) Men possessing revolvers of a given make and caliber with one chamber empty.

Induction in Sociology

Every science begins with inductions which are nothing more than superficial observations of superficial resemblances, within the categories of time and space, and of form, colour, habit, state, or condition; for example, the old division of the animal kingdom into beast, bird, and fish. Presently observations are made of resemblances of structure and function. Last of all come those systematic observations of the resemblances and differences of occurrence in a series, and of magnitude, which lead to the discovery of causation.

The history of the science of sociology is a perfect example. The study of society in ancient times began with superficial observations of the like reunions in time, for example, dances, hunting excursions, military expeditions; of the like distributions in space (*e.g.* in hunting grounds); and of the like habits and conditions of aggregated individuals. More careful observations and classification culminated in the elaborate studies made by Plato and Aristotle of social structure and function. Then came a long period of attempts to trace genesis and to isolate causes: by Epicurus, Machiavelli, Bodin, Hooker, Althusius, Grotius, Hobbes, Spinoza, Pufendorf, Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau. Comte undertook to do all this work over, comprehensively. With the rise of evolutionist science an effort was made to do it more exactly. New studies of structure and function were made by Spencer, Schaffle, DeGreef, Combes de Lestrade, Gumpłowicz, and Simmel. New studies of genesis were made by the ethnologists, Morgan, Maine, Bachofen, Lilienfeld, and McLennan; and by Spencer and others, reviewing and coördinating

the ethnological work. Studies of the relative magnitudes of social phenomena were made by the statisticians; and studies of cause by Buckle, Marx, Spencer, Ward, Tarde, Durkheim, Fouillée, and Le Bon.

Comparative and Historical Methods

The two specific methods of sociological research, namely, the Comparative and the Historical, are inductive.

By these methods, as ordinarily understood, we determine whether a given fact *qualitatively* belongs in a given class. We study the alleged resemblance. These methods, in their qualitative form, give us as results the first five categories, and inductions of condition.

A *quantitative* form of comparative and historical method is the Statistical. By this method we count up the number of resembling facts in a given class. This gives us the final category of resemblances, namely, that of magnitude, — the classes of More and Less. These, if we have complete statistical data, we can subdivide to any desired degree of accuracy.

This final category (of magnitude) is of the utmost importance in social investigation. If we find that it is not always possible perfectly to isolate our phenomena, as, for example, in Mill's familiar example of the effect of a protective tariff, we may nevertheless be certain that we have found the only sufficient antecedent if we know that we have found the only one commensurate with results. The failure to give due importance to this category was a serious deficiency in Mill's analysis of inductive logic.

Evidence, Records, Testimony. — Comparative and historical method may be subdivided into three general fields of investigation, in each of which we proceed by a systematic observation of resemblances and differences. These are, namely, (1) the critical study of circumstantial evidence in general, *i.e.* of observed facts of every sort; (2) the critical study of records, documentary and others,

variously known as Epigraphy, Paleography, and Archæology; and (3) the critical study of personal testimony.

In all of these studies, as has been said, we have to proceed by a systematic observation of resemblances and differences. Take, for example, a case in epigraphy. A certain document is brought to light, and the discoverer claims that it was written by George Washington. How shall we determine its genuineness? We can do so only by instituting a minute comparison between this document and writings of Washington that are known to be genuine. The comparison must extend to a study of handwriting in the most minute details, to quality of paper, to characteristics of style, and so on.

Human Testimony

Of all applications of the inductive process within the general limits of the comparative and historical methods, the most important is that of critically examining human testimony. Upon human testimony, in the last analysis, all our historical and statistical judgments must rest. When we have discovered that historical or statistical documents are genuine as documents, we still have to inquire whether the story they tell is truth or falsehood.


The scientific examining or sifting of testimony, then, is one of the most important of all inductive processes. It is necessary to proceed by observing resemblances and differences among witnesses, and by grouping witnesses into successive classes.

The important classes into which witnesses must be arranged are these:—

(1) Witnesses whose position in time and space is, or has been, such with reference to the alleged fact, that they can or could have seen or heard it. This throws out hearsay, or secondary testimony, as of secondary value.


(2) Witnesses who (*a*) have no motive to falsify, and who (*b*) are not liars by habit.

(3) Witnesses intellectually competent to observe or to hear and to report accurately: (*a*) sane and not feeble-minded, (*b*) not under hypnotic control, (*c*) not under the control of an overmastering passion or interest, and (*d*) not under the control of a mastering idea or suggestion.



Witnesses competent in virtue of:—

1. Position in time and space.
2. Truthfulness in motive and habit.
3. Intellectual qualifications.



Witnesses intellectually competent:—

- a.* Sane and not feeble-minded.

- b. Not under hypnotic control.
- c. Not under control of an overmastering passion or interest.
- d. Not under control of a mastering idea or suggestion.

Statistics

From an examination of the nature and criticism of circumstantial evidence, of documentary materials, and of human testimony, the student of inductive method passes on to an examination of the method of statistics, which, as has already been observed, must be described as a quantitative mode of the comparative and historical methods.

Statistical work consists largely in counting the individuals, qualities, circumstances, or habits, in any aggregation of persons or things, and in dealing, by various mathematical processes, with the numbers so obtained.

These quantitative operations, however, are not the fundamental operations of statistical research. The first step in any statistical investigation, as in inductive method applied to purely qualitative problems, is the noting of resemblances and differences. Theoretically, the statistician should ask as many questions — calling for numerical answers — as there are resemblances and differences in the subject-matter of his investigation.

Suppose, for example, that he is obtaining and arranging the simpler statistics of a population. At the outset he observes the great resemblances of the time and space categories, namely the co-existence, within a given period of time and within a given area, of a plural number of individuals. He observes next certain differences. He sees that the area or region under observation is naturally, and perhaps also artificially, divided into unequal and otherwise unlike parts; for example, the United States into coast regions, plain regions, mountain regions, and so on, and into commonwealths and territories. He roughly observes that the population which he is to study is unequally distributed, per square mile, over these different regional or artificial parts. He observes, also, differences within the population itself, namely, a difference of sex and differences of age.

Therefore, before beginning his counting, he decides what questions respecting the resemblances and differences that he has discovered it will be worth while to ask, in the hope of obtaining exact quantitative knowledge.

The first step, then, in statistical investigation, is that of classification according to the categories of resemblance. When this has been accomplished, the statistician proceeds to make his count. He inquires how many individuals are found in each class. The result is the formation of a new set of classes, or perhaps we should say, the discovery of a new distinguishing mark for each class. The classes have been converted into more and less classes. Thus the population in one given area is found to be greater than that in another given area. Males are found to be fewer than females. Men and women between the age limits of thirty and forty are found to be more numerous than men and women between the age limits of sixty and seventy. Deaths of children under five are found to be more numerous than deaths of youths over fifteen, and so on.

Analysis of Figures. — When more and less classes have thus been formed, certain mathematical analyses and comparisons are in order. These may yield generalizations, or lead to the discovery of laws, or even of causes.

The figures making up any one class or series are resolved into lesser magnitude-classes.

The lowest number, the highest number, and “the median” — the number midway between the lowest and the highest — are observed, and the average of all the numbers is found. Then the proportions in which the numbers group themselves about the average, the median, the maximum, and the minimum, are observed. Often these groupings are of great significance. The predominant grouping is called the “mode.”

Deviation. — When the figures of any one class or series have been analyzed and grouped, a further examination of them is made to ascertain, first, the range of deviation from the mode, and secondly, the *mode of the deviation*.

For example, the temperature maxima at Chicago day by day during July may range from 74° to 98° . Twenty out of thirty-one days may happen to show maxima varying not more than 2° either way from 89° . This grouping about 89° , then, is the mode of the maxima figures for the month. The extreme variation from the mode (89° minus 74°) is 15° . This variation, however, it may appear, occurs only once or twice, while possibly as many as twenty-six variations do not exceed 6° in any case above or below 89° , and the average of all variations above or below 89° may happen to be 6° . Six degrees, then, is the mode of deviation of these maxima figures.

The mode of deviation — more exactly calculated than is possible by a simple arithmetical operation, as in the foregoing example — is technically called the Standard Deviation, or Standard Variation. All natural phenomena — including all social phenomena — that admit of counting, show a normal range of variation from the mode and a standard deviation.

Thus, the mode of the heights of men of European nationalities is approximately five feet nine inches, and normal variation does not exceed six inches.

Standard Deviation is the key to an understanding of all phenomena of evolution — variation, natural and artificial selection. And this is as true of social as of psychic or biotic evolution.¹

Correlation. — When standard deviations have been determined, classes or series of figures may be compared one with another to ascertain whether they vary directly, or inversely, or without relation to one another. Direct or inverse variation is called Correlation. Degree of correlation is mathematically expressed as a Coefficient of Correlation.² A coefficient of correlation is always equivalent to a generalization or a law.

Inexact Statistics. — An important modification of usual

¹ For the full discussion of this subject, see Karl Pearson, "The Grammar of Science," Chapter x, § 6, and Bowley, "Elements of Statistics," Part II, § ii.

² See Pearson, *ibid.*, Chapter x, § 7, and Bowley, *ibid.*, Part II, § vi.

statistical methods has now to be noticed.¹ There are many facts which we know in terms of more and less, but not in arithmetically exact terms.

For example, we know that an adult is older than a child, although we may not know how much older. We know that a locomotive can travel faster than a horse, although we may be unable to say how much faster. We know that Venice had more trade immediately after the Crusades than London had, although we do not know how much more.

These differences of more and less which have not been reduced to arithmetical exactness are often of exceeding importance in social causation. The familiar example is that of a popular plurality or majority in a democratically governed state. One or another party wins in an election. So far as governmental policy is concerned, the exact majority or plurality of votes cast in the election is of practically no consequence. The important fact is that one party had more votes than the other. This familiar example is representative of a large class of more and less facts, continually determining the course of social evolution, and the investigator of society should learn all that he can about them.

These arithmetically inexact more and less classes are quantitative in an algebraic sense. Their sign is plus or minus. We therefore may say that there is an important statistical field in which our records are algebraic signs rather than arithmetical figures.

A convenient and, on the whole, the most precise way of making these records is to put the whole whose parts we are investigating equal to one hundred, and then to designate any part exceeding seventy-five per cent of the whole as a large majority; any part exceeding fifty per cent, but not exceeding seventy-five per cent as a small majority; any part less than fifty, but exceeding twenty-five per cent, as a large minority; and any part less than twenty-five per cent as a small minority.²

¹ It was described at length in an article by the author on "Exact Methods in Sociology," in the *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. LVI, No. 2, December, 1899.

² Quasi statistical methods, essentially like the one here described, have the sanction of distinguished scientific authority. See Galton, "Natural Inheritance," p. 47, and Bowley, "Elements of Statistics," pp. 5, 125, and especially p. 126.

Observations of more and less are *perceptions*, if the phenomena under investigation are within the field of sight and hearing. We directly *perceive* the quantitative difference between a tall man and a short one, between a slowly moving object and one moving rapidly. In social investigations, however, the entire field of phenomena is rarely within range of the vision or of the hearing of any one observer. In this case any records of more or less that we may make are likely to be records, not of direct perceptions, but rather of judgments, which, in their turn, are inductive inferences from perceived facts. There is here a large possibility of error.

How can the coefficient of error in this case be diminished? Errors of judgment can be eliminated only by subdividing the whole subject or phenomenon under investigation into parts that can be *perceived*, and thereby *substituting an aggregate of perceptions of parts for a judgment upon an undivided whole*.

For example, let there be a belief that the Roman Catholics in a given town attend church in relatively larger numbers than the Protestants do. This popular belief is merely a judgment, no actual count having been made. It may be erroneous. Without making an actual count, its truth or error may be established. The town in question being subdivided into streets, let the investigator station himself in the different streets one after another, and carefully observe whether on Sundays and other church days, within the actual field of his vision, where perception takes the place of judgment, more Catholics or more Protestants are seen to enter their respective places of worship, no actual count, however, being attempted. Obviously within this limited field of perception a reasonably careful man may be certain as to the facts of more and less. When the entire community has thus been gone over, an aggregate of definite perceptions of parts will have been substituted for a vague judgment upon the whole.

Our rule, then, for dealing with quantitative phenomena by the algebraic, as distinguished from the arithmetical,

method is this: *For every judgment on an undivided whole must be substituted perceptive observations upon the whole, subdivided into parts; and the parts must be sufficiently small for this purpose.* Judgments of the undivided whole must then be compared with the aggregate of observations.

When this rule has been followed, records of more and less, mere algebraic determinations though they are, should be as certain, although they are not as exact, as arithmetical statistics.

This rule has long been followed in all the concrete sciences. The astronomer finds the solar system as a whole too large for observation by immediate perception. Instead, therefore, of being satisfied with a judgment upon the system as a whole, he turns his telescope upon each of the component planets; and his final knowledge of the system consists of an aggregate of perceptive observations of the parts of the system, with which his judgment upon the system as a whole is from time to time compared and made to harmonize. In like manner, the biologist, instead of being satisfied with his observation of any animal, or even of any organ, as a whole, subdivides it into more and more minute parts, upon each of which he turns his microscope; and his resulting knowledge of the whole is an aggregate of perceptions, and of judgments made to harmonize with them.

In fact, this rule is only another form of the final test of truth in all the inductive sciences; which test is, *the ultimate agreement or harmony of perceptions with reasoned conclusions.* If care is taken to secure this agreement in all those studies of more and less which must necessarily be algebraic, rather than arithmetical, in form, our results will be certain.

Deduction

In every extended or complicated inductive research, it is necessary at times to have recourse to deduction.

The investigator, therefore, should understand that deduction, like induction, resolves into a systematic observation of differences and resemblances. Its validity depends absolutely upon accuracy of observation.

The deductive syllogism is more than a pretentious arrangement of identical propositions; it is more than an affirmation that the whole includes the part, that the universal comprehends the particular; it is a powerful instrument for the discovery of truth.

Thus, when in the familiar syllogism, we say:—

All men are mortal,
John, Sidney, and William are men,
Therefore, John, Sidney, and William are mortal,

we really say:—

All known men, $a, b, c, \dots z$, with the possible exception of o, p, q (John, Sidney, and William), are mortal.

John, Sidney, and William (o, p, q) resemble all known men, $a, b, c, \dots n, \dots r, s, t, \dots z$ in all essential characteristics, except, possibly, that of mortality.

Therefore, *it is probable* that o, p, q resemble $a, b, c, \dots n, \dots r, s, t, \dots z$ in mortality also.

Deductive reasoning thus essentially consists in the substitution of a wide class of partially known things for a narrower class of known things, on the basis of a resemblance of the wider class, so far as known, to the narrower.

In the syllogism analyzed above, we substitute for the class, "all known men," the wider class, "all men," including the men as yet only partially known, on the assumption that, so far as known, all partially known men resemble all fully known men.

Understanding, then, that deduction is the substitution of one class of resembling facts for some other class, or group of classes, and that its legitimacy depends upon accuracy of observation, we may use it to help out induction. Instead of observations which cannot be made, or which, with means at command, cannot be made with accuracy, we may use other observations easily made, if

the equivalence of the latter to the former is certainly known.

For example, suppose that we desire to know whether the men of Montana represent a type of character that might be described as forceful, but that we find no testimony, no record of personal observations, directly bearing upon our inquiry. We know, however, that by the general consent of mankind, men who follow adventurous and daring occupations are described as forceful. Turning, then, to the census, we learn that a majority of men in Montana follow adventurous and daring occupations. Accordingly, by substitution, we affirm that a majority of the men of Montana are of the forceful type of character.¹

¹ On substitution in statistics, see Bowley, "Elements of Statistics," pp. 12, 18.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEMS OF SOCIOLOGY

Work Accomplished

IN sociology a vast amount of inductive work has already been accomplished. A great many classes have been formed, and most of them are facts of familiar knowledge.

We have the Time and Space classes. We think of society as consisting of, or at least as a phenomenon of, a plurality of individuals of the same three or four generations and dwelling together within a described area.

We have Form, Colour, State, Condition, and Circumstance classes. A population is composed of men and women, that is organic beings of a certain form and stature. Their colouring has been a subject of observation since prehistoric time, and since history began their condition or relative advancement, as savages, barbarians, or civilized beings, has likewise been a subject of attention.

We have Structure and Function classes. A society consists of individuals resembling one another in bodily structure and function, so far, at least, as to belong to the same species, and more commonly to the same race and even nationality, and resembling one another in mental organization so far, at least, as to be able to work harmoniously together. Strictly sociological classes of the structure and function category are likewise familiar. Governments have been classified since the days of Aristotle,

and industrial systems most carefully since the days of the Physiocrats and of Adam Smith.

In historical and in statistical work these various classes have been subdivided and resubdivided. Population, as we have already observed, is distributed into sex and age classes, into colour, race, and nationality classes. Mind is distributed into mental types, types of character, types of habit, and so on.

The Further Task

Starting from the classifications already made and familiar, the further task of inductive sociology is to define, subdivide, and coördinate these classes, and then to arrive at such conclusions as are possible within the category of causation.

The accumulated facts that we already possess, in census and other statistical reports, and in the testimonies (documentary and other) of personal observers, are abundant for the purpose of making a fairly complete *analysis* and *classification* of social phenomena.

We can distinguish the minor from the major resemblances, and therefore distinguish the great, inclusive groupings, from the smaller, subordinate, included groupings. We can distinguish the essential resemblances of correlation and interdependence from the superficial resemblances of circumstance, and from the chance resemblances of merely accidental association in time or in place.

We have, in short, materials for a Structural Sociology — a descriptive Social Anatomy.

But we have *not*, as yet, an abundance of sufficiently accurate observations for extensive and delicate inductions of *cause*. It is necessary, therefore, to make use of our analyses and classifications in the same way that statisticians do, as schemes of inquiry for the further collection of facts.

In the following pages the attempt is made to present a classification of social facts, which seems to be warranted by existing knowledge, and to carry it out into tabular schemes of further inductive study, which, it is hoped, may in time lead to the verification of sociological laws already formulated, and to the discovery of others not yet surmised.

Tabular Analysis

In the following pages each group of topics or titles which is marked "Table" contains all the data necessary to enable the investigator or student to construct in outline or blank form the table which should be filled out with the results of his inquiries.

The words which in the same line follow the word "Table" are the title or heading of the Table.

The words or topics which are printed below the table heading, and numbered 1, 2, 3, etc., are the titles or headings of the several columns of the table. Columns should be numbered from left to right.

The capital letter A, M, or Y, which stands before a column heading, indicates what kind of information the column is to be filled with.

A stands for "Arithmetical Value," and means that the column is to be filled with figures — actual quantitative statistics.

M stands for "Majority," or "Minority," and indicates that the column is to be filled with majority and minority symbols. These symbols are: —

Large majority (75 per cent or more) to be written $\frac{3}{4}$, or .75 +, or + 2 m

Small majority (50 to 75 per cent) to be written +, or .50 +, or + m

Large minority (25 to 50 per cent) to be written \oplus , or .25 +, or - 2 m

Small minority (25 per cent or less) to be written \ominus , or .00 +, or - m

Y stands for "Yes" or "No," and indicates that the column is to be filled with symbols of "Yes" or "No" or "Uncertain." These symbols are: Yes, \checkmark ; No, \wedge ; Doubtful, $<$; or Y, N, D.

Besides the numbered columns a blank table or form must contain a sufficiently wide space for entering the enumeration units.

Enumeration units are the parts into which we subdivide the whole social group under investigation. Thus, if we are studying

the United States, our enumeration units may be the several commonwealths. If we are studying a single commonwealth, our enumeration units may be either the counties or the towns of the state. If we are studying a city, our enumeration units may be boroughs, wards, congressional or legislative districts, postal districts, or school districts. If we are studying a town or township, our enumeration units may be school districts. If we are studying a school district, a ward, or a village, our enumeration units may be streets. If we are studying a street, our enumeration units may be blocks or squares. If we are studying a block or other subdivision of a street, our enumeration units may be households. If we are studying a household, our enumeration units must be individuals.

In filling out a table after the blank form has been properly constructed, begin by entering the names of the enumeration units of the investigation in the left-hand space of the table. Then, in the columns, proceeding from left to right, enter for each enumeration unit in each column the information called for at the head of the column.

The entering of arithmetical values, when they can be obtained, and of the symbols of Yes or No or Uncertain requires no further explanation.

The term "majority," large or small, should always be understood to mean a majority of the individuals composing the particular enumeration unit under consideration. In like manner, the term "minority," large or small, should be understood to mean a minority of the individuals composing the particular enumeration unit under consideration.

If the enumeration unit is a household too small for convenient subdivision into proportions, the adults may arbitrarily be considered as constituting a majority; but when such procedure has been resorted to the fact should be mentioned in the investigator's report.

If the enumeration unit is a household of only two persons, one (and only one) of whom is a voter or an income earner, the voter or the income earner may arbitrarily be considered a majority, but such procedure must be mentioned in the investigator's report.

No trait or quality of mind, or of character, or of conduct, should be affirmed of any majority or minority unless the trait or quality is exhibited by the individuals composing the majority or the minority *in a majority of their frequently repeated acts*.

The facts themselves from which these inductions of class — of correlation and interdependence — are drawn are not recounted in

these pages. To recount would practically be to reprint volumes of statistics, of laws, and of historical documents. The nature of the facts, and where to look for them, are sufficiently indicated.

No statement in the following pages, nor any single feature of arrangement, subdivision, or subordination, should be accepted by the student as final. On the contrary, every statement, including every definition, every grouping, and every formulation of law, should be taken as a challenge to find out whether it is true or false. If, in filling out the tabular schemes here offered, investigators discover facts that cannot be reconciled with the present analysis, the analysis itself must be modified to any necessary extent.

BOOK II

THE ELEMENTS AND STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY

PART I

THE SOCIAL POPULATION

CHAPTER I

SITUATION

Distribution of Societies

NATURAL societies are found only where the physical features of land and climate are favourable to the grouping of living beings in relatively large aggregations.

Rather more than half of the land surface of the earth is unfavourable to any massing of population. Mountain ranges, deserts, tropical jungles, and the intensely cold regions of the Arctic zones together make up this forbidding part of the world. Natural societies flourish where soil is productive, and elevation is not too great an obstacle to industry and communication, and where climate is endurable.

The Inhabitable Areas

The inhabitable areas occupied by a natural society that is being inductively or descriptively studied should be examined with reference to the natural and artificial features named below, or to so many of them as are not too detailed for the purposes of the investigation undertaken.

When a population has modified its environment by the creation of artificial features, these may influence the distribution and the activity of the population as greatly as the original natural features continue to do. The massing of population at any given point is itself a condition favourable to further aggregation, because it affords protection to individuals, and makes possible the development of those forms of coöperation which most rapidly increase wealth.

Natural Features.—For purposes of statistical study natural features may conveniently be subdivided in accordance with the designations employed in the Federal Census Reports of the United States, with slight modification and rearrangement to make them adaptable to any continental area.

TABLE I. — NATURAL FEATURES

A 1. Mean Elevation.	Y 9. Prairie Region?
A 2. Mean Temperature.	Y 10. Great Forest Region?
A 3. Extreme Heat.	Y 11. Great Lake Region?
A 4. Extreme Cold.	Y 12. Interior Plateau?
A 5. Mean Rainfall.	Y 13. Hill Country?
Y 6. Sea-level Swamps?	Y 14. Mountainous Country?
Y 7. Coast-level Plain?	Y 15. Upland Swamps?
Y 8. Interior Alluvial Region?	Y 16. Upland Valleys?

For general information on the inhabitable areas of the United States consult Mills' "International Geography," Shaler's "The United States," and the Federal Census. For more detailed information consult the Reports and Maps of the Coast Survey, of the Geological Survey, of the Land Office, of the Weather Bureau, and of other bureaus of the Department of Agriculture.

Artificial Features.—Artificial features may be studied under the subdivisions Country Roads, City Streets, and more minutely under the designations Farms and Dwellings.

TABLE II. — COUNTRY ROADS

A 1. Railroad Station.	A 14. Summer Residence.
A 2. Telegraph Office.	A 15. Farmhouse, high grade.
A 3. Post-office.	A 16. Farmhouse, medium grade.
A 4. Hotel.	A 17. Farmhouse, low grade.
A 5. Store.	A 18. Labourer's House.
A 6. Mill or Factory.	A 19. Tenement.
A 7. Church.	A 20. Deserted House.
A 8. Parsonage or Rectory.	A 21. Cellar of Former House.
A 9. Cemetery.	A 22. Almshouse.
A 10. School.	A 23. Jail.
A 11. Library.	A 24. Courthouse.
A 12. Casino or Club.	
A 13. Saloon.	

Other columns may be added for objects found in the investigation, and not here named.

In the systematic description of a country road by the method of tabulation, enter in its proper column the distance in miles, rods, or yards of the object named at the head of the column from some given starting-point, proceeding from north to south or from east to west.

TABLE III. — CITY STREETS

A 1. Railroad Station.	A 20. Mission.
A 2. Telegraph Office.	A 21. Hospital.
A 3. Post-office.	A 22. Dispensary.
A 4. Express Office.	A 23. Day Nursery.
A 5. Mill, Factory, or Shop.	A 24. Almshouse, Home for Aged.
A 6. Store.	A 25. Asylum or other Charitable Institution.
A 7. Trade Union Headquarters.	A 26. School.
A 8. Employment Bureau.	A 27. Library.
A 9. Hotel.	A 28. Club.
A 10. Restaurant.	A 29. Political Headquarters.
A 11. Café.	A 30. Police Station.
A 12. Saloon.	A 31. Court or Prison.
A 13. Concert Hall.	A 32. Fire Engine House.
A 14. Theatre.	A 33. Professional Office.
A 15. Assembly Hall.	A 34. Private House.
A 16. Social Settlement.	A 35. Apartment House.
A 17. Church.	A 36. Tenement.
A 18. Parish House.	
A 19. Parsonage or Rectory.	

Other columns may be added for objects found in the investigation, and not here named.

Under each column enter the street number of the object named at the head of the column.

TABLE IV. — FARMS

A 1. Area in Acres.	A 4. Value of Farm Buildings.
A 2. Value of Land.	Y 5. Approved Sanitary Arrangements?
A 3. Value of House.	

TABLE V. — DETACHED DWELLINGS.

A 1. Area of Land in Acres.	A 3. Value of House.
A 2. Value of Land.	Y 4. Approved Sanitary Arrangements?

TABLE VI. — CITY HOUSES

A 1. Value.	Y 2. Approved Sanitary Arrangements?
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TABLE VII. — APARTMENTS, FLATS, TENEMENTS

A 1. What Floor from Ground.	Y 5. Approved Safeguards against Fire?
A 2. Floor Area.	
A 3. Number of Rooms.	Y 6. Approved Provision for Light and Air?
Y 4. Approved Fire Resistance Construction?	Y 7. Approved Sanitary Arrangements?

Primary and Secondary Sources of Subsistence

The strictly primitive means of subsistence are edible fruits, grains, nuts, roots, fish, and game in their natural state.

Human beings unacquainted with the arts of agriculture and manufacture can live only where these strictly natural food supplies can be obtained. In civilized communities they frequently are a not unimportant item in the subsistence of the rural poor. Secondary means are annual crops produced by a more or less systematic agriculture, artificial stores of food, and annual importations of food from other regions. To these must be added the power of importation enjoyed by communities that produce other commodities which can be exchanged for food.

For information upon the subsistence resources of the United States consult the Reports of the Department of Agriculture, of the Bureau of Commerce and Navigation, and of the Federal Census.

TABLE VIII. — NATURAL FOOD SUPPLIES, ABUNDANT

Y 1. Fruits?	Y 5. Shell-fish?
Y 2. Nuts?	Y 6. Fish?
Y 3. Grains?	Y 7. Game?
Y 4. Roots?	

Adjectives like "abundant" must always be referred to some concrete standard. For the purpose of this table interpret the word "abundant" to mean approximately the abundance of natural products in the most productive regions of the United States at the time of settlement by whites, as described by the

earliest writers. In like manner the opposite of abundance may approximately be measured by the scant production of regions like the Arid Belt before irrigation.

TABLE IX. — ANNUAL CROPS, VALUE

A 1. Fruits.	A 5. Shell-fish and Fish.
A 2. Nuts.	A 6. Meats.
A 3. Grains.	A 7. Dairy Products.
A 4. Roots.	A 8. Eggs.

In this table, if desired, substitute for values figures of quantity, as pounds or bushels.

TABLE X. — OTHER SECONDARY SOURCES, VALUE

A 1. Artificial Stores of Food.	A 3. Power of Importation.
A 2. Annual Importations of Food.	

In this table, if desired, substitute for values figures of quantity.

CHAPTER II

AGGREGATION

The Fact of Aggregation

BECAUSE some regions and some minor areas are better adapted than others to maintain a population, population everywhere shows a tendency to gather about certain points or centres. This phenomenon of the physical concentration of population we may call Aggregation.

The Inhabiting Species

Aggregation is seen not only in the distribution of human life, but also in the distribution of vegetal and animal species.

It is, in fact, the extent of vegetal and animal aggregation that largely determines the extent of human aggregation. Human aggregation within historical periods has greatly been affected by prehistoric aggregations, and further, to a great extent, the aggregation of civilized men has been affected by the aggregations of barbarians and savages. A complete inductive study of aggregation, therefore, must include observations of aggregation in all the inhabiting species of the region under examination and in all the stages of human culture.

For information on the distribution of inhabiting species in the United States, consult Reports of the Department of Agriculture, of the Smithsonian Institution, and of the Bureau of Ethnology; Memoirs of the American Museum of Natural History, and of the Peabody Museum; the Federal Census, and the census reports of the various states.

TABLE XI.—VEGETAL LIFE

Y 1. Number of Species, Great? Y 2. Total Abundance, Great?

Interpret the word "great" according to instructions for the word "abundant" under Table VIII.

TABLE XII.—ANIMAL LIFE

Columns as in Table XI.

TABLE XIII.—HUMAN LIFE

Y 1. Prehistoric Inhabitants, Numerous?	Y 3. Barbarians surviving, Any?
Y 2. Savages surviving, Any?	A 4. Civilized, Number.

Interpret the word "numerous" to mean numerous as compared with the prehistoric inhabitants of those regions that seem to have been most densely populated, as the St. Lawrence valley and the Mohawk valley in the East, or the Colorado valley in the Southwest.

Density

The measure of human aggregation at any given time and place is density of population. Density is statistically expressed as the total number of human inhabitants dwelling within a given area; or, as the number per square mile, so dwelling; or, sometimes, in cities, as the number per acre, so dwelling.

TABLE XIV.—DEGREE OF DENSITY

- A 1. Total Human Inhabitants.
- A 2. Human Inhabitants per Square Mile.

For information on the density of population in the United States consult Federal and State Census Reports.

Multiplication

Density is determined in part, but only in part, by the natural multiplication of human beings.

Multiplication is statistically ascertained by comparisons of total births with total deaths for a given period, or by comparisons of birth rates with death rates.

A birth rate is the number of births annually per one thousand of the population.

A refined birth rate is the number of births annually per one thousand married women between the age limits of fifteen and fifty years.

A death rate is the number of deaths annually per one thousand of the population.

TABLE XV.—RATES OF MULTIPLICATION

A 1. Total Annual Births.	A 3. Total Annual Deaths.
A 2. Birth Rates.	A 4. Death Rates.

See Mayo-Smith's "Statistics and Sociology," Book I, Chapters v and vii. For statistics of births and deaths in the United States consult Federal and State Census Reports, Reports of State Boards of Health, and Reports of City Bureaus of Vital Statistics.

Genetic Aggregation

Everyday observation shows us that there are two ways in which populations increase. One is by the birth of new individuals, the other is by immigration from populations dwelling in other parts of the world. The first way, if birth rates exceed death rates, increases the total population of the world. The second method merely redistributes it, increasing some populations at the expense of others.

A population reproduced by its birth rate irrespective of immigration may be called a Genetic Aggregation. More strictly defined, a genetic aggregation is a group of kindred individuals that have lived together in one locality from their birth.

The smallest genetic aggregation is merely a natural family composed of parents and their children of the first generation. A larger genetic group is an aggregation of two or three generations of descendants of a single pair. On a scale yet larger and more complex, the genetic group is an aggregation of families that may have been related or not at some former time, but that are now undoubtedly of one blood through marrying in and in.

Assuming that a population receives no accessions by immigration and loses none by emigration, its total number at the end of any given period must of course equal

its number at the beginning of the period plus the total excess of births over deaths for the entire period. In English-speaking populations the average duration of human life is forty-one years. If, then, we suppose a population to be increased by births but not by immigration for forty-one years, it will normally at the end of that time be a pure genetic aggregation, because, in the average case, the forty-one-year period suffices for the elimination of any inhabitants living in the community from the beginning of the period who may have come into the community by immigration instead of by birth. The few individuals of this description that, in particular instances, survive from an earlier period, are a negligible quantity for purposes of statistical comparison.

Therefore, the maximum or greatest possible genetic aggregation of any community (village, city, county, state) equals the population of the community at the beginning of a forty-one-year period plus the total excess of births over deaths in that community for forty-one years. This number may be called the Potential Genetic Aggregation of the community.

The potential genetic aggregation is always in fact greater than the actual genetic aggregation because some individuals born within the forty-one-year period and counted in the excess of births over deaths have moved out of the community; and other individuals, born within the forty-one-year period and counted in the excess of births over deaths, are descended from immigrants who have intermarried with immigrants rather than with the original stock.

Much larger also than the true genetic aggregation is, usually, the number of the "native born." This term as used in American statistical publications means born within the United States. The statistical quantity, "the native born of native parents," approximately equals the total genetic aggregation in the entire population of the United States. But in any subdivision of the United States, for example, the city of New York, the native born there enumerated have not all been born within the city itself.

TABLE XVI.—MEASURE OF GENETIC AGGREGATION

A 1. Potential: Population of the Community at Beginning of Forty-one-year Period plus Total Excess of Births over Deaths for Forty-one Years.

A 2. The Native Born.

A 3. The Native Born of Native Parents.

Data for the study of genetic aggregation in the United States are obtained from the same sources of information that were mentioned under Multiplication.

Migration

Aggregation and the degree of density are continually changing, not only because of births and deaths, but also in consequence of migration.

Migration is statistically expressed in figures of emigration,—a movement of inhabitants out of a given community—or of immigration—a movement of inhabitants into a given community.

TABLE XVII.—EMIGRATION

A 1. To Other Enumeration Units. A 2. To Foreign Lands.

TABLE XVIII.—IMMIGRATION

A 1. From Other Enumeration Units. A 2. From Foreign Lands.

Statistics of immigration into the United States are found in the Reports of the Bureau of Immigration of the Treasury Department, and in the Federal Census. Imperfect statistics of interstate migration are found in the Federal and State Census Reports; and the latter occasionally give imperfect statistics of intercounty or intertownship migration.

Congregation

The growth of a population by immigration is a process of Congregation, and it may be called by that name to distinguish it from genetic aggregation. It is a gathering in one place or area of individuals from many other places or even from remote parts of the world, who are attracted by the resources or other opportunities of a new home.

If the potential genetic aggregation of any community be subtracted from the total population of the community, the remainder is certainly attributable to congregation. It is, however, less than the true or actual congregation, because potential exceeds true genetic aggregation. The imperfect arithmetical expression for congregation so obtained may be called the Minimum Congregation.

Much less also than the true congregation is, usually, the number of the "foreign born." This term, as used in American statistical publications, means those inhabitants of the United States who were born in other countries. The total number of the foreign born plus the native born of foreign parents is approximately equal to the total congregation in the entire population of the United States. But in any particular subdivision of the United States the congregation includes, in addition to the foreign born, inhabitants born in other parts of the country.

TABLE XIX.—MEASURE OF CONGREGATION

A 1. Minimum Congregation: Excess of Actual Population over Potential Genetic Aggregation.

A 2. The Foreign Born.

A 3. The Native Born of Foreign Parents.

Causes of Aggregation

The proximate causes of aggregation in any place are found in the normal fecundity of the native population, which gives an excess of births over deaths, and in the life opportunities which attract immigration.

TABLE XX.—PROXIMATE CAUSES OF AGGREGATION

M 1. Fecundity: Excess of Births over Deaths: Proportion of Aggregate directly attributable to.

M 2. Life Opportunities: Proportion of Aggregate directly attributable to.

M (1). Agricultural Fertility.	M (4). Commercial Opportunities.
M (2). Fisheries.	M (5). Manufacturing Opportunities.
M (3). Mineral Wealth.	

CHAPTER III

DEMOTIC COMPOSITION

Variation and Mixture

GENETIC aggregation is complicated by variation, which is a mark of all organic evolution. For this reason, and also because genetic aggregation is practically never the only way in which a population grows, a population is always a mixture and composition of elements that are more or less unlike.

This proposition is not in contradiction of the statement previously made, that a social population is composed of individuals in many respects alike. Likeness and unlikeness are facts of degree. Moreover, individuals may be alike in some respects and unlike in others. Some of the resemblances and differences that may be observed in a population are physical, others are mental and moral.

The physical differences that may be observed in every population are the following, namely: (1) Organic Variation, (2) Differences of Age, (3) the Difference of Sex, and (4) the Degrees of Kinship.

In all great modern populations the degrees of kinship include differences of nationality, and often differences of colour. This is especially true of the people of the United States.

The intermingling of elements unlike in organic constitution, in age, and in sex, and of elements bred of different parent stocks and having therefore unlike qualities and habits, may be called the Demotic Composition.

The word "demotic" means pertaining to the *demos*, the Greek word for people. The demotic composition, therefore, is the admixture of various elements, of organic nature, age, sex, and kinship, in a people or population.

Organic Variation

No two individuals are born with equal endowments of strength and vitality. No two attain the same weight and stature. No two have the same suppleness of body, the same amount of energy, or the same desire for physical activity. These differences, not to mention differences of mental and moral endowment to be considered later on, are the basis of many groupings and stratifications of men in the industrial, military, and political activities of society.

TABLE XXI. — AMOUNT OF ORGANIC VARIATION

Y 1. Frequent Occurrence?

Y 2. Wide Range?

"Frequent" and "wide" are terms of relative meaning, and must be referred by the investigator to some concrete standard, cf. Tables VIII, XI, and XIII.

Age

The familiar distinctions of age in a social population are those designated by the terms "infancy," "childhood," "youth," "maturity" or "adult manhood," and "old age." These roughly correspond to the periods from birth to five years, five to fifteen years, fifteen to twenty-one years, twenty-one to sixty years, sixty years and over.

These periods are the basis of many social distinctions and of practical groupings for purposes of coöperation. They respectively correspond to the years of education, of industrial and political activity, and of retirement from active life. If the six periods are reduced to three by combining the first three into one, they roughly correspond to the three generations commonly found in the family group.

In statistical descriptions of population, for example, in the Federal Census of the United States, the classification by age periods is minutely carried out. The number of infants under one year of age is ascertained, the number of children under five, and then the number of individuals in each five-year period up to one hundred years of age.

Sex

Next to the more striking differences of age, those, namely, between childhood and manhood, or between maturity and old age, the most important difference is that of sex.

Statistics of population show in all communities an approximate balance of the sexes, but seldom equal numbers of males and females. In one region males predominate, in another females. This difference is partly due to the greater migration of men into relatively new and undeveloped regions, but it is also partly due to differences of male and female birth rates, the causes of which are not yet perfectly understood.

All social phenomena admit of instructive comparisons based on the distinction of sex. Thus the different industrial occupations show varying proportions of men and women engaged therein. Educational and moral statistics, statistics of crime and pauperism, religious statistics, all show unequal distributions of men and women in respect of these matters.

TABLE XXII. — AGE AND SEX: MALES

- A 1. Under One Year. A 2. Over One Year and under Five.
A 3. Five Years to Nine.

Proceeding thus by five-year periods, add further columns up to the designation, one hundred years and over.

TABLE XXIII. — AGE AND SEX: FEMALES

- A 1. Under One Year. A 2. Over One Year and under Five.
A 3. Five Years to Nine.

Information on the distribution of population by age and sex in the United States is found in the Federal and State Census Reports.

Kinship

A third and more complex mode of physical difference and resemblance is that which we call kinship. This is the physical relationship that is based upon community of blood.

Everywhere in the world kinship and the mingling of non-kindred elements play an extremely important part in social affairs. Men of the same colour have common prejudices, men of the same nationality in a still stronger degree are drawn together, and in a degree yet stronger men of the same family lineage show sympathies and common prejudices that play a part in all the affairs of their everyday life.

There are nine degrees or subdivisions of kinship that may be observed in the total human population of the earth, and that have importance for social theory. No less than eight of these are commonly found in the population of each nation. The nine degrees are conveniently designated by the following names and symbols: (1) Consanguinity, K_1 ; (2) Propinquity, K_2 ; (3) Nationality, K_3 ; (4) Potential Nationality, K_4 ; (5) Ethnic Race, K_5 ; (6) Glottic Race, K_6 ; (7) Chromatic Race, K_7 ; (8) Cephalic Race, K_8 ; (9) Humanity, K_9 .¹

Consanguinity.—Consanguinity is that narrowest degree of kinship which includes those who are most nearly related, as father, mother, and children, brother and sister, grandparents and grandchildren, uncles and aunts, nephews, nieces, and cousins.

TABLE XXIV.—DISTRIBUTION OF CONSANGUINITY

- A 1. To how Many Other Enumeration Units related.
2. To what Other Enumeration Units related. (Make out list of names.)

¹ This analysis of kinship and a proposition to give definiteness of meaning to the term "race" was first presented in a paper by the author read at a meeting of the Section on Anthropology and Psychology of the New York Academy of Sciences on March 25, 1901, and published in *Science*, New Series, Vol. XIII, No. 330, April 26, 1901, pp. 662, 663.

Propinquity.—Propinquity is a kinship one degree more remote than consanguinity german.

In the primary meaning of the word, "propinquity" is nearness in place, proximity, a living together in the same neighbourhood or local region. A secondary meaning is nearness of blood. The word is thus perfectly descriptive of the sociological fact with which we are here concerned. Propinquity of residence always has among its consequences numerous intermarriages of those who dwell together in one neighbourhood; and, in the course of generations, families so placed become interrelated in blood. The community becomes one of more or less distant consanguini.

TABLE XXV.—DISTRIBUTION OF PROPINQUITY

- A 1. To how Many Other Enumeration Units adjacent.
 2. To what Other Enumeration Units adjacent and connected by Intermarriage. (Make out list of names.)

Nationality.—Nationality is the degree of kinship which includes all those who from birth have been of the same speech and political association.

Examples are all Englishmen born and brought up under the government of England, all Frenchmen born and brought up under the government of France, all Germans born and brought up under the government of Germany, all Italians born and brought up under the government of Italy, all Americans born and brought up under the government of the United States.

TABLE XXVI.—DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONALITY

A 1. English.	A 5. Austrian.	A 9. Russian.
A 2. Scotch.	A 6. Norwegian.	A 10. French.
A 3. Irish.	A 7. Swedish.	A 11. Spanish.
A 4. German.	A 8. Italian.	A 12. Dutch.

Add columns for other nationalities for which data are given by the Federal Census.

Potential Nationality.—This is the remote relationship, which exists while nationality is still in the making, of those who dwell together in the same nation or state and will presently speak the same language.

For example, here in the United States we have in our population elements which the census distinguishes as the native born of native parents, the native born of foreign parents, and the foreign born. We call all these elements American citizens, but they are not yet all fused in a common nationality. The native born are more or less closely related by intermarriages for generations. In time their descendants, the descendants of the native born of foreign parents, and descendants of the foreign born, will have intermarried, and the American people will constitute a true nationality. These three elements, then, the native born of native parents, the native born of foreign parents, and the foreign born, stand in that degree of relationship which may be called potential nationality.

TABLE XXVII.—DISTRIBUTION OF POTENTIAL NATIONALITY

A 1. Native Born of Native Parents.	A 2. Native Born of Foreign Parents.
A 3. Foreign Born.	

Ethnic Race.—The ethnic race is that degree of kinship which includes all of those nearly related nationalities which speak closely-related languages, and exhibit common psychological characteristics distinguishing them collectively from other similar great divisions of mankind.

Thus we recognize the Irish, the Welsh, the non-Saxon Scotch, and a portion of the population of Brittany as belonging to the Celtic race. These different nationalities speak different but closely related languages, and, although for generations they have been under different political influences, they manifest common traits of mind and of character, which distinguish the Celt the world over from the Teuton and from the Latin. In like manner, the Saxon-English, the Dutch, the Germans, and the Scandinavians are related nationalities, all belonging to the Teutonic ethnic race, which has marked psychological characteristics, and which once had one common language.

The ethnic race is one of four degrees of kinship, each of which is designated in current works on anthropology, ethnology, and philology by the term "race," which, therefore, has come to have an exceedingly uncertain meaning. Thus we are familiar with such terms as the "white race," the "dolichocephalic race," and the

"brachycephalic race," all of which mark physical distinctions; with such terms as the "Semitic race," and the "Aryan race," both of which refer to glottic rather than to anatomical characteristics; and with such terms as the "Græco-Latin," the "Teutonic," and the "Celtic" races, which mean not only differences of language within the great Aryan group, but also great psychological differences that are even more pronounced than the lingual. The only way to escape from the confusion is to adopt compound terms, in which the word "race," combined with a descriptive adjective, shall in each case have a precise meaning. That plan is here adopted.

TABLE XXVIII. — DISTRIBUTION OF ETHNIC RACE

A 1. Teutonic.	A 3. Celto-Latin.	A 6. Semitic.
A 2. Celtic.	A 4. Ibero-Latin.	A 7. All others.
	A 5. Slavonic.	

To ascertain the number of persons of any ethnic race in the population find the sum of the numbers of the nationalities composing the ethnic race. For example, for the Celtic ethnic race add the Irish, the Scotch, and the Welsh. The Celto-Latins include the French, the Belgians, and the French Canadians. The Ibero-Latins include the Italians, the Spaniards, and the Spanish-speaking peoples of America. For full information upon ethnic distinctions among the European peoples, consult Ripley, "The Races of Europe."

Glottic Race. — The glottic race is a yet broader kinship, which includes all those related ethnic races or parts of ethnic races which once at some remote period had a common culture and spoke the same language.

Philologists tell us that the Teutons, the Celts, the Latins, and the Greeks, the Slavs, some of the people of Persia, and some of the people of India, speak languages that sprang from a common Aryan tongue. And while we cannot argue that relationship in speech means an equal degree of relationship in blood, — because, over and over in history, peoples most remotely related have, through conquest or migration, come to speak the same tongue, — yet even in such cases there is presently much intermarriage. Consequently we may be sure that people speaking languages of common origin are in a remote degree related in blood.

TABLE XXIX. — DISTRIBUTION OF GLOTTIC RACE

A 1. Aryan.	A 2. Non-Aryan.
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Chromatic Race.—Chromatic race is that remote degree of relationship which includes all glottic races of the same general colour of the skin and type of hair.

Thus, for example, the white chromatic race includes such glottic races as the Semitic, which has long lived to the southeast of the Mediterranean Sea, the Hamitic (sometimes called the Afro-Semitic) of ancient Egypt and Phœnicia, and the Aryan of Europe.

Other chromatic races are the black of Africa, the yellow of Asia, the red of America, and the brown of Oceanica.

TABLE XXX. — DISTRIBUTION OF CHROMATIC RACE

A 1. White.	A 3. Red.	A 4. Brown.
A 2. Yellow.		A 5. Black.

The respective numbers of all these chromatic races in the population of the United States can be ascertained from the Federal Census, which gives total whites, total blacks, Chinese and Japanese (yellow race), American Indians (red race), Hawaiians, Samoans, and Filipinos (brown race).

Cephalic Race.—This is a yet more remote kinship, which is manifested in peculiarities of cranial structure.

Some men are long-headed and others round-headed. The distance through the head from the forehead to the back of the skull is called the longitudinal diameter. The distance through from side to side, over the ears, is called the transverse diameter. The decimally expressed ratio of the transverse to the longitudinal diameter is called the cephalic index.

A broad head, called brachycephalic, is one with a cephalic index of eighty-one or more. The long head—index less than seventy-nine—is called dolichocephalic. An intermediate type is called mezzocephalic; but a better usage is to distinguish two intermediate types, designating one of them sub-dolichocephalic (less long-headed than the longest-headed types), and the other sub-brachycephalic (less broad-headed than the broadest-headed types).

In the population of Asia the broad head predominates; in the population of Africa the long head predominates. It is possible that there were originally but two races of mankind: one uniting a certain head form with a certain pigmentation of the skin, the other uniting a different head form with another pigmentation of the skin; and that from innumerable crossings of these types all the cephalic, chromatic, glottic, and ethnic distinctions now existing were produced.¹

The white population of Europe is, on the whole, mezzocephalic, as compared with the African black and the Asiatic yellow; but in the population of Europe, nevertheless, anthropologists distinguish three cephalic races, namely, the Baltic (*Homo-Europæus*), the Alpine (*Homo-Alpinus*), and the Mediterranean race. The Baltic race is characterized by a head long rather than broad, tall stature, light hair and complexion, and blue eyes. It is familiarly known as the Scandinavian or Germanic type. The Alpine race is shorter in stature, its head is broad rather than long, and its complexion is relatively dark. It is familiarly known as the upland French or Swiss type. The Mediterranean race is relatively short in stature, its head is long rather than broad, its complexion is very dark, and its hair and eyes are black. It is variously known as the "Neapolitan," "Sicilian," or "Iberian" type.

TABLE XXXI.—DISTRIBUTION OF CEPHALIC RACE

- | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| A 1. Dolichocephalic. | A 3. Sub-brachycephalic. |
| A 2. Sub-dolichocephalic. | A 4. Brachycephalic. |

At present we have no such mass of data concerning the distribution of cephalic races in the United States as that which has been accumulated relative to the cephalic races of Europe, where measurements of the population are made for military purposes. Numerous measurements, however, of school children have been made in this country. Consult the anthropometric writings of Professor Franz Boas.

Humanity.—This is that widest relationship, which comprehends mankind of all races—the human species.

¹ Cf. "The Principles of Sociology," Book III, Chapter ii.

CHAPTER IV

DEMOTIC UNITY

Prevailing Likeness

WE now return to the assertion that, notwithstanding the many unlikenesses in a social population, to which attention has been given, a population is on the whole characterized by the likeness rather than by the unlikeness of its elements.

The differences of age and of sex are, of course, radical and persistent. All other physical differences tend to disappear.

Amalgamation

Amalgamation is the physical blending of different physical types through intermarriage.

The amalgamation of chromatic races results in half-breed or mulatto types. Intense prejudices against such amalgamation, however, commonly prevent the perfect fusion of different colour races. With cephalic, glottic, and ethnic races and nationalities, the case is altogether different. No hesitation is ever seen on the part of dolichocephalic blonds to marry brachycephalic brunettes. Teutonic, Celtic, and Iberic ethnic races have intermarried for generations. The amalgamation of nationalities in the United States is very little retarded by differences of language, which soon disappear. A more positive hindrance is interposed by differences of religious belief.

TABLE XXXII.—AMOUNT OF AMALGAMATION

A 1. Number of Nationalities represented in Existing Marriages of Mixed Nationality.

- A 2. Number of Ethnic Races represented in Existing Marriages of Mixed Nationality.
- A 3. Number of Glottic Races represented in Existing Marriages of Mixed Nationality.
- A 4. Number of Chromatic Races represented in Existing Marriages of Mixed Chromatic Race.
- A 5. Total Number of Marriages of Mixed Nationality
- A 6. Total Number of Marriages of Mixed Chromatic Race.
- A 7. Proportion of Mixed Marriages to whole Number of Marriages.

The Federal Census of the United States gives imperfect statistics of marriages of mixed nationality.

Autogeny

Besides amalgamation there is another process which creates and maintains unity in the population. Colonies, and new cities in the first or second generation of their existence, are occasionally exceptions. All other populations are perpetuated mainly by their birth rate rather than by immigration. For the purposes of sociology we may designate this fact by a technical term, and say that a population is normally Autogenous, that is, self-generating, self-perpetuating.

TABLE XXXIII. — DEGREE OF AUTOGENY

- A 1. Excess of Number of Individuals born and living in Enumeration Unit over Number living in same Unit, but born in other Enumeration Units.
- A 2. Excess of Number of Individuals living in Enumeration Unit and born in the Nation, over those living in Enumeration Unit, but born in Foreign Lands.

PART II

THE SOCIAL MIND

CHAPTER I

LIKE RESPONSE TO STIMULUS

Stimulation and Response

THE simplest psycho-physical process that takes place in the nervous system is the response of nervous matter to an external stimulus.

A stimulus is anything that excites the activity of nerve substance and especially of an organ of sense. Light is a stimulus to the nerves of the retina of the eye; sound waves are a stimulus to the auditory nerves of the ear.

Nature of Nervous Phenomena.—The stimulation of a sense organ is normally followed by a twofold result. One effect is sensation—the most elementary fact of consciousness. The other effect is a muscular movement called a “reflex.”

Thus, stimulation of the optic nerve is followed by sensations of light and of colour. Stimulation of the auditory nerve is followed by sensations of sound, of noise, or of tone. Optic stimulation causes not only sensations, but also contractions or dilations of the pupil of the eye. A sharp sound causes us to start.

In these pages the phrase “Response to Stimulus” will denote both sensation and reflex, and all their combinations and products.

All mental phenomena are built up of sensations and reflexes. Sensations are combined in those states of consciousness which we call perceptions, ideas, and thoughts. Reflexes are combined in all the modes of muscular activity. Sensations and reflexes are combined in emotion and in voluntary movements.

Modes of Activity. — The activities of mind and body, which together constitute the total response to stimulation, assume definite and practical modes, and concentrate themselves upon practical achievements.

They seize upon the facts of experience, and organize them into knowledge, preferences, and values. They seize upon objects of the external world and convert them to use. They adapt or accommodate the conscious individual himself to his situation. And, finally, they adapt or accommodate conscious individuals to one another.

1. *Appreciation.* — The first conscious business of life for every conscious individual is to get used to the world that he lives in. The process consists partly in acquiring knowledge. With the knowledge, however, is mixed a great deal of liking and disliking. With every act of learning some degree of preferential feeling is combined. In a rough way every person and every thing that is brought into the widening circle of acquaintance is valued, and is assigned a certain place in a scale of values. This mental process, in which knowledge, preference, and valuation are combined, may be called Appreciation.

It may not be that critical appreciation, which we look for in the artist, the poet, or the scientific man, but it is at least a rough, preliminary, practically useful appreciation, which serves as a mental guide for the purposes of everyday life.

Appreciation, then, is the mind's general grasp of the situation in which the individual finds himself, and it is the first great practical activity of life. It is the sum of his responses to stimulus, regarded as mental processes, and as constituting an attitude of mind toward its environment.

2. *Utilization.* — The individual not only tries to grasp his situation as a mental picture, but he tries also to make use of the objects about him. The second great practical business of life is the attempt to adapt the

external world to ourselves. The deliberate and systematic adaptation of the external world to ourselves we call Utilization.

This word is sometimes employed to denote an *unconscious* appropriation by any organism of things necessary or helpful; for example, the absorption of food elements by a growing plant. If such an extension be given to the word "utilization," we must, for the sake of clearness of thought, give a similar purely figurative extension to the word "appreciation"; for, back of all merely organic or unconscious utilization lies the unconscious process of selection, variously manifested in chemical affinities, and in organic attractions and repulsions. Hence, whether we use the words figuratively or strictly, the fact to be remembered is, that *on the same plane of existence* appreciation (figurative or real) is antecedent to utilization. Utilization on a lower plane of existence is, of course, antecedent to appreciation on a higher plane.

3. *Characterization*. — Attempts to utilize the environment—to adapt it to the purposes of the individual—are never perfectly successful, and to some extent it is necessary for the individual to accommodate himself to his surroundings. Accordingly, the third great practical business of life is the attempt to adapt ourselves to the external world.

The reaction of this attempt is seen chiefly in the moulding of character. In its entirety the process of adapting ourselves to the external world may be called Characterization.

4. *Socialization*. — The fourth great practical business of life is the attempt to adapt ourselves to one another.

The process of getting acquainted with one another, of establishing sympathies and friendships, of learning to enjoy association, and of discovering how to coöperate with one another in our work, we may call Socialization.

Socialization begins as early as appreciation, but we do not greatly occupy our minds with it, or enter upon a serious effort to

develop it, in the purpose to derive the utmost pleasure and profit from it, until after we have made some progress in appreciation, in utilization, and in characterization.

Like Response

All the modes of practical activity above defined are modes of response to stimulus, and all may be observed in the life of a single individual, who, however, is not uninfluenced by fellow-beings.

From time to time, however, we observe coexisting individuals who are so constituted that they *respond in like ways to the same stimulus*. Like response is the beginning of that practical and mental resemblance which ultimately makes society possible.

For example, if two or more children prefer a certain colour, as red or blue or yellow, to any other colour that is shown them, these children, reacting in the same way to the same stimulus, are to this extent mentally alike. If two or more men, when entering upon their life work, show a strong preference for the same occupation, they are to this extent mentally alike. If many men, upon hearing that some great disaster has overtaken the commercial world, are so filled with fear that they sell their stocks or other investments, these men are mentally and morally in a high degree alike. Or, finally, if hundreds or thousands of men are so affected by some great wrong as to hold public meetings, and carry on a prolonged agitation to do away with the evil that depresses them, these men are so far mentally and morally alike.

Non-simultaneous Like Response.—Like response is not necessarily simultaneous.

For example, in the psychological laboratory one person after another may be subjected to certain tests, and, when the results are examined, it may be found that the persons so examined fall into classes, on the basis of mental resemblances, and quite irrespective of the order in which the different individuals have appeared before the observer.

Simultaneous Like Response.—Like response, however, may be simultaneous.

Thus, while a class is listening to a lecture, if a book is dropped, or a door is suddenly opened, most of the pupils will visibly start. The response to stimulus is instant and simultaneous. If an explosion occurs in the street, hundreds of persons at the same instant are startled, and many of them simultaneously begin to move in the direction of the noise.

TABLE I. — LIKE RESPONSE

M 1. Response not Simultaneous. M 2. Response Simultaneous.

Innumerable historical studies of simultaneous like response to stimulus among the people of the United States may be made from trustworthy records. Conspicuous examples are the English colonization, the westward movements, and the enlistments in response to calls for volunteers in the Civil and Spanish Wars. To find documents, consult Channing and Hart's "Guide." Records of enlistment are found in the Reports of the Adjutant Generals.

Integration of Like Response

Like responsiveness to the same stimulus is discovered in different stages of development. It may be observed in simple forms, in forms that are somewhat complex, and yet again in forms that are complex in a high degree.

The word "integration" may be used to denote the combination of the mental activity of two or more individuals in one common activity or in producing a common product of their combined thought.

The integration, then, of the mental activity — that is, of the like responses to like stimuli — of two or more individuals, is of different degrees and of progressive stages.

Momentary Like Response. — The first stage is a mere initial like responsiveness, a mere first interest in any subject.

When two or more individuals receive similar sensations, or perceive the same object or event, and react upon it in like ways, without thought of one another, or any purpose of continued action, there is a simultaneous like response than which no simpler mode is known. Perhaps the most familiar example is the spontaneous

applause of an audience when a speaker unexpectedly touches the emotions of his hearers. This first interest, even if for the moment very strong, may not last.

Habitual Like Response. — A second stage in the integration of like response is that persistent repetition of a given mode of response to the same repeated stimulus which becomes a continuous activity or occupation, a habit, or a fixed manner.

Thus most of our forms of speech and of courtesy are habitual like ways of responding to the stimulus of personal meeting. The like is true of those continuous modes of activity which we call business qualities or traits of character.

Mental and Practical Resemblance. — Persistent or habitual modes of like response constitute the mental and practical resemblances which are the chief factors of social phenomena.

From the earliest times and in all parts of the world, human beings have classified one another according to their differing mental traits, their dispositions, and their characters.

1. *Types of Motor Reaction, Emotion and Intellect.* — As the processes and results of appreciation vary in different individuals, so appear different types of motor reaction, of emotion, and of intellect.

Some individuals are quick and some slow, some are continuously and some intermittently active, some are involuntary and some largely voluntary in movement, some are strongly and some weakly emotional, some believe as they feel, and some as they judge from evidence, some reason by guesswork and analogy, some by deduction without due attention to premises, and some by either deduction or induction, after a critical scrutiny of premises.

2. *Types of Disposition.* — According to the various ways in which men go about the activities of utilization we find among them different types of disposition.

Some individuals are aggressive. They directly and unhesitatingly attack the object or the person that they wish to utilize or to subdue. Other individuals are instigative; they incite their fellows to act, or perhaps they placate those already excited. A third sort of individuals are domineering; they assume superiority and authority, they command and direct. Finally, a fourth sort of individuals are in disposition creative; they are always ready to assume responsibility and risk, to adopt plans and to put them in operation, to carry on enterprises.

3. *Types of Character.*—According to the varying degrees and results of characterization we find among men varying types of character.

Some individuals are forceful, some are weakly self-indulgent in their convivial pleasures, some are self-denying and austere, and finally some, in a broad and rational spirit, are conscientious.

4. *Types of Mind.*—A type of disposition and of character is always combined with some type of motor reaction, of emotion, and of intellect. We find, therefore, in the social population types of mind.

In some individuals a forceful character, an aggressive disposition, intellect of low grade, and strong emotion are combined with a prompt and persistent motor activity. This type we shall call the Ideo-Motor. In other individuals a convivial character, an instigative disposition, an imaginative intellect, prone to reason from analogy, a weak but persistent and usually good-natured emotion, are combined with motor reactions that are usually intermittent and of less promptness than in the ideo-motor type. This type we shall call the Ideo-Emotional. In individuals of a third sort an austere character and a domineering disposition are combined with dogmatism of belief, strong emotion, and intermittent activity. This type may be named the Dogmatic-Emotional. In a fourth kind of individuals all the emotional and motor processes are dominated by a critical intellect, and even disposition and character are intellectually controlled. This type we may call the Critically-Intellectual.

The Consciousness of Kind.—The awareness of resemblances and differences by the resembling individuals

themselves is the third stage in the integration of like response.

Like response, whether momentary or habitual, may be caused independently of any influence exerted by the responding individuals upon one another through contact and acquaintance.

If, for example, quite independently of one another, two or more farmers take up land in a new country, and establish their homesteads many miles apart, where for a long time they continue to conduct their farming operations without social intercourse or coöperation, they will all, none the less, be in like manner affected by the change of seasons, the rains and the droughts, and by the gradual transformations of the region through cultivation. They will begin their farming operations at very nearly the same time in the spring, and harvest their crops at very nearly the same time in the fall. They will acquire like habits, determined by their similarity of situation and their like occupations. Yet their mental and practical resemblances may remain unperceived by the resembling individuals themselves.

As a rule, however, resembling individuals become acquainted, and through communication become aware of their resemblances and differences.

The awareness of resemblance may be little more than a feeling of sympathy, or it may become a clean-cut perception. It may include feelings of affection and a desire for recognition. In all its degrees, from sympathy to a clear perception of resemblances and differences, including every perception by the responding individuals themselves that they do respond in like ways to like stimuli, this awareness of resemblances and differences plays a large part in social groupings and activities. It will here be called by the general descriptive term, the *Consciousness of Kind*.

Concerted Volition. — The consciousness of kind in its higher developments, when, namely, it becomes perceived

like response to the same stimulus, passes through various emotional and intellectual developments into concerted action. This is the fourth stage in the integration of like response.

The Social Mind

The phenomena thus far described, when looked at in their entirety, are seen to be facts of mind, but not merely facts of any one individual mind taken by itself.

Two or more minds respond in like ways to the same stimulus. They become increasingly alike in their preferences, their thoughts and emotions, their practical activities, and their moral character. Such individuals usually discover their mental and moral resemblances, think about them, take pleasure in them, and turn them to good account in many useful ways. And, sooner or later, knowing their agreement, they participate in concerted activity.

To the group of facts thus described we give the name, the Social Mind.

This name does not denote any other consciousness than that of individual minds. Like the familiar terms, the "moral sense of the community," "public opinion," and "the public will," it means only that individual minds act simultaneously in like ways, and continuously influence one another; and that certain mental products and practical consequences result from such combined mental action, which could not result from the thinking of an individual who had no communication with his fellow-beings.

Modes of the Social Mind. — The four stages of integration of like response to stimulus that have been described may otherwise be viewed and described as four modes of the social mind. These accordingly are: —

1. *Social Stimulation and Response.* — The same stimulus must act upon a plurality of individual minds, and they must respond in like ways, before the social mind in even its simplest manifestation can be said to exist.

And just as in the individual mind the most complex processes are built up out of the simple elements of stimulation, sensation, and reflex, so also are the most complex processes of the social mind products of like stimulation and like response.

2. *Mental and Moral Differentiation.* — When the responses of two or more individuals to the same stimulation are habitually alike, and the responses of two or more other individuals to the same stimulation are also habitually alike, but the responses of the one group are nevertheless different from the responses of the other group, we have the types of intellect, or of disposition, or of character, that have already been described.

The social population accordingly is differentiated into sections that respond on the whole impulsively, or emotionally, with persistent faith, or with critical intelligence, all to the same stimulation; just as the cerebral cortex is differentiated into tracts, which, to the same stimulation, respond in ideo-motor activity, in emotion, in dogmatic belief, and in critical intellection.

3. *Social Consciousness.* — The consciousness of kind — the awareness of resemblances and of differences — is, in so far as we have any means of knowing, the only social consciousness. This awareness must, however, be considered as a real social consciousness. It is even at times a social self-consciousness.

As the individual may become conscious of his sensations, or of his thoughts, and may even think about them in the most systematic way, so may any number of individuals become aware, not only of the fact that they are responding in like ways to the same stimulus, and that in general they are mentally and morally alike, but also that at the same given moment they are thinking the same particular thoughts, and sharing the same specific feelings; and these facts may be made the subject of conversation, and even of formal discussion.

4. *Social Force and Control.*—Concerted volition reacts with controlling power upon the individuals participating in it, and even at times upon other individuals that have taken no part in its evolution. This phenomenon is strictly analogous to the reaction of volition in the individual mind upon sensation, emotion, and thought.

Merely as facts of consciousness, sensation, emotion, and thought, whether existing at a given moment in one individual mind, or in many minds, cannot be thought of or argued about in terms of our physical conceptions of energy or force. Associated with these facts of consciousness, however, are, as we know, facts of nervous activity and muscular movement. Therefore, it is legitimate to speak of mental energy, or of the force of an individual mind, meaning thereby the transformations of energy and the physical changes in the external world that are brought about through those activities of the nervous mechanism that are associated with sensation, emotion, and thought.

In this sense the mind is a force, and the social mind in all its phases or modes is a social force, by which is meant a force that originates in society or in social conditions, and reacts upon society or upon its individual members.

In any stage of its development, then, the social mind, whether it be merely the simultaneous like responsiveness of two or more individuals to the same momentary stimulus, or whether it be a highly developed social consciousness manifesting itself in a concerted activity that has been deliberately planned, if it is more than mere reflection, is a power superior to any individual force.

The social mind in its active or energetic manifestation is often spoken of as the Social Will.

The active manifestation of the social mind may or may not be consciously intended. On the one hand, individuals without any plan or intent in the matter may simultaneously act in the same ways, and such action may be a compelling social force of tremendous power. On the other hand, the display of energy may be deliberately planned or intended. In other words, a social force may be an intended social force.

Definition of the Social Mind.—Having regard to all of these modes of the social mind, namely, stimulation

and response, mental and moral differentiation, social consciousness, and social control, the social mind may be defined as follows: The social mind is the like responsiveness to stimulation, the sympathy and concurrent intelligence, the consciousness of kind, and the concerted volition of two or more individuals.

CHAPTER II

MENTAL AND PRACTICAL RESEMBLANCE

Socializing Forces

THE detailed study of mental and practical resemblance can be carried on only through the recording and tabulating of large numbers of observations of appreciation and types of mind, of utilization and types of disposition, of characterization and types of character.

Incidentally, such a study will disclose the origin of the forces that create society, and which, therefore, may be called socializing forces.

The term "social forces," which was defined in the preceding chapter, is often inaccurately used. In accordance with the definition given it should be employed only to denote processes of concerted volition, which can arise only when society already exists. In other words, the socializing forces create society; the social forces are created by society, and then react upon society.

Appreciation

Starting from that very general account of appreciation and its definition which were presented in the preceding chapter, it is important to observe the degrees of appreciation, its motives, and its methods.

Appreciation, like characterization, is an accommodation of the mind to its environment, but while in characterization the accommodation is consciously effected, the accommodation of appreciation is for the most part an unconscious process.

Degrees of Appreciation. — The degree of appreciation depends upon the range of experience.

Fortunately there is a simple and accurate means of measuring the range of individual experience, and therefore of measuring the degree of appreciation.

The range of experience depends upon the development of the demotic composition. An individual's experience is narrow or wide, according as his contact has been with the narrow degrees of kinship only, or has extended to the wider ones. If he is acquainted only with those consanguini who constitute his immediate relatives, he knows little of the world or of mankind. If his travels have brought him in contact with men of every tongue and of every colour race, he has picked up information of the most varied kinds, and has formed decided preferences and valuations touching the greatest number of human interests.

The range of experience, then, as limited by contact with men within the successive and broadening degrees of kinship, may be taken as a measure of the degree of appreciation. Using this measure, we may distinguish four degrees of appreciation, namely:—

1. *Lowest.* — This is the only degree of appreciation that can be developed by an experience which has been limited by consanguinity.

Examples are afforded by endogamous savage hordes, and by the lowest endogenous groups of ignorant persons in civil populations.

2. *Low.* — This is the highest degree of appreciation that can be developed by an experience which has been limited by propinquity.

Examples are afforded by exogamous savage hordes, and by small exogenous groups in civil populations.

3. *High.* — This is the highest degree of appreciation that can be developed by an experience limited by tribal or national dialect.

Examples are afforded by single tribes of barbarians, and, in civil populations, by distinct nationalities speaking only their native tongues.

4. *Highest*.—This is the degree of appreciation that can be developed only by an experience as wide as that which is made possible by tribal federation, or which has no limits short of acquaintance with ethnic race.

Examples are afforded by tribal federations, ethnic nations, and civic nations. An interesting historical example is found in the phrase, "a decent regard for the opinions of mankind," in the American Declaration of Independence, and another in Article IV of the Articles of Confederation.

TABLE II.—DEGREES OF APPRECIATION

M 1. Lowest. M 2. Low. M 3. High. M 4. Highest.

The sources of information are Federal and State Census Reports, ethnological materials as named in Part I, records made by individual observers, and special testimony.

Motives of Appreciation.—All the conscious activities of mankind, the internal activities of thought and feeling, no less than the external activities of practical conduct, spring from certain internal motives, such as sensations, passions, appetites, desires of various kinds, and ideas. In the motives of action most of the causes of social change are ultimately to be found.

The original causes of appreciation are the external stimuli from which sensations and muscular reactions result. Sensations, however, are pleasant or unpleasant, and the more complex mental products that are built up of sensations are often in a stronger degree agreeable or disagreeable, pleasurable or painful. When the mind has had experiences of the pleasant and the unpleasant, the pleasurable and the painful, it begins consciously to react upon its own processes and upon the activity of the entire bodily organism, endeavouring to get as much as possible of pleasurable sensation, emotion, and thought, and to avoid as far as possible the painful. Thus, as the mind consciously and deliberately extends its appreciation, it does so from causes that must be described as *motives*, rather than as mere stimuli. These motives may be grouped in four classes, according to the degree of complexity of the mental processes of which they are constituted.

1. *Pleasures of Physical Activity, Receptive Sensation, and Simple Ideation.* — These are the earliest and simplest motives of appreciation.

The child delights in active bodily exercise, and so in a less degree does the healthy adult. The child is continually moved to experiment with external objects, because of the pleasures of sensation which they afford him; and throughout life, light, colour, musical tones, soft and delicate surfaces, give us pleasure through the sensory organs of sight, hearing, and pressure. Combined with pleasures of immediate sensation are the pleasures afforded by simple ideas.

2. *Pleasures of Sense, Idea, and Emotion.* — These are motives of appreciation one degree more complex than the foregoing.

The reaction of the nervous system to stimulus is not always completed in a discharge of energy through the muscular system. The released energy is often expended in those internal disturbances which we know in consciousness as emotion. Some emotions, such as fear, grief, and remorse, are in a high degree painful, while others, as mirth, joy, and hope, are pleasurable. The pleasures of emotion are usually much intensified by combination with pleasures of sensation and simple idea. And certain types of men are easily distinguished as more easily moved by pleasures of sense and emotion than by pleasures of physical activity. They are emotional rather than motor types.

3. *Pleasures of Emotion and Belief.* — Motives of appreciation yet higher are found in those emotional pleasures that originate in fixed ideas or controlling beliefs, such as religious or political beliefs, rather than in sensation, or ideas of a simple sort.

Persons who hold their beliefs strongly, and care much about them, find endless satisfaction in them, and often take their chief pleasure in courses of conduct prompted by them.

4. *Pleasures of Thought.* — The highest motives of appreciation are the pleasures of thought, experienced by

minds that have acquired the habit of seeking knowledge and of putting judgments together into scientific or philosophical systems.

TABLE III. — MOTIVES OF APPRECIATION

- M 1. Pleasures of Physical Activity, Receptive Sensation, and Simple Ideation.
- M 2. Pleasures of Sense, Idea, and Emotion.
- M 3. Pleasures of Emotion and Belief.
- M 4. Pleasures of Thought.

Information must be obtained from records made by individual observers and from special testimony.

Methods of Appreciation. — The motives of appreciation work themselves out in actual appreciation through four chief methods, or, it might be more accurate to say, degrees of method.

1. *Instinctive Response to Stimulus.* — At first, appreciation in its method is nothing more than a merely instinctive response of the nervous mechanism to whatever stimulus it comes in contact with.

2. *Curious Inspection.* — But with the development of elementary thought-processes, and the rise of curiosity, we may observe a keen desire to know and to understand the surrounding world, which manifests itself in a merely curious inspection of everything novel.

This is characteristic of children, of uncivilized people, and of people who have lived in local isolation, whenever they are brought into contact with new objects or with strangers.

3. *Preferential Attention.* — As the intellectual processes become better organized, appreciation becomes more and more selective. Attention is fixed with marked preference upon certain objects, circumstances, or persons, to the relative neglect of others.

4. *Critical Inspection, Comparison, and Analysis.*—These are the perfected methods of appreciation, followed by highly developed minds: the methods of the artist, the critic, the scholar, and the investigator.

TABLE IV.—METHODS OF APPRECIATION

- | |
|---|
| M 1. Instinctive Response to Stimulus. |
| M 2. Curious Inspection. |
| M 3. Preferential Attention. |
| M 4. Critical Inspection, Comparison, and Analysis. |

Information must be obtained from records made by individual observers, and from special testimony.

Types of Motor Reaction, Emotion, and Intellect

Since appreciation is a complex of motor reactions, emotions, and intellectual states, its further study can best be undertaken if we first resolve it into these elements.

According as various degrees of mental development, various motives, and various methods are combined in heredity, and, according as these are recombined with degrees and with kinds of individual experience, appear Motor Types, Emotional Types, and Intellectual Types.¹

TABLE V.—MOTOR TYPES: PROMPTNESS OF REACTION

- | | |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| M 1. Prompt: R ₁ . | M 3. Slow: R ₃ . |
| M 2. Prompt: R ₂ . | M 4. Slow: R ₄ . |

TABLE VI.—MOTOR TYPES: CONTINUITY OF ACTION

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| M 1. Persistent: A ₁ . | M 3. Intermittent: A ₃ . |
| M 2. Persistent: A ₂ . | M 4. Intermittent: A ₄ . |

TABLE VII.—MOTOR TYPES: KIND OF MOVEMENT

- | | |
|--|---|
| M 1. Largely Involuntary: Instinctive. | M 3. Largely Voluntary: Co-efficient, Belief. |
| M 2. Semi-involuntary: Imitative, Sympathetic. | M 4. Largely Voluntary: Co-efficient, Judgment. |

¹ On the nature and statistical determination of types, see Karl Pearson, "The Grammar of Science," revised edition, Chapter x, § 5 sq. On the observational and experimental determination of psychological types, consult Scripture, "The New Psychology."

TABLE VIII. — EMOTIONAL TYPES: PARTICULAR EMOTIONS

M 1. Fear.	M 5. Moroseness.
M 2. Anger.	M 6. Joyousness.
M 3. Jealousy.	M 7. Cheerfulness.
M 4. Hatred.	

TABLE IX. — EMOTIONAL TYPES: DEGREE

M 1. Strong: E ₁ .	M 3. Weak: E ₃ .
M 2. Strong: E ₂ .	M 4. Weak: E ₄ .

TABLE X. — EMOTIONAL TYPES: TEMPERAMENT

M 1. Choleric.	M 3. Melancholic.
M 2. Sanguine.	M 4. Phlegmatic.

TABLE XI. — INTELLECTIVE TYPES: PARTICULAR INTELLECTUAL STATES

M 1. Suspicion.	M 3. Scepticism.
M 2. Credulity.	M 4. Balanced Judgment.

TABLE XII. — INTELLECTIVE TYPES: FORMATION OF BELIEF OR JUDGMENT

M 1. Subjectively Determined: By Instinct, Habit, and Auto-suggestion.	M 3. Subjectively Determined: By Emotion, Mood, or Temperament.
M 2. Objectively Determined: By External Suggestion, Personal or Impersonal.	M 4. Objectively Determined: By Evidence.

TABLE XIII. — INTELLECTIVE TYPES: MODE OF REASONING

M 1. Conjectural.	M 4. Deductive and Inductive: Critical of both Prem- ises and Logic.
M 2. Analogical.	
M 3. Deductive: Speculative; may be Critical of Logi- cal Processes, rarely of Premises.	

Data for Tables V-XIII must be obtained from the records of psychological laboratories and by individual investigation.

Before the tables can be filled out for any large community, for example, the United States or any state, they must be filled out for each nationality and for the native born of different regions. This done, the tables can be made out by geographical areas according to the distribution of nationalities and native born.

Utilization

The detailed study of utilization as a mode of mental and practical resemblance should follow the same plan that has been adopted for the study of appreciation.

Degrees of Utilization.—Like the degrees of appreciation, the degrees of utilization are measured by that contact with near or remote degrees of kinship which determines the range of experience.

The lowest degree of utilization is that possible within the range of an experience limited by consanguinity. The low degree of utilization is that made possible by an experience limited in its range by propinquity. The high degree of utilization is that made possible by an experience limited only by tribal or national dialect. The highest degree of utilization is that made possible by an experience limited in its range by nothing narrower than ethnic race.

TABLE XIV.—DEGREES OF UTILIZATION

M 1. Lowest.

M 3. High.

M 2. Low.

M 4. Highest.

The sources of information are the same as for degrees of appreciation.

Motives of Utilization.—The motives which lead men to attempt to utilize their environment, and to adapt it to themselves, are certain organic demands, certain pleasures, and desires. They fall naturally into four classes, namely:

1. *Need*, or intolerance of pain, as seen, for example, in hunger, in thirst, or in cold.

2. *Appetite*, or craving for pleasure, as seen, for example, in the continuing enjoyment of savory foods and stimulating drinks after mere hunger and thirst have been appeased.

3. *The Sense of Power*, and the love of exercising power, as seen, for example, in the enjoyment of the hunter in taking game, of the ranchman in mastering his broncho, of the business man in conducting great commercial enterprises.

4. *Rational Desire*, or the craving of our entire intellectual and moral nature for the higher satisfactions, — of knowledge, of enjoyment of the beautiful, of friendship, and of the pleasures of hospitality and social intercourse.

These degrees of motive roughly correspond to the four degrees of appreciation and of utilization. The utilitarian motives of men whose experience is limited by consanguinity seldom rise much above the level of need. Only those whose experiences are of the widest range are greatly moved by rational desire in its higher developments.

TABLE XV. — MOTIVES OF UTILIZATION

M 1. Need (Intolerance of Pain).	M 3. Sense of Power (Love of Exercising Power).
M 2. Appetite (Craving for Pleasure).	M 4. Rational Desire.

Information must be obtained from records made by individual observers and from special testimony.

Methods of Utilization. — The motives of utilization work themselves out in actual utilization through four chief methods, namely, Attack, Instigation, Direction, Invention.

1. *Attack* includes the exertion of muscular force against any living or non-living object. It includes also the feelings and the ideas that are associated with such muscular efforts, and which range from a mere consciousness of strength to an active hatred of the object seized, if it resists or proves to be dangerous.

2. *Instigation* is the tempting, inducing, or urging other individuals to act, or to refrain from acting. It includes incitement, — the tempting or urging to act, — and placation, or the appeasing of those already excited.

3. *Direction* is the control and guidance of others. It includes *Impression*, which is the mental, as distinguished from the muscular power that one person has over another. Physically weak men, by sheer mental force, often awe

and control men who are physically strong. Direction includes also *Domination*, or the active assertion of authority.

4. *Invention* is any new combination of forces and things for a useful purpose.

As here used, the word means more than mechanical invention. In the psychological and sociological sense, inventions include all new combinations of ideas, acts, things, and forces. The plot of a novel is an invention. A successful act of legislation, a new device in military or naval strategy are inventions.

TABLE XVI.—METHODS OF UTILIZATION

M 1. Attack.	M 3. Direction (Impression and
M 2. Instigation (Incitement	Domination).
and Placation).	M 4. Invention.

Information must be obtained from records made by individual observers and from special testimony.

Types of Disposition

There are four great Types of Disposition which roughly correspond to the four degrees of utilization, to the four developments of motive, and to the four methods.

1. *The Aggressive*. — This disposition, with or without sufficient deliberation, unhesitatingly attacks any thing or difficulty that may be in the way. It more often sets examples than merely imitates them. It is apt to be capricious and spasmodic in action.

2. *The Instigative*. — This disposition is more often associated with appetite — the craving for pleasure — of one sort or another, as a dominant motive, than it is with mere need or with a sense of power. It is not much given to direct attack, and it rarely commands. It works through other men by suggestion, temptation, or persuasion.

3. *The Domineering.*—This is the disposition of individuals who have well developed powers of impression, and know it, and who love to exercise power. It asserts its authority over other men, it commands, superintends, and guides.

4. *The Creative.*—This is that highest disposition which is seen in those men who assume responsibility for new and complicated enterprises, who seize upon inventions, and bring together the ways and means of converting them from mere ideas into practical realities.

This disposition, as it is seen in the business world, is known to economists as that of the entrepreneur. As seen in the political world, it is the disposition of the responsible statesman, as distinguished from that of the mere political boss.

TABLE XVII. — TYPES OF DISPOSITION

M 1. Aggressive.

M 3. Domineering.

M 2. Instigative.

M 4. Creative.

Information must be obtained from records made by individual observers and from special testimony. The types of disposition are not distributed in masses as the types of intellect often are. Each type of disposition is likely to be found in even the smallest community.

Characterization

The detailed study of characterization as a mode of mental and practical resemblance, should follow the same plan that has been adopted for the study of appreciation and of utilization.

Degrees of Characterization. — Like the degrees of appreciation and of utilization, the degrees of characterization are measured by that contact with near or remote degrees of kinship which determines the range of experience.

The lowest degree of characterization is that possible within the range of an experience limited by consanguinity. The low degree of characterization is that made possible by an experience limited

in its range by propinquity. The high degree of characterization is that made possible by an experience limited only by tribal or national dialect. The highest degree of characterization is that made possible by an experience limited in its range by nothing narrower than ethnic race.

TABLE XVIII. — DEGREES OF CHARACTERIZATION

M 1. Lowest.

M 3. High.

M 2. Low.

M 4. Highest.

The sources of information are the same as for degrees of appreciation and degrees of utilization.

Motives of Characterization. — The motives of characterization are more difficult to describe than are the motives of appreciation and of utilization. The motives of characterization originate in vague desires, which spring from the needs of the entire bodily and mental self rather than from the need or activity of any particular organ.¹

1. *Neglected Desires.* — If a man were spending nearly all his time and effort in satisfying his hunger, many organs of his body, which did not happen to be called into play, would feel the need of exercise and would grow restive under restraint. The powers of his mind, too, would clamour for opportunity. This vague desire of the entire self for opportunity and activity is the primary form of the moral motive — the motive of characterization.

2. *New Desires.* — As it develops, this motive, under the influence of new experiences, assumes, sometimes, the form of new desires.

3. *Sense of Authority of Integral Desire.* — Further developing, the motive of characterization becomes a sense of the authority of integral desire — the authority, that is, of the desires of the organism in their entirety, as over against any particular desire.

¹ See "Democracy and Empire," Chapter ii, "The Ethical Motive."

4. *Sense of Proportion in Life.*—In its final development, the motive of characterization becomes a sense of proportion in life, including the desire for completeness or expansion of life, and a protest against any incompleteness, failure, discouragement, lack of resolution, or breadth of view on the one hand, or any exaggeration on the other hand.

TABLE XIX.—MOTIVES OF CHARACTERIZATION

M 1. Neglected Desires.	M 3. Sense of Authority of Integral Desire.
M 2. New Desires.	M 4. Sense of Proportion in Life.

Information must be obtained from records made by individual observers and from special testimony.

Methods of Characterization.—The methods through which the motives of characterization manifest themselves are Persistence, Accommodation, Self-denial, and Self-control.

1. *Persistence* does not call for definition. It includes persistence of attention, of thought, of physical effort, and of purpose.

2. *Accommodation* is that change which takes place in any living being when new combinations or circumstances make necessary some modification of previous habits.

When, for example, a tree is transplanted to a soil or climate different from those of its native place, its life depends upon its ability to adapt itself, that is, to accommodate itself, to the new conditions. The immigrant, making his home in a new land, has to make many changes of habit in respect to almost every detail of his life. All these changes are accommodations.

3. *Self-denial* is a mere doing without, a giving up or sacrificing of something that is desired.

4. *Self-control* is a far higher method of characterization. It includes both self-denial and self-indulgence; but both are subordinated to a rational knowledge of one's situ-

ation as demanding now denial and now satisfaction, or as demanding the one in some measure or in respect of some things, the other in some measure or in respect of other things. It is the power to bring order and proportion into life without being a slave, on the one hand, to habits of self-indulgence or, on the other hand, to a dominating idea that mere self-denial is in itself a good thing.

TABLE XX.—METHODS OF CHARACTERIZATION

M 1. Persistence.	M 3. Self-denial.
M 2. Accommodation.	M 4. Self-control.

Information must be obtained from records made by individual observers and from special testimony.

Types of Character

Produced by the different degrees of motive and of method are four great Types of Character, which, as modes of mental and practical resemblance, are not less important among factors of society, than are the types of intellect and of disposition. The four types of character are the Forceful, the Convivial, the Austere, and the Rationally Conscientious.

The Forceful.—This is the type of character in which are emphasized the qualities of courage and power. It is adventure-loving, fearless, valorous, fond of athletic exploits, feats of arms, and dangerous occupations.

In modern industrial communities dangerous occupations are the chief resource of the restless spirits of the forceful type. They make their way into navigation, fisheries, mining, ranching, and the railroad service, and into such public services as those of the fire and police departments.

The pleasures of the forceful type are sensory and active. Where this type is largely represented, drinking, wrestling, fencing, shooting, gambling, and dancing are prevailing amusements.

The Convivial.—This is the pleasure-loving type, composed of men who are fond of boon companions and a social good time.

The convivial man is not always over-scrupulous about the character of his indulgences and is altogether of an easy-going sort. His occupations are of the safe, common-place, easy, profitable kind. His pleasures are sensory and emotional. Like the forceful man, he is fond of eating, drinking, and gambling, but unlike the forceful man he has no desire to participate in muscular exploits. He prefers to look on as a witness, at prize-fighting, bull-fighting, cock-fighting, and racing, and he is usually fond of dramatic exhibitions.

The Austere.—This type is the product of a reaction against the excesses of convivial indulgence.

It enters all respectable vocations, but is much occupied also with avocations of religious, moral, and political reform. Opposed in general to convivial pleasures, it preaches and practises self-denial, and especially an avoidance of such pleasures as social drinking, gambling, horse-racing, and sometimes even dancing, card-playing, and the theatre. In England and America it is usually spoken of as the Puritan character.

The Rationally Conscientious.—This type is the product of a reaction against and progress beyond the austere character. It is usually developed out of the austere type.

Like the austere it is strongly conscientious, but it is less narrow in its interpretation of what constitutes harmful self-indulgence, and is more solicitous to attain complete development of all powers of body and mind. It enters all respectable vocations, but is much occupied also with liberal avocations, including literature, art, science, and citizenship. Its pleasures are of all kinds, athletic, convivial, and intellectual, including enjoyment of the arts; but all pleasures are enjoyed temperately.

TABLE XXI.—TYPES OF CHARACTER

M 1. Forceful.
M 2. Convivial.

M 3. Austere.
M 4. Rationally Conscientious.

Information upon the distribution of Types of Character in the United States may be found in census reports, the statutes of the several commonwealths, the rules of religious denominations, the proceedings of religious, reform, and other conventions, and the testimony of individual observers. Statistics of the distribution of population by occupations are an important source of knowledge of the forceful type. Statistics of the per capita distribution of saloons and dance halls are an indication of the distribution of the convivial type. Restrictive legislation affecting liquor selling, gambling, prize-fighting, horse-racing, and the use of tobacco indicates the distribution and activity of the austere type (see "Bulletin of State Legislation," published by the New York State Library, Albany). Statistics of the distribution of independent voting throw some light upon the distribution of the rationally conscientious type.

TABLE XXII. — CHARACTERISTIC PLEASURES TO BE LOOKED FOR
IN EACH TYPE OF CHARACTER

- | | |
|---|---|
| M | 1. Sensori- or Ideo-Motor: Active. |
| M | 2. Sensori- or Ideo-Motor: Passive. |
| M | 3. Sensori- or Ideo-Emotional: Active. |
| M | 4. Sensori- or Ideo-Emotional: Passive. |
| M | 5. Dogmatic-Emotional: Active. |
| M | 6. Dogmatic-Emotional: Passive. |
| M | 7. Intellectual: Æsthetic: Active. |
| M | 8. Intellectual: Æsthetic: Passive. |
| M | 9. Intellectual: Scientific: Active. |
| M | 10. Intellectual: Scientific: Passive. |

TABLE XXIII. — TRAITS OF CHARACTER FOUND MORE OR LESS IN
EACH TYPE

- | | | | |
|---|-----------------------------|---|------------------------|
| M | 1. Courageous. | M | 8. Cleanly. |
| M | 2. Magnanimous. | M | 9. Neat and Orderly. |
| M | 3. Generous. | M | 10. Temperate. |
| M | 4. Rarely Industrious. | M | 11. Continent, Chaste. |
| M | 5. Irregularly Industrious. | M | 12. Truthful. |
| M | 6. Regularly Industrious. | M | 13. Honest. |
| M | 7. Frugal. | M | 14. Compassionate. |

Types of Mind

By combining the types of disposition and of character with the types of motor-reaction, of emotion, and of intellect, we get Types of Mind, in its integrity.

The readily distinguishable degrees of experience, and therefore of appreciation, were found to be four. Accordingly, for the sake of precision in comparison and correlation, we have in the further analysis of mental and practical resemblance adhered to a fourfold subdivision, even when, as in the case of promptness of motor response, or as in the case of strength of emotion, a twofold subdivision would for many purposes do as well.

We are now to discover a further reason for holding to the fourfold subdivision.

Since mental phenomena present three general aspects, namely, motor, affective (or emotional), and intellective, we might naturally look for three types of mind, according as one or another phase of mentality predominates. Other considerations, however, suggest four types, corresponding to the commonly recognized four temperaments. A more scientific determination of types than either of the foregoing is found in the six possible arrangements (in order of predominance and subordination) of the three fundamental modes of mental phenomena. Designating each of the three by a letter, namely, motor reactions by M, feeling (affection or emotion) by E, and the intellective aspect by I, we have the following six possibilities:—

M E I	E M I	I M E
M I E	E I M	I E M

Of these six arrangements, two, in which intellect holds the third place, namely, M E I and E M I, are found only among animals, human babies, and defectives. Among normal human adults intellect moves forward to the second or the first place, and we have, therefore, four mental types of normal human beings of adult age, namely, M I E, E I M, I E M, and I M E.

Starting, then, with these four arrangements, we should group under each of them those psychological characteristics of motor reaction, emotion, intellection, disposition, and character, already investigated, that are found to be usually combined in the same personality or class of persons.

In the provisional scheme herewith presented there are thirty-six items of psychological importance, distributed into four groups of nine items each. No item can be combined with another item in the same horizontal line. Making allowance for this limitation, there remain 2,665,797,300,224 ways in which the thirty-six items can be combined in a scheme of four columns of nine items each. It is

therefore conceivable that no two individuals can be found in the world sufficiently alike to constitute a psychological class. Such a conception, however, is negated by everyday observation. Certain combinations of traits often recur, and other mathematically possible combinations never occur.¹ It is the usual combinations only that are of fundamental importance for psychology and for sociology.²

Having regard to all the characteristics grouped in each column, we may give descriptive names to the resulting types of mind; calling the first Ideo-Motor, the second Ideo-Emotional, the third Dogmatic-Emotional, and the fourth Critical-Intellectual.

COMPOSITION OF MENTAL TYPES³

Type of Mind	MIE Ideo-Motor	EIM. Ideo-Emotional	IEM. Dogmatic-Emotional	IME. Critical-Intellectual
Promptness of reaction.	Prompt (R_1).	Prompt (R_2).	Slow (R_3).	Slow (R_4).
Continuity of activity.	Persistent (A_1).	Intermittent (A_2).	Intermittent (A_3).	Persistent (A_4).
Kind of movement.	Largely involuntary (instinctive).	Semi-involuntary (imitative, sympathetic).	Largely voluntary (coefficient belief).	Largely voluntary (coefficient judgment).
Degree of emotion.	Strong (E_1).	Weak (E_2).	Strong (E_3).	Weak (E_4).
Temperament.	Choleric.	Sanguine.	Melancholic.	Phlegmatic.
Formation of belief or judgment.	Subjectively determined (by instinct, habit and auto-suggestion).	Objectively determined (by external suggestion: personal or impersonal).	Subjectively determined (by emotion, mood, temperament).	Objectively determined (by evidence).
Mode of reasoning.	Conjectural (guesswork).	Imaginative (analogical).	Deductive (speculative). May be critical of logical processes, rarely of premises.	Critical, of premises as well as of logic: inductive.
Disposition. Character.	Aggressive. Forceful.	Instigative. Convivial.	Domineering. Austere.	Creative. Rationally conscientious.

¹ "No two minds were ever exactly alike, yet all follow the same general laws." Scripture, "The New Psychology," p. 143.

² On mental and practical differences and resemblances in general, as manifested in associating individuals, see especially Titchener, "An Outline of Psychology," pp. 110-116.

³ This analysis of Mental Types was first published by the author in a paper entitled, "A Provisional Distribution of the Population of the United States into Psychological Classes," contributed to *The Psychological Review*, Vol. VIII, No. 4, July, 1901.

Ideomotor. — This is the lowest type of the human mind. Its activities are for the most part instinctive. Sensations, simple ideas, and motor reactions are in this type not merely the materials out of which mind and practical activity are built, as in higher types, but they are a chief content of conscious life. Intellect does not develop much beyond perception and conjecture. Belief is determined mainly by instinct, habit and auto-suggestion. The disposition is aggressive and the character forceful.

Examples are afforded by the lowest savages, and in civil populations, by the physically active but ignorant.

Ideo-Emotional. — This type is somewhat weakly, but almost continuously emotional rather than physically active. Its intellect is imaginative, its beliefs are largely determined by external suggestion, and it habitually reasons from superficial analogy. It is instigative in disposition and convivial in character.

Examples are afforded by all the higher savages and barbarians, and especially by the negroes. In civil populations the type is found in two gradations: one, the emotional, volatile minds, not densely ignorant, but of comparatively little intellectual development, and two, the sensuous, imaginative, artistically creative minds, of higher intellectual development.

Dogmatic-Emotional. — This type is marked by an extreme development of preferential attention. The mind is fixed upon some one dominant idea, or group of ideas or beliefs. Such controlling ideas arouse great volumes of emotion, which, in turn, create a habit of intolerance. Belief, in this type, is subjectively determined by emotion, mood, and temperament. Reasoning is habitually deductive, and, while much nice attention may be given to the logical process, premises are seldom subjected to a searching criticism, but are usually accepted on trust. Disposi-

tion is domineering and character austere. Persons of this type have often been useful to the community as reformers or even as martyrs, but they are seldom temperate or judicious in their methods.

Examples may be found in barbarian tribes in the persons of particular individuals, usually sachems or chiefs; in civil populations in (1) persons of strong and domineering convictions, of one idea, and (2) in dogmatically speculative minds.

Critical-Intellectual. — The highest type of mind is that in which the ideo-motor, the ideo-emotional, and the dogmatic-emotional activities, never suppressed, much less destroyed, are habitually kept under the control of a critical and vigilant intellect. Clear perceptions, sound judgments, objectively determined by evidence and taking the form of common sense, careful reasoning, deductive or inductive, a habit of subjecting premises no less than logical processes to a searching examination — these intellectual activities constitute a major part of the mental life, and keep all of the lower processes in due subordination. Intellect in this type may be deductive and critical or critical and inductive. Disposition is creative and character rationally conscientious.

Examples are, highly developed minds in tribal federations, in ethnic nations, and in civic nations.

In the great civilized populations of mankind the critical type is now widely distributed. In times of great excitement large numbers of persons who, on the whole, belong to this type relapse into the dogmatic-emotional, or even into an ideo-emotional, state. For the moment their higher brain activities are half paralyzed, and fail to do their controlling work. Nevertheless, these individuals, usually and normally dominated by common sense and reason, must be classed in the critical type.

The deductive and critical intellects may further be subdivided into the æsthetic and the scientific. The æsthetic subdivision includes all minds that are imaginative and artistically creative if they

are also critical. The scientific subdivision includes those critically logical minds that work by deductive and systematizing methods rather than by induction, but always with a due regard for the validity of premises.

These intellects are uncompromising. In the same individual mind intellect must dominate faith or be dominated by it. The uncompromising intellect is revolutionary in methods of social change. The best examples of it, both æsthetic and scientific, are found in the population of France.

The inductive intellects are compromising. In the same individual mind intellect can make terms with faith, surrendering to it a sphere of activity. This is because the inductive intellect is never able to believe that no further truth remains to be discovered. The compromising intellect is non-revolutionary in methods of social change. The best examples of it are found in the Anglo-Saxon stock of England and the United States.

TABLE XXIV.—TYPES OF MIND

M 1. Ideo-Motor.	M 3. Dogmatic-Emotional.
M 2. Ideo-Emotional.	M 4. Critical-Intellectual.

Before this table can be filled out for any large community, — for example, the United States or any state, — it must be filled out for the native born of different regions, and for each nationality. For a provisional distribution of the American population into these types of mind see Appendix I.

The general sources of information upon the distribution of types of mind in the United States are: Federal and State Census Reports, Colonial Records, and the testimony of individual observers. Special materials for the study of the distribution of the dogmatic-emotional type are: Histories of witch burners, of Quaker beaters, of the Great Awakening, of the revivals of 1834 and 1857, of the Millerite excitement, and of Second Adventism, Mormonism, Spiritualism, Theosophy, and Christian Science, of the Abolitionist, Prohibitionist, Single Tax, Populist, Free Silver, and Anti-Imperialist agitations.

TABLE XXV.—SUB-TYPES OF CRITICAL INTELLECT

M 1. Deductive and Critical: Æsthetic.	M 2. Deductive and Critical: Scientific.
M 3. Critical and Inductive.	

Special materials for the study of the distribution of the deductive and critical intellect are art products and literature, science and philosophy, with analyses of their per capita geographical distribution. Special materials for the study of the distribution of the inductive intellect are: Records of exploration, of discovery, of invention, with analyses as above.

Total Resemblance

Any quality of practical action, of mind, of disposition, or of character may be a point of resemblance between one individual and another.

The total number of points of resemblance in any given case may be called the Total Resemblance.

Degrees of Total Resemblance. — Accordingly, total resemblance may be of greater or less degree, varying with the number of points of resemblance.

Usually the degree of mental and practical resemblance may be observed to correspond to the degree of kinship.

As a rule the mental and practical resemblance of individuals of the same nationality is greater than the mental and practical resemblance of individuals of different nationalities but of the same ethnic race; as a rule the mental and practical resemblance of individuals of the same ethnic race is greater than the mental and practical resemblance of individuals of different ethnic races, but of the same glottic race, and so on.

Degrees of total mental and practical resemblance, in so far as they correspond to degrees of kinship, may be designated by the symbols k' , k'' , k''' , and so on; k' designating the greatest degree of such resemblance, k'' a lesser degree, and so on.

Total mental and practical resemblance may, however, vary irrespective of degrees of kinship.

Two individuals of different nationalities, or even of different races, may more closely resemble each other in mind and activity than do two other individuals of the same nationality.

Degrees of the total mental and practical resemblance that varies irrespective of degrees of kinship may be designated by m' , m'' , m''' , and so on; m' designating the greatest degree of such resemblance, m'' a lesser degree, and so on.

A potential mental and practical resemblance, or the capacity of two or more minds to become alike, may be designated by v .

The theoretical significance of these distinctions of degree will appear in the following chapter.

CHAPTER III

THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF KIND

The Subjective Aspect

IN the preceding chapter the modes of mental and practical resemblance were viewed as objective facts. It is necessary now to analyze the subjective phenomena which, perhaps, accompany all degrees of mental and practical resemblance, and certainly are found in connection with the higher degrees.

Organic Sympathy

Before there is any distinct perception of differences or of resemblances by individuals who, from time to time, are brought into contact with one another, there are in their minds differences or resemblances of sensation corresponding to differences or resemblances of response to stimulus. In each mind also are differences or resemblances between sensations awakened by self and sensations awakened by fellow beings. Furthermore, in each mind there are vague feelings of repulsion or of attraction, and equally vague feelings of agreeableness or of disagreeableness in the presence of other persons. Collectively, the resembling sensations of resembling individuals, the resembling sensations of self and of others who resemble self, and the accompanying vague feelings of attraction and of pleasure, may be designated by the phrase, Organic Sympathy.

Like Feelings with Like Response. — The basis of organic sympathy is the mental and practical resemblance itself.

The original element in organic sympathy is the resemblance of the complex of sensations in one mind to the complex of sensations in another mind, accompanying the like response of the two similar nervous organizations to the same or like stimuli.

Similarity of Sensations of Self and Others. — On this basis, experience creates groupings of other resembling sensations which are antecedent to perceptions of likeness, but which prepare the way for them.

Passing his hands over his mother's face, the infant experiences sensations of pressure that are similar to the sensations that he receives when passing his hands over his own face; but when he strokes the back of the cat, or clutches the hair of the dog, he receives sensations unlike those that he experienced when feeling his own face. From his own voice and the voices of his brothers and sisters, he receives auditory sensations that are alike; but different from these are the sensations aroused by the barking of the dog, or the mewing of the cat. In like manner, the sensations of vision and of smell that are awakened by his own bodily organism, and by the bodily organisms of persons resembling himself, are alike; while between these sensations and those awakened by various animals, the difference is conspicuous. So, throughout life, the child growing into the man is continually receiving from his own bodily organism, and from the closely resembling bodily organisms of individuals like himself, sensations that are in a high degree alike; while sensations different from these are being received from other objects of every kind.

Facility of Imitation. — Animals or persons that closely resemble one another in nervous organization imitate one another with facility.

Often imitation is incited by conspicuous difference, but the greater the difference between one organism and another, the more difficult is any imitation of one by the other. Like response to like stimulus easily develops into an imitation, in minor matters — in details of difference — of one another by creatures that, on the whole, are alike rather than unlike.

Sensations of Meeting.—When two persons who have never before seen one another unexpectedly meet, something happens in the nervous organization of each which, when examined, would have to be described as a physical shock, and something happens in the consciousness of each which would have to be described as either a shock of unpleasant feeling, or as a thrill of pleasurable feeling.

The feeling of shock, surprise, anger, disgust, which may happen to be the experience in the case, is due to a very complicated impression of unlikeness which the stranger makes. The impression is composed of sensations of many kinds: sensations of sight, sensations of hearing, perhaps, also, sensations of odour and of touch. The man's appearance, as seen with the eye, may be repellent or threatening; his voice may grate unpleasantly on the ear; the touch of his hand may create something closely akin to a shudder.

When, however, the experience is a thrill of pleasure, the effect is produced by a complex combination of impressions of unlikeness with impressions of likeness; namely, impressions of the difference of the stranger from the person who encounters him, with impressions of his apparent resemblance. It is instantly clear that this hitherto unknown individual has his own distinctive personality; he is in many respects, perhaps in outward appearance, perhaps in tone of voice, almost certainly in mind and character, different from the one who confronts him. At the same time, there is something recognizable and familiar about him. The fundamental resemblances of the two persons are sufficiently great to dominate their differences, which, for the moment, become relatively unimportant.

It is quite possible for the first impression made by a stranger to awaken little more than sensation and emotion. Thoughts, ideas, perceptions, in the strict meaning of these words, may hardly enter into the matter at all.

The mere sensations of meeting, then, may be analyzed, observed, and recorded, as disagreeable or agreeable.

TABLE XXVI. — SENSATIONS OF MEETING

M 1. Disagreeable.

M 2. Agreeable.

Information must be obtained from records made by individual observers.

Total Organic Sympathy.—All of the phenomena above described enter into the composition of that vague but positive state, organic sympathy.

Similarities of sensation in general in the minds of resembling individuals; similarities of sensation of self and of others resembling self; spontaneous imitations, easily effected among like individuals because their differences are trifling in comparison with their resemblances; and sensations of meeting that on the whole are agreeable; these collectively develop into that attraction for one another which is daily seen among resembling men, as it is also among resembling animals, and which lies deeper in consciousness than any clear perception of resemblance. Creatures that presumably have no power of intellectual discrimination manifest the attractions of organic sympathy. Human beings quite capable of nice discrimination often find themselves liking or disliking one another when they can give no reason for their feeling.

Degrees of Organic Sympathy.—The careful observer will not fail to discover that human beings differ among themselves in their power of organic sympathy. In some persons organic sympathy is strong, in others of medium strength, in others weak.

These terms, like many that have already been used in these pages, are purely relative. To give them meaning for purposes of measurement, the observer must take as his standard of strong organic sympathy some one individual or type whose characteristics admit of careful observation and description. One possible standard for organic sympathy is the organic sympathy of mother and babe.

TABLE XXVII. — DEGREES OF ORGANIC SYMPATHY

M 1. Strong. M 2. Medium. M 3. Weak.

Information must be obtained from records made by individual observers.

Perception of Resemblance

When the child begins to combine sensations of the moment with memories of similar sensations in the past, and to connect these immediate and memory sensations

with the objects that have produced them, the process of perception has begun. The child now has not only like and unlike sensations, but also Perceptions of Likeness and Unlikeness. These are much more complicated mental states.

Perceptions of Difference and of Resemblance. — It seems probable that perceptions of unlikeness appear earlier in the experience of every individual than perceptions of likeness. Indeed, likeness can be distinguished from absolute identity only by perceptions of the differences that exist between things that are in certain respects alike.

In the process of becoming acquainted, the differences between one individual and another are first observed; and a sense of difference is always present in the mind to be more or less overcome by any growing sense of similarity.

As individuals differ in their power of organic sympathy, so do they differ also in their power to perceive differences and resemblances. Some men's perceptions are keen, some are of medium acuteness, some are dull. Before recording and tabulating observations a standard of comparison must be chosen and described.

TABLE XXVIII. — DEGREES OF PERCEPTION OF DIFFERENCE AND RESEMBLANCE

M 1. Keen.	M 2. Medium.	M 3. Dull.
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Information must be obtained from records made by individual observers.

Impressions of Meeting. — With the attainment of clear perceptions of differences and resemblances, the mere sensations of meeting are merged in complex Impressions of Meeting. On the intellectual side these are impressions of difference or impressions of resemblance. Accompanying these, however, are emotional states, which are manifested in the attitude of strangers toward one another.

Attitude toward Strangers. — According as the impressions are, on the whole, impressions of difference or

impressions of resemblance, the general attitude of strangers toward one another is one of wonder and curiosity; of fear, suspicion, and unfriendliness; of indifference; or of trust and friendliness. Observations should be made of all these emotional manifestations.

TABLE XXIX. — ATTITUDE TOWARD STRANGERS

M 1. Wonder.	M 5. Suspicion.
M 2. Curiosity.	M 6. Trust.
M 3. Indifference.	M 7. Friendliness.
M 4. Fear.	M 8. Unfriendliness.

Information must be obtained from records made by individual observers.

The Motives of Communication. — The first impressions of meeting are usually confused. Impressions of difference and impressions of resemblance are so mingled in the mind that one is left in doubt as to the real degree of resemblance and the possible interest and pleasure of further acquaintance. The desire to impart and to gain a more definite knowledge on these points is the original motive of communication.

The desire to impart must probably be placed first. In all communication we can discover in each communicating person a desire to make an impression. Subordinate to this desire, in most instances, appears to be the desire to know well the other person.

After acquaintance is established much communication takes place, which seems to spring from an interest in the subject that is talked about. We give and ask information about third parties or material things, as well as about ourselves. Even then, however, the other motives that have been mentioned can always be detected; and it is probable that in all cases they are really the predominant ones, although we are not always conscious of the fact.

TABLE XXX. — THE MOTIVES OF COMMUNICATION

M 1. To Perfect Acquaintance by Impression.
M 2. To Perfect Acquaintance by Learning about Another.
M 3. To Gain or Impart Information.

Information must be obtained from records made by individual observers.

Reflective Sympathy

When the perception of resemblance has arisen in consciousness, it reacts upon organic sympathy, and converts or develops it into an Intelligent or Reflective Sympathy. Reflective sympathy is awakened by the distinct knowledge that another person is like one's self.

The phenomenon was first clearly and accurately described by Spinoza, in the "Ethic," Part III, Prop. XXVII.

"Although we may not have been moved toward a thing by any affect, yet, if it is like ourselves,* whenever we imagine it to be affected by any affect, we are therefore affected by the same. . . . If, therefore, the nature of the external body be like that of our body, then the idea of the external body which we imagine will involve an affection of our body like that of the external body. Therefore, if we imagine any one who is like ourselves to be affected with any affect, this imagination will express an affection of our body like that affect; and, therefore, we shall be affected with a similar affect ourselves, because we imagine something like us to be affected with the same."

In other words, when we perceive that some one who is organized as we are is doing a certain thing, we feel the impulse to act as he acts. If he appears to be in pain, we feel a certain discomfort or even a certain degree of the pain that he experiences. If he is evidently in a state of great joy, we also feel a certain degree of gladness.

The relative degrees of reflective sympathy should be observed and estimated according to the method explained for the estimation of degrees of organic sympathy, and perceptions of difference and resemblance.

TABLE XXXI.—DEGREES OF REFLECTIVE SYMPATHY

M 1. Strong.	M 2. Medium.	M 3. Weak.
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Information must be obtained from records made by individual observers.

Affection

The perception of resemblance and conscious sympathy commonly develop into the stronger feeling which is variously named Liking, Friendliness, and Affection, accord-

ing to the degree of its strength. Those individuals who, as we say, have something in common, that is, those who are so much alike that they are sympathetic and have similar ideas and tastes, on the whole like one another better than individuals who have little or nothing in common.

We must not make the mistake, however, of supposing that in all cases the strongest affection springs up between persons who, at the moment of their first acquaintance, are actually very much alike in mental and moral qualities. Perhaps the more frequent case is that of a growing affection between persons potentially alike. Apparently it is the capacity of two or more persons to become alike in mental and moral nature, under each other's influence, that gives rise to the strongest friendship and the highest degree of pleasure in companionship.

Degrees of affection as strong, medium, or weak should be observed and estimated by the method heretofore described for the estimation of the degrees of organic sympathy.

TABLE XXXII.—DEGREES OF AFFECTION

M 1. Strong.	M 2. Medium.	M 3. Weak.
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Information must be obtained from records made by individual observers.

Desire for Recognition

A remaining mental fact to be noted as a subjective consequence of resemblance, is the desire which an individual feels for Recognition, including a return of sympathy and affection.

This phenomenon also was first clearly described by Spinoza in Prop. XXXIII. of Part III. of the "Ethic": "If we love a thing which is like ourselves, we endeavour as much as possible to make it love us in return."

When a person perceives that his acquaintance resembles himself in mind and character, and is conscious of a certain sympathy and affection for his acquaintance, he looks for some manifestation of interest in himself. He expects the acquaintance also to recognize the points of similarity, and to show feelings of sympathy and liking. This state of mind is the basis of some of the most important passions, such as pride and ambition.

The relative degrees of the desire for recognition should be observed and estimated by the method explained for the estimation of the degrees of organic sympathy.

TABLE XXXIII. — DEGREES OF DESIRE FOR RECOGNITION

M 1. Strong.	M 2. Medium.	M 3. Weak.
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Information must be obtained from records made by individual observers.

The Total Consciousness of Kind

The five modes of consciousness which have been described are not independent of one another. They are so intimately blended that it is only by a process of scientific analysis that they can be thought of singly. In actual experience they are united in a state of mind that for the moment seems perfectly simple. The perception of resemblance, the sympathy, the affection, and the desire for recognition that go with it, seem, for the time being, to be as perfectly one fact of consciousness as does the image of a person or of a landscape upon the retina of the eye. This state of consciousness is pleasurable, and includes the feeling that we wish to maintain it and expand it. The feeling that it carries with it is, in fact, like that which one experiences while engaged in a pleasurable game or witnessing an engrossing drama. One does not stop to ask whether it is useful or worth while any more than he does when eagerly looking forward to the next successful move on a chessboard. He enjoys it while it lasts, and feels that it is worth while in itself, quite irrespective of any consequences that may follow.

The consciousness of kind, then, is that pleasurable state of mind which includes organic sympathy, the perception of resemblance, conscious or reflective sympathy, affection, and the desire for recognition.

There are two groups of indications of the consciousness of kind in any community which may be made use of for the purpose of esti-

mating extent and degree. One group is made up of the words and phrases in common use significant of a consciousness of kind. The other group is made up of common acts and prejudices of like significance.

The observer should not begin his search for these indications with a list already made in his own mind. Rather, as he encounters expressions and observes acts which at the moment strike him as having significance as such indications, he should record and classify them, and then make up his lists from materials so obtained.

TABLE XXXIV.—WORDS AND PHRASES IN COMMON USE SIGNIFICANT OF A CONSCIOUSNESS OF KIND

M 1. Very Few.	M 3. Numerous.
M 2. Few.	M 4. Very Numerous.

TABLE XXXV.—COMMON ACTS AND PREJUDICES SIGNIFICANT OF A CONSCIOUSNESS OF KIND

M 1. Very Few.	M 3. Numerous.
M 2. Few.	M 4. Very Numerous.

Information must be obtained from records made by individual observers.

The Consciousness of Potential Resemblance

A relatively perfect consciousness of kind can exist only in minds that are in a high degree alike. In every population, however, a large proportion of its component individuals, not yet in a high degree mentally alike, are gradually becoming alike. The consciousness of Potential Resemblance which may be observed in minds that are thus developing into resemblance is a phenomenon of the social mind not less important than the consciousness of kind already relatively perfect.

Potential Resemblance.—We all know from personal experience that there are some minds among our acquaintances that never become more sympathetic with our own. The oftener we engage in argument with them the further apart do they and we seem to drift. With other minds the case is wholly different. The ripening of acquaintance

is the ripening of sympathy and agreement. Our differences disappear or become of little consequence. We learn to see things in the same light and to regard them with the same feelings. This organization of two or more minds, which makes their approach or agreement certain, is the thing which is meant by the term "potential resemblance."

The Consciousness of Mental Approach.—Accordingly, the consciousness of potential resemblance is a subjective phenomenon somewhat more complex than the consciousness of kind as thus far described. It includes the ordinary perceptions of difference and of resemblance; but combined with these is the further perception that the differences are decreasing and the resemblances increasing; or, perhaps, the judgment that the differences probably will decrease and the resemblances increase. As potential resemblance develops into actual and perfected resemblance, the consciousness of potential resemblance becomes a relatively perfect consciousness of kind.

Assimilation or Socialization

The process of mental approach which presents these two aspects, objective and subjective—the growing resemblance of two or more minds to one another, and the developing consciousness of kind in each one—is familiarly known as Assimilation. It may also be called Socialization.

To a great extent socialization is deliberately furthered by various acts of concerted volition, yet to be described in following chapters. In its beginnings, however, socialization is very largely an unconscious, or only semi-conscious, process, consisting in a modification of the emotions and thoughts of potentially-resembling individuals by one another in ways which they do not clearly perceive at the moment; and in the gradual discovery that, without realizing exactly how, they are becoming alike.

The Socialization of Motives and Methods.—The process consists in part in a gradual socialization of the motives and methods of appreciation, utilization, and characterization. Under the influence of a growing consciousness of kind purely individualistic motives and methods are made over or converted into socialized motives and methods.

1. *The Conversion of Individualistic Motives.*—The pleasures of physical activity, receptive sensation, and simple ideation among the motives of appreciation, and mere need among the motives of utilization, are least susceptible of modification. The pleasures of emotion and of thought, the sense of power, rational desire, and the sense of proportion in life, are modifiable in a high degree. Intermediate in capacity of modification are such motives as appetite and desire.

Few if any of our appetites and desires are what they would have been if each individual had lived by himself, in contact only with the physical world and lower forms of life. To a great extent we cultivate certain appetites, and repress others, merely because our associates do so.

It is as factors of a growing consciousness of kind that new desires arise as motives of characterization, for example, the desires for esteem and for praise; and that new combinations of appetite and sympathy develop into that powerful moral motive, the very names of which,—kindness, affection, love,—are significant of its origin. This motive manifests itself in a new mode of conduct, namely, self-sacrifice. Affection and self-sacrifice probably originate in organic sympathy, but are greatly strengthened by the intellectual perception of resemblance.

TABLE XXXVI. — DEGREE OF SOCIALIZATION OF MOTIVES

M 1. Slight Extent.

M 2. Great Extent.

2. *The Conversion of Individualistic Methods.*—Of the methods of appreciation, utilization, and characterization,

the least modifiable by the consciousness of kind are instinctive response to stimulus, and attack. Modifiable in the highest degree are preferential attention, critical inspection, direction, and self-control.

Direction is greatly modifiable because of the effect of the consciousness of kind upon impression. Impression itself produces two very different effects. One effect is fear, which may become terror, and terminate in paralysis; the other is fascination and pleasure. The one mode of impression is the cause of submission, surrender, and the abject kind of obedience; the other mode of impression is the cause of loyalty, fealty, and the voluntary attachment to a leader.

The effect of the consciousness of kind upon the fear-inspiring mode of impression is reflected in the saying that familiarity breeds contempt. The sense of difference and its accompanying sense of mystery are a large element in fear. These disappear with the discovery of resemblance. Rulers and dignitaries who wish to inspire fear surround themselves with an air of mystery, and foster the public delusion that in some inexplicable way they are unlike other men. The effect of the consciousness of kind upon the fascination-producing mode of impression is to intensify devotion. The more "in touch" a leader is with his followers, — that is to say, the more like them he is in every respect except his superior sagacity and power, the more blind and unswerving is their allegiance.

TABLE XXXVII. — DEGREE OF SOCIALIZATION OF METHODS

M 1. Slight Extent.

M 2. Great Extent.

Deeper Causes of Assimilation. — Every phenomenon in nature presents three aspects, namely, original Similarities of action, original oppositions or Conflicts of action, and imitations or Adaptations of action.¹

¹ Professor Gabriel Tarde has constructed not only a system of sociology, but also a complete system of philosophy on the basis of these three aspects of natural phenomena. See "Les Lois de l'Imitation," "La Logique Sociale," "L'Opposition Universelle," and "Les Lois Sociales." Professor Tarde, however, seems to identify imitation with similarity or agreement rather than with accommoda-

In the growth of a consciousness of kind among individuals potentially alike, and in the gradual socialization of motives and methods, we may at every moment observe both conflicts and similarities of action, and imitation.

At the beginning of acquaintance difference is more conspicuous than likeness, and the phenomenon of communication is for the most part one of opposition or conflict. From the first, however, there are some like responses to like stimuli. Little by little the conflicts are softened and the like responses are multiplied through the continuing modification of activities by imitation. The modification, however, is never carried so far as to do away entirely with opposition. Conflict persists in the social mind side by side with imitation. These two aspects, social imitation and the persistence of conflict, deserve more detailed examination.

1. *Social Imitation.* — We imitate one another because our nervous apparatus is so organized that any sight, or sound, or touch, is a stimulus which results in muscular movements that, by long habit, have become associated with such stimuli.

If, for example, one person sees another reach out a hand for a glass of water, the chances are that the observer, unless he stops to think about it, and deliberately restrains himself, also will reach out to take a glass of water, if one is near him. We imitate then, except when we consciously restrain ourselves, and we do not restrain if the action imitated is pleasurable and is obviously conducive to well-being. In this latter case our conscious will reinforces the tendency to imitate, and we deliberately repeat our own and one another's acts indefinitely. In this way conscious imitations may extend to populations numbered by millions, and be kept up for

tion, and to make accommodation consist in the harmonizing of imitation and conflict. In criticism of Professor Tarde's views the student should inquire whether it cannot be shown, (1) that a large proportion of all similarities of motion or change, physical or psychical, are original and not products of imitation; (2) that imitation always contains a coefficient of conflict; (3) that all accommodations are imitations within Professor Tarde's definition of imitation; and (4) that each of the imitations that Professor Tarde has described in detail is an accommodation within the accepted evolutionist meaning of the latter word.

thousands of years. Modern civilization is the continuing imitation of Greece and Rome.

Not all imitations, however, indefinitely survive. The imitation of examples in any way remarkable tends to overcome or to combine lesser imitations. It is for this reason that in each nation, and in each local subdivision of a national population, certain habits, such as customs in eating, clothing, and amusements, are practically universal there, but are not found in other parts of the world. In every population, therefore, there may be observed a general approach to certain persistent types of action, expression, and character. This is the socializing process in its most subtle and efficacious mode. It is this that ultimately blends the diverse elements of the most heterogeneous population into a homogeneous type. It creates a common speech, common modes of thought, and common standards of living. By destroying and softening many original differences of speech, belief, and practice, it promotes intermarriage. These influences are gradually assimilating the foreign-born elements in the population of the United States to an American type.

The phenomena of social imitation should be studied by observing and recording specific imitations of individuals by individuals, of nationalities by nationalities, of races by races, and of communities by communities.

TABLE XXXVIII. — SPECIFIC IMITATIONS

M 1. In Language.	M 7. In Worship.
M 2. In Manners.	M 8. In Education.
M 3. In Costumes.	M 9. In Economic Arts.
M 4. In Amusements.	M 10. In Morals.
M 5. In Poetic Arts.	M 11. In Law.
M 6. In Plastic Arts.	M 12. In Politics.

(1) *The Laws of Imitation.* — There are two great laws of imitation, which have been formulated by M. Tarde.

The first is the law of progression. *In the absence of interferences, imitations spread in a geometrical progression.*

If a new example is copied by a single individual, there are immediately two example centres. If each is again copied by a single individual, there are four example centres, and if each of these is copied by a single individual, the example centres become eight. It

is the geometrical progression of imitation that accounts for the extreme rapidity with which new words, new fashions, fads, panics, and revolutions sometimes spread.

The second law of imitation is the law of refraction.
Imitations are refracted by their media.

Words, customs, laws, religions, and institutions are modified as they pass from race to race and from age to age.

2. *The Persistence of Conflict.*—Because they are refracted, imitations are never perfect; and because continually undergoing modification, they tend to multiply and subdivide, and become differentiated. For this reason there may arise in any society a conflict among imitations. When this happens, one of two results must follow. If the conflicting imitations are irreconcilable, one must give way to the other. If, however, they can be combined, the outcome may be an entirely new thing or mode of activity; namely, an invention.

The most important of the conflicts between imitations is that between imitations of things old, venerable, long-standing, and the imitation of novelty. The one kind of imitation we call custom; the other we call fashion. At times custom imitation encroaches upon fashion; at other times fashion seems to encroach upon custom.

While, therefore, imitation on the whole softens conflict and assimilates the unlike elements of a population, it at times becomes itself a cause of fresh conflict and an obstacle to assimilation.

Thus, notwithstanding the socializing motives, there remain in a population persistent causes of the more serious modes of conflict.

First, of course, are the instincts of conquest proper to utilization, which are kept alive by the necessity of destroying life to maintain life, and the instincts of aggression that are kept alive by the opposition always met with by those individuals and populations that develop more rapidly than others. Wherever civilization finds itself face to face with savagery, or a young and growing civilization finds itself opposed to one old and decaying, the antagonism is mortal.

Secondly, there are original differences of nature and habit that have not yet been blended or neutralized by the process of assimilation.

Thirdly, there are secondary differences that continually arise through the conflicts of imitation. To these must be added occasional causes that at times operate with terrible effect. These are the failure of ordinary food supplies, as in times of famine, and the occasional occurrence of some great calamity, like flood or pestilence, which demoralizes people with fear, and so far destroys sympathy and self-sacrifice as to leave only the animal instincts of self-preservation in full activity.

3. *Subjective Toleration.* — These lapses from toleration, however, are not enduring. The causes that establish toleration in the first instance tend to reëstablish it after every failure. Coöperating with the tendency of conflict to bring about an equilibrium of strength, there is now a conscious desire for the amelioration of strife. In addition to toleration as a mere objective fact, there has at length appeared an idea of toleration and a wish to maintain it. There has come into existence a Subjective Toleration.

Conflict and toleration should be studied through detailed observations of specific examples.

TABLE XXXIX. — CONFLICT OR TOLERATION BETWEEN

M 1. Species.	M 7. Nationalities.
M 2. Cephalic Races.	M 8. Communities.
M 3. Colour Races.	M 9. Political Parties.
M 4. Glottic Races.	M 10. Parties at Law.
M 5. Ethnic Races.	M 11. Economic Classes.
M 6. Potential Nationalities.	M 12. Religious Sects.

Information must be obtained from records made by individual observers.

Psychological Stages of Conflict and Agreement. — According to the mental development of differing or potentially resembling individuals, their conflicts or agreements take the form of activities predominately ideo-motor, ideo-emotional, dogmatic-emotional, or deliberative. The ideo-motor minds "fight it out," the critically intellectual minds quarrel by discussion until they arrive at a good understanding.

TABLE XL. — STAGES OF CONFLICT AND AGREEMENT

M 1. Ideo-Motor.	M 3. Dogmatic-Emotional.
M 2. Ideo-Emotional.	M 4. Critically Intellectual.

Mutability and Degrees of the Consciousness of Kind

Because the consciousness of kind is complex, it is necessarily an ever-changing mental state. It varies as one or another of its elements is predominant. At one time it may be chiefly an idea; at another time chiefly sympathy; at another time chiefly the desire for recognition; but never is it one of these elements alone. All are present in some degree.

The consciousness of kind varies in degree with the degree of resemblance upon which it is based. It loses intensity as it expands to the more remote resemblances, and becomes intense as it contracts to the narrower degrees.

The Law of Sympathy. — Using the word “sympathy” as a collective word for all the feelings that are included in the consciousness of kind, the law of sympathy is: *The degree of sympathy decreases as the generality of resemblance increases.*

Thus, for example, when we compare those degrees of mental and practical resemblance that correspond to degrees of kinship, we discover that there is normally a greater degree of sympathy among members of a family than among all members of a nation, a greater degree of sympathy among men of a common nationality than among all men of the same ethnic race, a greater degree of sympathy among men of the same ethnic race than among all men of the same glottic race, and a greater degree of sympathy among men of the same glottic race than among all men of the same colour race.

In like manner, when we compare those degrees of mental and practical resemblance that are irrespective of the degrees of kinship, we discover that there is, for example, greater sympathy among Protestants than among Protestants and Roman Catholics taken together, and more sympathy among Protestants and Roman


Catholic Christians taken together than among all Christians and all devotees of all other religions taken together.

The degree of sympathy is a variable of all the modes of likeness combined, and not of any one mode alone. Expressed mathematically it is: $S = \phi(k, m, v)$.

In this formula the symbol ϕ expresses that relation between S (Sympathy) and k, m, v , which accounts for every variation of S .

The actually observed variation of S is a progressive diminution of sympathy as we pass from k' to $(k' + k'')$, and from $(k' + k'')$ to $(k' + k'' + k''')$, and so on, and in like manner pass from m' to $(m' + m'')$, and from $(m' + m'')$ to $(m' + m'' + m''')$, and so on. Therefore, ϕ is an algebraic function expressed in terms of diminishing resemblances, and symbolizing a progressive diminution of sympathy.

Now resemblance is a variable that approaches but never reaches the limit identity, as the fraction $\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{8} + \frac{1}{16}$, and so on, approaches but never reaches the limit 1. Sympathy, diminishing as resemblance diminishes, in like manner approaches, but never reaches the limit 0. The fraction given above is the numerical variable that most rapidly approaches the limit 1, and in the succession of fractions $\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{8}$, etc., we have the most rapid approach to the never-reached limit 0. Sympathy diminishes with great rapidity as we pass from the closely related to the remotely related. Graphically represented, the hyperbolic curve has a sharp descent, thus:¹—



¹Cephalic race, apart from other racial distinctions, may apparently be an exception; but see the studies of Ammon, Lapouge, and Ripley, and remember that in mankind generally, cephalic index is correlated with both ethnic race and colour.

It is therefore probable that the succession of fractions $\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{8}$, etc., very closely represents the diminution of sympathy with diminishing resemblance. If so, our complete formula is as follows:—

$$\begin{aligned}
 S = k' + \frac{(k' + k'')}{2} + \frac{(k' + k'' + k''')}{4} + \frac{(k' + k'' + k''' + k''')}{8} \\
 + m' + \frac{(m' + m'')}{2} + \frac{(m' + m'' + m''')}{4} \\
 + \frac{(m' + m'' + m''' + m''')}{8} + v.
 \end{aligned}$$

CHAPTER IV

CONCERTED VOLITION

The Rise of Concerted Volition

WHEN individuals have become aware of their resemblances, especially of any similarities of purpose and of action, they begin, consciously, to combine their activities for the better realization of their common purposes.

In other words, the consciousness of kind converts a spontaneous like response into a Concerted Volition.

Subjective Conditions. — The rapidity of the transformation, the extent to which the conversion is effected, and the forms that concerted volition assumes, depend upon the subjective conditions, namely, the types of mind, of disposition, and of character, and the degree of the consciousness of kind.

If appreciation is of a low degree, if the type of mind is ideomotor, and the character forceful, an imperfect consciousness of kind, usually found with such mental states, can create only an imperfect concert of volition, which will bear a close resemblance to instinctive conduct in the individual. The presence of ideo-emotional individuals in large numbers may give to the concerted volition the form of a swiftly acting, sympathetic movement, such as panic or insurrection. Dogmatic minds develop a concerted volition that tends toward fanaticism or toward formality. If the highest types of mind and of character prevail, and the consciousness of kind is intellectual, rather than merely sympathetic, concerted volition is deliberate or rational.

Objective Conditions. — The subjective factors of concerted volition can be combined only under favouring

objective conditions of developed communication and association.

1. *Developed Communication*.—The first step in the conversion of spontaneous like response into concerted volition is a more or less systematic development of Communication.

This is effected in backward communities by occasional gatherings, and through journeys or an exchange of visits; in more advanced communities through assemblies, journeys, and visits, and through an exchange of letters; and in the most advanced modern communities through all the above means and by means, also, of the telegraph and the telephone, and the circulation of newspapers, magazines, and books.

2. *Association*.—The second step is the development of Association, which may be described as either a frequent personal meeting and conversation, or as a sustained and indefinitely continued communication, carried on by the same individuals.

Personal meeting, conversation, and discussion are the usual form. Meetings may be informal, as in the association of men who frequent a tavern or a club; or they may be formal, as the meetings of a board of directors or of a body of citizens.

Coöperation

Concerted volition itself, as distinguished from its subjective and objective conditions, is always a form of Coöperation.

This word stands for many kinds of mutual aid; and from one point of view nearly every kind of activity in human society is a form of coöperation. For this reason there have been writers who have described coöperation as the essential and distinctive fact of society. This view might successfully be maintained if it could be shown that coöperation is coextensive with like response to the same stimulus. If it is only one mode or development of like response, it is not the primary social fact.

The Nature of Coöperation.—The fact, then, is that not all like response can be described as coöperation. Like response may result in nothing useful or even tangible. It may end in an aimless activity or in mere uproar and confusion. It is coöperation only if the like activities of the similarly responding individuals are by some means coördinated and brought to bear upon some particular work or task which is necessary or useful, or which, at any rate, is supposed to be useful.

The necessary coördination may be brought about by other means than a conscious planning by the coöperating individuals. Certain coördinations result from the mere mechanical laws of motion. Some of these may prove to be useful, although no use was consciously anticipated. Useful coördinations may be preserved by natural selection and become instinctive. Such coöperation may be described as unconscious coöperation.

In conscious coöperation like activities are coördinated and directed upon some useful achievement through conscious planning. This kind of coöperation is a mode of concerted volition, and, practically, all concerted volition is conscious coöperation.

Conscious coöperation presupposes (1) a common interest in a common object or end, which, as we have seen, is a like responsiveness to the same stimulus; (2) a perception by each that all are responding in like ways to the same stimulus, and this perception is a consciousness of kind; (3) communication, one motive of which is the consciousness of kind; (4) some degree of confidence in one another, which presupposes a consciousness of kind.

Whenever it is proposed to organize an association for any purpose, the consciousness of kind manifests itself in the first step that is taken, namely, the canvassing of a tentative list of possible members. The test applied to each proposed individual is the

question, "Is he interested, or will he become interested, in this undertaking, are his qualities and abilities of the right sort, and will he coöperate harmoniously with the other members."

The Causes of Coöperation.—Not only must mental and practical resemblance precede all coöperation, and the consciousness of kind precede conscious coöperation, but also, if they exist, the coöperation necessarily follows. When a population is undergoing socialization by the processes that were described in the preceding chapter, it engages in coöperative activities as a necessary consequence of the same causes and conditions that establish the mental and moral changes of socialization.

This becomes clearly apparent when we recall the fundamental condition of all social activities; namely, like responsiveness to the same stimuli, and remember that like responsiveness is the doing of the same thing under the same or like circumstances.

Like responsiveness to stimulus shades so gradually into coöperation that it is often difficult to discover at what point the coöperation begins. Where, for instance, does it begin in the pursuit of a thief on the street? The question is obviously one of degrees or stages of responsiveness, as, by degrees, like activities are coördinated and directed upon a particular end or achievement.

If, for example, all the men and women and children of a village rush out of their houses to see a fire that has flamed up upon the horizon many miles away, the act is merely a like response to the same stimulus. If, a few hours later, the fire is discovered to be a prairie or forest conflagration that is sweeping onward with great rapidity toward their own hamlet, these people begin to take measures to prevent the destruction of their property. They go out with ploughs and spades to throw up furrows of earth which they hope the flames will not cross. We now speak of their activity as coöperation. The only difference, however, between their conduct at the first and at the last is that at the last the like responsiveness is carried a stage or two further, is complicated and coördinated by the consciousness of a common intent, and results in the accomplishment of a purpose of common interest.

In ways like this all coöperation arises, and under favourable circumstances all like responsiveness to the same stimulus becomes coöperation.

To the uncritical observer the beginnings of coöperation such as may be seen among animals and, on a larger scale, among uncivilized men, may seem to be merely accidental. Beetles among insects, mice, rats, and squirrels among rodents, often aid each other in moving objects too heavy for one alone to manage. Various species of hunting birds drive fish into a corner of a bay or curve of a river by forming a line across the water. Packs of hunting animals carry coöperation of this simple sort yet further. In all these cases it is easy to say that the coöperation has originally been purely accidental, and that it has become habitual through the development of instinct by natural selection. This explanation, however, does not go to the root of the matter. Instinct has not been developed by natural selection without having had material to work on; and that material, in all cases, has been the like responsiveness of the like nervous organizations of the coöperating animals or men to the same stimulus, more or less complicated by sympathy and imitation.

Among individuals mentally and practically alike, coöperation, thus necessarily initiated, is necessarily further developed, because it yields to the coöperating individuals the same kind of pleasure.

The pleasure here referred to is not that which is afforded by the remoter utilities, such as an abundance of food, or security against danger, in which the coöperation presently results; it is the immediate pleasure of combined activity. When a boat crew rows or a football team plays for practice, it not only enjoys in anticipation the hoped-for triumph over a rival organization in some future contest, but it enjoys at the moment the pleasurable reaction of concerted physical and mental activity. In the excitement of play the football men do not think of the future victory to be achieved; they are absorbed in the incidents of the immediate contest. All coöperation, bringing individuals together in combined effort, yields this stimulating excitement in a greater or a less degree, and, therefore, more or less of immediate pleasure, which becomes a motive for continuing and perfecting the coöperation.

Thus begun and partially developed, coöperation is yet further developed and perfected because the remoter utilities which it creates are by its resembling participants regarded in like ways. If a particular mode of coöperation produces an unwonted abundance of food supplies, or establishes a degree of security hitherto unknown, the individuals who have engaged in coöperative activity because of their mental and practical resemblance and their consciousness of kind, necessarily see and interpret the results in substantially the same way; they reason in substantially the same way about the desirability of perpetuating and increasing such results by a further extension of their co-operation.

For three reasons, then, coöperation, which can arise only among individuals mentally and practically alike, among them necessarily does arise and develop as a consequence of their similarity and socialization. They respond in like ways to like stimuli, and find themselves actually coöperating before they know why or how. They find the same pleasure in coöperative activity; and therefore, irrespective of its remoter results, they desire to continue and to perfect it. In like ways they perceive, interpret, and reason about the useful results, more remotely flowing from coöperative activity, and therefore with a common judgment they decide to continue and to extend it.

The Forms of Coöperation.—Thus originating, coöperation develops into various forms and through successive stages of complication, step by step with the development of successive modes of mental and practical resemblance and of the consciousness of kind.

In its beginnings coöperation is simple and direct in its plan or form.

Such, for example, is the coöperation of rural neighbours in a barn-raising or a corn-husking.

Another simple form of coöperation is indirect. Instead of being a combination of the efforts of two or more individuals in doing precisely the same thing, it is a combination of their efforts in achieving the same general result through a performance of different specific things.

The coöperation in this case takes the form of exchange. All trade is a simple but indirect form of coöperation.

Coöperation becomes complex when the direct and indirect forms are combined, as they are in any undertaking in which different individuals engaged in creating the same product or result, produce very different parts of it, or work in different ways.

In a manufacturing establishment, the coöperation is direct, because all the operatives, mechanics, foreman, superintendent, and other employees are engaged in producing the same sort of goods. It is also indirect, because some are working at one process with one kind of machinery, others at a different process with another kind of machinery; and because some superintend or direct, while others are directed and merely follow instructions. Any operation into which the principles of subordination and of the division of labour enter is a complex coöperation.

In the modern industrial world, these complex forms of coöperation enter into further complications through their relations with one another in the market. Great manufacturing businesses, themselves highly complex forms of coöperation, are so many units in the vast system of commercial exchange. In its entirety, therefore, the industrial and commercial organization of modern society is a coöperation which has become doubly and trebly complex.

And even this highly complicated system is only a unit in that greater coöperation of industrial with political, educational, religious, and pleasurable enterprises, which, together, make up the entire activity of modern communities.

The extension of coöperation from its simple beginnings to these complicated higher forms obviously depends upon an extension of genuine mental and practical resemblance

throughout the population, and a corresponding expansion of the consciousness of kind. The particular points of resemblance that are most essential to the higher forms of coöperation are those which enter into what we call good faith; and a common belief throughout the community in the general good faith of the individuals composing society is the particular form of the consciousness of kind that also is essential.

TABLE XLI. — PREVAILING FORMS OF COÖPERATION

M 1. Simple and Direct.	M 3. Complex.
M 2. Indirect.	M 4. Compound.

Extent of Coöperation. — The number of persons similarly responding to any given stimulus, and, therefore, the group of possible coöperators in a given work, may not exceed a small fraction of an entire natural society; it may be a large fraction; or it may include all members of the entire social population.

The coöperation of all individual members of an entire natural society constitutes what we are in the habit of calling Public Activity, and an entire natural society viewed as coöperating is a State.

Public and Private Coöperation. — It is not necessary, however, to the conception of the state to suppose the active participation of each individual in every common task, or to suppose that the common response to stimulus is immediate and direct. In many instances the coöperation may be passive rather than active; in many instances response may be indirect. It is sufficient if the like response to a common stimulus is adequate to assure the passive assent, or to prevent the resistance, of those individuals whose coöperation does not assume the active mode. And it is sufficient if in many instances the like response is immediate and direct among a few individuals only,

if these have the power to compel the obedience and thereby to enforce the coöperation of all others. In other words, that coöperation of an entire social population which constitutes it a state, is largely effected through complicated relations of coöperation between sovereign and subjects.

Any individual, group, or class of coöperating individuals, or entire coöperating people having the disposition and the power to exact, and, in fact, exacting obedience from all individuals in the social population, is a Sovereign.

All individuals who obey a sovereign — be that sovereign a person, a class, or a people — are Subjects.

Sovereign and subjects together, in their normal relation of authority and obedience, are a State.

The coöperation of sovereign and subjects, or state activity, is Public Coöperation.

The state then, or the public, is the entire natural society responding in like ways to the same stimuli, and coöperating in the achievement of useful tasks of common interest: and this is true, whether the response of all individual members of the society is direct, and their coöperation active, or the response of some is indirect, taking the form of obedience to a sovereign, and their coöperation mere passive assent or non-resistance.

When only a part of the social population responds to the same stimulus, and engages in coöperation without the participation or the command of the sovereign, although not without the sovereign's tacit or implied consent, we speak of the coöperation as Private or Voluntary.

In the analysis, which we are about to make, of the work of coöperation, it is necessary to view each group of activities from the standpoint of private, and from that of public coöperation.

The Work of Coöperation: Complex Activities. — It was shown that coöperation consists of those like activities of

similarly responding individuals that are coördinated and brought to bear upon some particular task which is useful, or at least is supposed to be useful. We have now to observe and to analyze the work upon which coöperation is directed.

Appreciation, utilization, characterization, and socialization are the simple modes of all the practical activities known to a social population. These simple modes, however, are variously combined in four great groups of Complex Activities, the essential character of each of which is determined by the predominance of some one of the primitive modes of practical activity. The work of coöperation always consists in carrying on and developing the complex activities.

Since each group of complex activities includes both the purely mental processes of appreciation and the motor processes of utilization, it is necessary to regard each group of complex activities from the intellectual and the practical standpoint, — as a development of ideas through communication, association, and other modes of concerted volition, and as an outward manifestation in conduct, also developed by concerted volition. We shall, therefore, speak of each group of concerted activities as a development of thought and activity.

Outward action, in turn, or concerted conduct, presents two aspects, each of which must be observed. One is that of action as such, irrespective of the forms that it assumes, or the modes of organization developed by those who participate. Concerted action as such is always a combined aggression, or a combined defence; real, as in serious enterprises, or mimic, as in play or ceremonial. The second aspect is that of the forms that concerted action assumes. If relatively enduring, these forms constitute social organization. The study of forms is therefore a large subject by itself, and will be taken up in detail in Part III. In the present chapter we shall have to do with it only to the extent of mentioning the forms that arise in connection with the concerted activities from which they spring.

1. *Cultural Thought and Activity.* — The coöperative development of appreciation is called Culture. Cultu-

ral activity is appreciation complicated by utilization, characterization, and socialization. Various adaptations of the things about us — the useful elements of the environment — are brought to bear upon the evolution of appreciation, as for example in the plastic arts, in scientific experimentation, and in the improvement of the means of travel and communication. In all this, utilization is combined with and made auxiliary to appreciation. Characterization is brought to bear through every accommodation of the individual life to the circumstances of its existence, whereby, in the further activities of appreciation and utilization, a higher degree of achievement is made possible; and socialization is obviously combined with appreciation in the very fact of coöperative activity.

The elementary cultural *ideas* are those pertaining to language and its development. Language, in the last analysis, is a number of signs or names attached to objects, circumstances, acts, and qualities. Abstract or conceptual thinking in the last analysis consists in the mental separation of names from the things named; in other words, in thinking of names as such, and applying or not applying them to particular things at will.

It is unnecessary to argue that the naming of things, qualities, acts, and circumstances has been coöperatively developed. Any name actually in use is the product of many minds. An object may have suggested its own vocal or written sign, but the sign actually in use is a product of countless imitations. In like manner, the ideas conveyed by language are a product of countless suggestions, coöperatively developed. Conceptual thinking is coöperative thinking.

Next in simplicity to linguistic ideas are ideas known to ethnologists by the name "animistic," suggested by Professor E. B. Tylor. Children and savages, and many ignorant persons in civilized communities, conceive of

inanimate objects as personal. Beliefs about their supposed habits and powers constitute a large part of the culture of savage communities. Animals, in like manner, are conceived as being like men, not only in their power of voluntary motion, but also in powers of thought, imagination, and purpose.

Animistic thought survives in important cultural phenomena of highly developed communities. The habit of personification is one which the human mind does not outgrow.

Crude or developed animistic thought is differentiated into two great groups of ideas. One consists of animistic interpretations of the finite; the other consists of animistic interpretations of the infinite. The first group includes all personifications of familiar objects and acts, that is, all conceptions of them as personal, or as proceeding from personality. These are æsthetic or artistic ideas, and they are further differentiated into the poetic and the plastic. The other group of animistic ideas includes ideas of a first cause, of creation, of the beginning of life, of death, and of the possibility of existence after death. These collectively are religious ideas, and religion in general may be defined as the animistic interpretation of the infinite.

Poetic ideas of finite things shade imperceptibly into religious ideas of infinity. Thus, the worship of animals has prevailed in every part of the world, and it yet survives among savage peoples. But animals, when worshipped, are conceived as having extraordinary powers, as having existed from a dim past, and played a rôle in the work of creation, and as having a possibility of continued existence after apparent death. In other words, in primitive animistic thought, notions of the finite and of the infinite, poetic ideas and religious ideas, are not yet discriminated.

Later in development than the linguistic and the animistic, and grasped by fewer minds, are cultural ideas of

a third class, namely, the scientific. The simplest scientific notions are those of counting, measuring, weighing, and classification. From these ultimately are developed generalizations and conceptions of law and cause.

Cultural *activities* are directly related to these three classes of cultural ideas.

Directly related to linguistic ideas are those partly imitative, partly conscious acts, maintained and developed by concerted volition, which collectively we call Manners. Related both to linguistic and to archaic animistic ideas are concerted activities in the ceremonial development of manners.

Directly related to archaic animistic ideas are concerted activities in the ceremonial use and development of Costume.

Dress and its development into costume did not originate in ideas of comfort, or in any sense of modesty. A very early, if not the earliest, motive for concealing parts of the body was the wish to prevent the access of unwelcome spirits.¹ More elaborate costumes had their origin in imitations of birds and animals, for the purpose of exercising over them a magical control, and especially to assure success in hunting.

Corresponding to archaic animistic ideas, both poetic and religious, are the concerted activities of Festivity and Social Amusement.

Already attention has been drawn to the immediate pleasure which companionship affords, irrespective of any remoter utility that coöperation may procure. Human beings living together in local proximity, then, do not have to invent social pleasures; but they soon acquire the habit of spending much time and thought in perfecting pleasurable forms of social intercourse. In every community a large proportion of time is spent in the various forms of

¹ See Professor William I. Thomas, "The Psychology of Modesty and Clothing," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. V, No. 2, September, 1899.

social pleasure, that have no other foreseen utility than the immediate enjoyment which they afford.

Social pleasures which thus, on the subjective side, are a development of companionship, on the physical side are a development of two simple physiological facts; namely, first, the necessity of eating, which becomes the occasion of the common meal, the banquet, and the festival, and second, that expenditure of surplus energy, by animals, children, and adult human beings, which takes the form of play.

Partly because it is an expenditure of surplus energy, and partly because it is the indulgence of the young, rather than of the old, play consists largely of imitations of the more serious activities of life engaged in by adults. A great part of all play is mimic work or mimic war.

In their imitations of the serious activities of life, however, coöperative play and the more elaborate social amusements often go back to examples which originated in a distant past, instead of copying as nearly as possible the methods of work and war at present followed. The games of children are peculiarly rich in survivals of early practices. Of the social amusements that adults share with children, dancing affords a good illustration. The forms of the dance have all been derived from the serious business of life; but as carried on by the primitive, rather than by the modern man. The march describes itself as of a very simple military origin. Some of the less simple forms have been derived from imitations of the chase and from imitations of animal movements of interest to the hunter. The sacred dances of uncivilized peoples are for the most part connected with forms of animal worship, and animal worship is a phase of the primitive man's system of economy. His dances, accordingly, imitate the running, leaping, flying, and other spontaneous movements of the animal species that are worshipped and mimicked. From these origins, by a very slow evolution, have been derived the graceful movements of modern waltzes, polkas, and other dance forms.

Closely associated with a mimetic perpetuation of primitive activities is the essentially animistic quality of social amusements; they are dominated throughout by animistic ideas. Compared with the wealth of poetic and artistic conceptions which are found in every actually existing mode of social pleasure, the scientific conceptions are in almost insignificant number and influence.

It is by the addition of animistic play or poetic ceremonial, or at

least of artistic costume and ceremonial manner of animistic significance, that the common meal, an organic function developed by mere companionship into a simple social pleasure, is transformed into the banquet or the festival. It is by the agency of animistic ideas and through the incorporation of animistic forms, more or less ceremonial, that spontaneous plays are converted into elaborate games or spectacular popular amusements, for example, the bull-fight or the circus.

Largely developed out of social amusements, and like them corresponding to animistic ideas, both poetic and religious, are the *Æsthetic Arts* and all concerted activity in developing them.

From the story-telling of festival occasions have been derived our higher forms of literature, the epic, the historical narrative, and the novel. From the primitive dance, with its mimicry and its choral song, have come our drama, our lyric poetry, and our music. From the rude drawing, carving, and painting of animate forms, originally practised for purposes of imitative magic, and chiefly in connection with the development of costume, have grown our painting and our sculpture, and the artistic element in architecture.

Of all modes of concerted volition none, perhaps, reacts more powerfully upon concerted volition itself and upon socialization, than coöperation in social pleasure. It is on the playground that boys and girls learn most of the lessons of toleration, sympathy, coöperation, and knowledge of human nature, and have those experiences of the pleasurable of association that, in after life, make them appreciative of the value of society, and able to contribute to its defence or perfection. By the social pleasures of adult life these experiences are deepened and enriched. Even when in solitude we enjoy the creations of literature and art, we are in imagination living with our fellow-men, participating with them in conflict, sharing in their loves and their hatreds, sympathizing with them in suffering, and rejoicing with them in success.

Corresponding to religious ideas are those forms of concerted action constituting Worship, Revivals, Pilgrimages, and the more elaborate Religious Ceremonies. Religious coöperation, like coöperation in social pleasure, has always

reacted powerfully upon socialization and the further development of concerted volition.

Corresponding to scientific ideas are coöperative undertakings in exploration and research, and in the recording and transmission of knowledge.

Cultural ideas arise in individual minds and, for the most part, are developed, at least in the earlier stages of their history, by private coöperation; but sooner or later they always receive the stamp of public coöperation.

The sovereign undertakes to mould them, and not without success, by authoritative definition, by suggestion, by recommendation and promulgation, or by the opposite course of repression. The active agents of the sovereign in this effort have been state priesthoods, public censors, and ministers of instruction.

Cultural activities are carried on chiefly by private or voluntary coöperation, but in every natural society they are carried on also by public coöperation.

The state gives banquets and provides public entertainments. It encourages literature and art, and provides for many scientific researches for which private resources would be inadequate.

2. *Economic Thought and Activity.*—The coöperative development of utilization is the chief process in Economic Activity; yet economic activity is more than utilization. It is the complex product of utilization in combination with appreciation, characterization, and socialization. Utilization is possible only to the extent that through appreciation we have mentally grasped the environment which we would adapt to our own purposes. Moreover, to carry on economic activity men must not only have the instinct to utilize and the habit of trying experiments, in adapting the external world to themselves, but they must have acquired that discipline of character which enables them to work persistently and with intelligent

purpose; and they must further have formed the habit of helping one another in their work in all possible ways. Economic activity, then, is a moralized and socialized process of utilization.

Economic *ideas* include many animistic beliefs in combination with scientific conceptions of man's relation to his environment.

Accordingly, the economic ideas of a people must be described as, on the whole, animistic, if superstition and an unlimited belief in luck, reliance on omens, signs, and magic, govern their hunting, fishing, agriculture, and industrial arts; as, on the whole, scientific, if scientific notions of utility, of productive labour, of capital, and of organization control.

The larger part of the economic thinking of each individual is borrowed from his predecessors of former generations, and most of the remainder from his contemporaries. The final form which his economic ideas assume, however, is, in nearly all cases, determined by his actual economic coöperation with his business associates or fellow-workmen.

Economic *activities*, maintained by concerted volition, are developed out of, and coördinated with, the purely organic activities of physical life and the instinctive utilization of the lower animals. The system of activities and relations, including natural selection and the survival of the fittest, which determines the well-being of physical organisms devoid of mentality, may be called an Organic Economy.¹ The activities and relationships into which instinct enters as a controlling factor, and which determine the well-being of animal life, may be called an Instinctive Economy. Supplementing the organic and the instinctive economy in savage, barbarian, and the more ignorant civil communities, are numberless ceremonial activities, based upon animistic conceptions and having for their object

¹ See "The Economic Ages," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. XVI, No. 2, June, 1901, pp. 193-221.

success in hunting or fishing, the fertility of flocks and herds, the fertility of the land, or the control of rain and sun. These constitute a Ceremonial Economy. Largely replacing such ceremonies in all more highly civilized communities are the coöperative activities of a Business Economy, including the development of the household, the conduct of trade, and organized industry, with its more or less complex division of labour. Incidental to these developments of coöperation in civilization are the phenomena of concerted volition in financial or industrial booms, crazes, panics, and strikes.

Economic coöperation is either public or private. The economic activity of the state is known as public economy, or as public finance.

3. *Moral Thought and Activity.* — The coöperative development of characterization is Morality, or Moral Activity. Morality, however, like cultural and economic activity, is a complex process. With the relatively simple activity of characterization are combined the activities of appreciation, utilization, and socialization, each of which, through concerted volition, is brought to bear upon the development of character.

Moral *ideas*, as developed by private coöperation, include notions of conduct as injurious or beneficial to the community, and as therefore deserving of approbation or disapprobation, praise or blame, reward or punishment, conceptions that develop into notions of right and wrong.

Specific kinds of conduct thus falling under the categories of right and wrong are: acts of violence, fidelity, and treachery, the keeping and breaking of pledges, the performing of agreements, truth-telling and lying, sexual mating, and the dealings of parents and children, brothers and sisters, and other relatives, with one another.

Moral ideas developed by public authority become legal or juristic ideas, and moral principles become rules of law.

The original content of a rule of law is one of those notions of right or wrong already mentioned, a principle of action which experience has demonstrated, and which discussion has reduced to intelligible formulation. Such a principle becomes a rule of law when it is authoritatively affirmed by the community as a whole through its government, or in its capacity as the state, as a rule of conduct which all men must obey, and when it is enforced by the infliction of penalties for disobedience. More briefly, law is morality enforced by public coöperation.

Voluntary concerted *activity* in moral matters takes the form of common tolerations and abstinences, social condemnation, boycotting, hazing, mobbing, lynching, or other collective vengeance not inflicted by public authority.

Public moral activity, — *i.e.* Juristic Activity, — is an enforcement of the rules of law.

Enforcement takes the form of judgment and execution by authorized agents of the public. An enforced public arbitration terminates private disputes. Public accusation, trial, and solemn punishment are substituted for private vengeance and lynching.

4. *Political Thought and Activity.*—Socialization, which begins spontaneously and unconsciously in acquaintance, imitation, and conflict, is deliberately furthered by concerted volition. To this end all new developments of appreciation, of utilization, and of characterization, are brought to bear upon the process of assimilation. Public and private coöperation in the task of socialization, thus complicated, is Political Activity.

Political ideas and activities regarded as a coöperative development of socialization cleave into two distinct divisions. The ideas of the one division are concepts of individuals regarded as members of society, and of society

itself as enjoying a certain distinction or attainment; the corresponding activities are direct dealings by society with itself, or with its individual members, in an effort to mould their natures to a common social type. The ideas and activities of the other division relate to various means by which the end, socialization, is more or less indirectly achieved.

Examining first the political *ideas*, we may conveniently designate the two divisions or groups into which they fall as primary and secondary, since the one pertains to ends to be achieved or conserved, and the other pertains to means.

First, among the *primary* political notions, is an uncritical idea of the *group* or *population itself*, and of its self-preservation.

The individual members of a community in their own persons are the supreme end or object for which the society exists. All social relations, and all coöperative activities, are means for the safe-guarding and the perfection of these concrete associates.

Second, among the primary political ideas, is the notion of the *character* or *kind* of the group, as found in its individual members in their capacity of companions or associates, neighbours, friends, and fellow-workers.

As a member of society every individual finds himself profoundly interested in the concrete personalities about him. Their qualities concern him directly. His own self-preservation may depend on their character and social attitude. When self-preservation is assured, all other social phenomena concern him chiefly as they affect the types of personality with which he has to deal.

In societies that have a public organization of the civil as distinguished from the tribal type, the *socius* is a citizen.

This object of ever-present political interest, the *socius* or citizen, may be conceived as actual or as ideal.

In the thought of the socius as actual, some mode or point of resemblance is seized upon. The less developed a community is and the cruder its thinking, the more likely is it to emphasize the importance of that resemblance which is or is supposed to be correlated with the degree of kinship. The savage bases his whole system of social organization upon distinctions of real or nominal blood relationship. Minds of a higher development fix upon mental and moral resemblances irrespective of kinship, and as expressed in culture, economy, law, or politics.

In the concept of the socius as ideal, the point of resemblance usually fixed upon is the type of character. The idealized citizen is conceived as a forceful man, a convivial man, an austere man, or a rationally conscientious man. Concerted effort to assimilate different qualities of mind and character in the community is usually an attempt to mould all men to one of these types of character which, at the moment, happens to be preferred above any other.

Third in importance among primary political ideas is that of the preferred *distinction* or *attainment* of the community. This is always determined by the preference for one or another type of character. According as the community prefers the forceful, the convivial, the austere, or the rationally conscientious man, it desires to be distinguished for power, for splendour, for uprightness and justness, or for liberty and enlightenment.

The *secondary* political ideas, pertaining to the means by which the conservation or the perfection of a certain social type is attained, are distributed in four groups. They comprise, first, notions of social cohesion or unity; second, notions of the extent and composition of the community; third, ideas of social property or possessions, and, fourth, ideas of social policy.

Combined with ideas of the cohesion of the community, are notions of comprehension, loyalty, patronage, bribery, or coercion, as means to maintain it. The notions of the extent and composition of the community include the concept of the community as a simple group or as made up of federated or consolidated groups. Con-

cepts of the possessions of the community include ideas of such traditional personages as gods, saints, and heroes; of such inherited territories as the national or communal domain, historic spots and sacred places; of such inherited customs as those constituting worship, the arts, amusements, costumes, manners, and language; of such institutions as the form of government, the legal system, contract, property, the labour system, the church, marriage, and the family, and the state itself. Ideas of social policy include plans for maintenance or growth, programmes of socialization or modification of the social type, and ideas of the form which such policies should assume, as coercive or educative, socialistic or individualistic.

All concerted social *activity*, as has been said, assumes the form of Aggression or the form of Defence. This is more conspicuously true, perhaps, of political activity than of any other form of coöperation.

The simplest concerted acts of political aggression or defence pertain to the self-preservation of the group and to its common possessions, namely, the gods, the sacred places, the common territory, the cherished customs and institutions. Next in order come, collective aggression upon, or collective defence of, the social cohesion—the internal public order. These acts may take the form of crusades, riots, insurrections, or rebellions, or the opposite form of concerted activity to put down such disturbances. Third in order is collective aggression or defence relative to the extent and composition of the community, usually taking the form of wars of conquest and expansion. Finally, comes all coöperative activity to achieve the preferred distinction of the community, and to mould the citizen to a preferred social type.

All these modes of social activity, like coöperation in cultural, economic, or moral activity, may be public or private.

Private political coöperation may be a spontaneous effort to repel an impending danger, to organize resistance or rebellion, or to awaken the public mind to a consciousness of some great abuse or desirable reform. It may be a systematic agitation, an organized electoral campaign, or the organization and development of a political party.

It includes the activity of all political cliques, clubs, rings, and "machines." As applied to the preferred distinction of the community and the preferred type of citizen, it includes all efforts to favour one type of conduct and character at the expense of others, by means of public opinion, or of private penalties and rewards, including discrimination, patronage, economic coercion, and ecclesiastical disfavour.

The state engages in aggressive and defensive operations with reference to the acquisition or protection of territory, the development or conservation of religion and the arts, the creation, maintenance, or overthrow of institutions, and the maintenance of public order. It endeavours to achieve the preferred distinction of the community by means of a formulated policy, carried out through the agency of the legislature, the executive, and the courts. It represses certain social types by bringing the military power, the law, or ecclesiastical penalties, to bear upon them. It cultivates other types by means of educational undertakings and by public favour.

Modes of Concerted Volition: Like-mindedness

When the simultaneous-like responses of a plural number of individuals have developed through the consciousness of kind into concerted volition, the total phenomenon of resemblance thus established may be called like-mindedness. According as instinctive, sympathetic, dogmatic, or critical elements predominate in the type of mind, will the mode of concerted volition vary, from an almost instinctive action up through impulsive and contagious action into formal, or perhaps more or less fanatical, action, or ultimately into deliberative action. And, according to these variations, may the like-mindedness, as a whole, be described as Instinctive, Sympathetic, Dogmatic, or Deliberative Like-mindedness.

Instinctive Like-mindedness. — The simplest combination of the feelings, ideas, and volitions of a number of individuals is that which occurs instinctively, with little or no conscious realization of what is happening.

That such combinations occur among animals is quite certain. That they occur among human beings without modification by higher mental processes is possible but not proven. Among human beings, however, there are formed from time to time local aggregations of individuals so ignorant, so uniformly of an ideo-motor type, that their coöperative activity, rudimentary and irregular, is very largely a phenomenon of instinct rather than of conscious intent.

1. *Subjective Factors of Instinctive Like-mindedness.* — The basis of instinctive like-mindedness, including instinctive coöperation, is a predominance of the ideo-motor type of mind. Response to stimulus is prompt and mechanical, always presenting the appearance of spontaneity. Emotion is strong and violent, and reasoning conjectural. The consciousness of kind is of an imperfect sort, sympathy and perception rather than the complex emotions or any reflective thought predominating. Imitativeness is but moderately developed, while combativeness and intolerance are of primitive strength.

Many observations and tabulations of facts must be made, however, before much that is specific and definite can be affirmed of the subjective factors of instinctive social action.

2. *Objective Factors.* — As we have already seen, the objective factors which enter into concerted volition are, the means and frequency of communication and the forms and frequency of association.

In groups of purely instinctive individuals there can be no other means of communication than those which nature provides. There must be actual meeting, and an expression of mental states by voice or gesture.

Inasmuch, however, as it is more than doubtful whether instinct alone ever develops into concerted volition — as distinguished from an unpremeditated coöperation — the real problem for the student of instinctive like-mindedness is always one of the relative proportion of instinct to reason in the actual coöperation observed. If, then, in

any coöperating group the means of communication are largely artificial, it is certain that the like-mindedness is of a higher grade than the instinctive.

3. *Development of Coöperation.* — Since a purely instinctive coöperation is unpremeditated, it can contribute nothing to the development of cultural ideas, and consequently can add nothing more than mere force to a consciously intended development of cultural, economic, moral, and political activities.

Observations of these complex activities in groups that are largely instinctive rather than rational must therefore relate to the precise degree and extent to which the complex activities are coöperatively developed.

4. *Evidences and Extent of Instinctive Like-mindedness.* — If language consists of few words, and shows little grammatical structure; if poetic and plastic ideas are simple, though genuine and æsthetically good; if religious ideas are extremely low and crude, and scientific ideas almost lacking; if the cultural activities seldom rise above the level of coarse festivity and crudely mimetic dancing; if economic ideas and activities are prevailingly animistic rather than scientific; if the only moral sanctions are private revenge and collective vengeance, and if political ideas embrace only the social type and organization of a small horde of consanguini, or of an isolated local community, it is safe to describe and to classify the like-mindedness as on the whole instinctive.

Such groups are the endogamous hordes of the lowest savagery, and certain small and very ignorant rural neighbourhoods or city slums in modern populations. The type is well represented in the "squatter."

Instinctive like-mindedness is combined with elements of rationality in all the higher modes of concerted volition. Its important contribution to coöperation is energy, — a prompt, vigorous activity, the basis of all accomplishment.

Sympathetic Like-mindedness. — A higher and more complex like-mindedness is that which is predominantly sympathetic and imitative. No social phenomenon has occupied a larger place in the totality of human affairs than this, and none calls for more painstaking study by the serious investigator.

1. *Subjective Factors of Sympathetic Like-mindedness.* — The basis of all sympathetic like-mindedness is found in a predominance of the ideo-emotional type of mind, with its prompt response to stimulus, its emotionalism, imaginativeness, suggestibility, and habit of reasoning from analogy. Other factors are a reciprocal consciousness of kind which is rapidly formed, a great susceptibility to emblem and shibboleth, great imitativeness, and contagious emotion.

(1) *Impulsive Like-response.* — The like response to stimulus in which a sympathetic like-mindedness begins is prompt, but it is less automatic than the response of mere instinct.

Little of the current of energy which is carried along afferent nerves to the spinal cord is switched off into the thought centres of the brain to set up deliberation; but it may be enough to convert mere reflex action or blind instinct into a conscious, even though practically resistless, impulse.¹

(2) *Suggestibility.* — This impulsive like-response, however, is not to external stimulus merely. In the phenomena of sympathetic like-mindedness a large part is played by suggestion.

A person is subject to suggestion if he responds unconsciously to an idea as we all respond automatically in reflex action to a sensation. The normal tendency of an idea, as of a sensation, is toward motor discharge; for an idea is not only a state of consciousness, it

¹ For a careful discussion of the difference between instinct and impulse see Marshall, "Instinct and Reason," Part III.

is also a hint to do something — it is a suggestion. The tendency to act is held in check only by counteracting ideas. If no counteracting ideas come into the mind, or if, when they come, they receive no attention, the idea already there has everything its own way. The suggestion is unconsciously followed. Complete inability to resist suggestion is, however, an abnormal state of the brain. It is known as the hypnotic trance. The critical faculty of the hypnotized patient is altogether suspended; and he converts suggestions into acts with the unhesitating precision of a machine. Hypnotic conditions are not infrequently found in the phenomena of concerted volition.

(3) *Reciprocal Consciousness of Kind*. — Suggestibility is heightened by a reciprocal consciousness of kind. By this term is meant a consciousness of kind that exists at the same moment in each of the resembling individuals.

Obviously, it may happen that one of two or more resembling individuals becomes aware of the resemblance before any other person does. Such a consciousness of kind, limited to the thought of a single individual, cannot give rise to concerted volition. But when each of the resembling individuals becomes aware of the resemblance, such consciousness may become a suggestion to combined action, or it may create suggestions which will initiate concerted volition.

(4) *Emblem and Shibboleth*. — The suggestions here referred to are created by the reciprocal consciousness of kind by fixing the attention of each individual upon some object, word, phrase, or cry. Such an object or word must, however, be a symbol or sign, calling to mind a group of facts in which the mind is interested.

The national flag, for example, is a symbol that calls to mind all the ideas and emotions of patriotism. When, at the same moment, the attention of many individuals is arrested by this symbol, as it is when the flag is unfurled on some noteworthy occasion, it not only serves as a stimulus to which the ideas, emotions, and conduct of the men who behold it respond in like ways, and as a means of awakening their consciousness of kind as they think of their common coun-

try, their common history, and their common hopes for the future, but it also starts yet other modes of mental activity which greatly complicate those already mentioned.

The process is this: The reciprocal consciousness of kind, acting upon common possessions, interests, and ideas converts their images, symbols, and names into Social Emblems and Shibboleths.

Examples of emblems and shibboleths are armorial bearings, the flags and banners of states, and such words or phrases as "family," "home," "class," "altars," "the gods," "the fathers," "the country," "native land," "the king," "the army," "the party," "our cause," "the right," "liberty," and "fraternity." Any one of these words may, in a moment of general excitement, arouse a crowd to furious enthusiasm or even to frenzy.

Such objects and names are not converted into emblems and shibboleths, and do not acquire their power over the human mind merely by meaning the same things to many individuals, or even by being thought of by many individuals at the same moment. They become emblems and shibboleths only when each individual is conscious that, at a given moment, they mean to his associates what they mean to him, and arouse in them the same emotions that they arouse in him. They are emblems and shibboleths only when they are products of a reciprocal consciousness of kind, but as such products they powerfully react upon the consciousness of kind itself.

The emblem or shibboleth not only calls the attention of an individual who sees or hears it to the object or fact that it symbolizes, and awakens in him certain feelings; it also fixes his attention upon the feelings that it arouses and the conduct that it incites in others. The emotions and conduct of others, of which he is thus made aware, at once begin to act upon himself as an influence that merges with the original effect of the emblem or shibboleth. It intensifies or diminishes the initial power of the symbol over his mind, and quickens or restrains his responsive action.

(5) *Imitativeness*. — If with the foregoing factors great imitativeness be combined, there will exist the possibility of exceedingly swift concerted action by great masses of men, which, in its character, will be blindly impulsive, wholly uncontrolled by critical deliberation, unconscious of the right or the wrong, the expediency or the in expediency of what is being done, and regardless of consequences.

(6) *Contagious Emotion*. — Among suggestible and imitative individuals emotion is often highly contagious, and if strong emotion, particularly fear, anger, or hate, is added to the factors already described, we have the complete phenomenon of sympathetic like-mindedness.

The sympathetic concert of will may be incredible in its brutality or astonishing in its heroism or magnanimity, according to the character of the stimulus in which it began.

2. *Objective Factors*. — Suggestion by emblem and shibboleth and the contagion of emotion depend upon communication. The effectiveness and rapidity of suggestion, and both the intensity and the extent of contagious emotion depend largely upon the means and the extent of communication and upon the character of association.

(1) *Physical Conditions and Communication*. — Coöperating with the ideo-emotional type of mind are certain predisposing conditions favourable to suggestion by emblem or shibboleth and to emotional contagion. The means and extent of communication and the character of association enable these conditions to exert their full influence, or they counteract and annul them.

First among the conditions referred to are those strictly physical conditions of geography and climate that predispose social populations to emotional and impulsive action.

It has long been observed that the southern peoples of the northern hemisphere are more excitable and impulsive, in both individual

and social activity, than are the people of colder northern climes. To what extent this is due to temperature merely, we do not yet know. It is, however, certain that excessive temperature is a real factor in emotional conduct.¹

Rapid alternations of heat and cold, and especially swift transitions from winter to summer, and from summer to winter, combined with a dull monotony of surface, as on the steppes of Russia or the vast plains of America, strongly predispose a population to a moody emotionalism.² An equable climate, combined with a varied and interesting topography, as in ancient Greece and in modern England, predisposes a population to intellectual activity and to a control of emotionalism by thought.

In lands where earthquakes, famines, and pestilences are most frequent, the habitual state of fear represses a cool, critical, intellectual activity, and stimulates imagination and emotion. These are the states of mind that most powerfully contribute to sympathetic like-mindedness and impulsive social action.³

The power of these physical conditions to increase the preponderant influence of the emotional factors, and especially fear, in sympathetic like-mindedness, depends upon an intellectual condition, namely, the relative proportions of ignorance and knowledge.

In the nature of things, an ignorant population can act deliberately, that is, with rational consideration, only to a very slight extent. Deliberation must have material to work upon. Reason is incapable of arriving at sound conclusions unless it has stores of accurate knowledge to think about. An ignorant population, there-

¹ This is proven in very many ways, among others by the increasing number of crimes of violence with the transition from early spring to summer in countries like the United States, England, France, and Germany; by the increase at the same period of the year of nervous disorders; and by the greater difficulty that the managers of prisons, jails, insane asylums, and other places where people are restrained of liberty, have in maintaining the usual routine of discipline whenever a sudden rise of temperature occurs. See Edwin G. Dexter, "Conduct and the Weather"; *The Psychological Review*, Monograph Supplements, Vol. II, No. 10; Morselli, "Suicide"; and Morrison "Crime and Its Causes."

² See an interesting discussion of the Russian character by William Dudley Foulke, "Slav or Saxon," Chapter ii.

³ See especially Henry Thomas Buckle, "Introduction to the History of Civilization in England."

fore, is at the mercy of its sensations, passions, superstitions, and fears. It can easily be led to believe that danger threatens when no danger exists, and that salvation depends upon some instant course of action that complete knowledge would show to be cruel and disastrous.

The relative proportions of knowledge and ignorance, in turn, depend upon the extent of communication, which, in its turn, is closely correlated with the means of communication.

Ignorance is the necessary condition of those whose communication is limited to vocal conversation within a narrow circle of acquaintances, whose own range of acquaintance does not extend beyond the boundaries of a neighbourhood or province. Only where communication extends to minds of every grade, crossing all boundaries of state and nation, and reaching back through generations to the great minds of all ages, can knowledge be sufficient to overcome the fear-inducing power, and the otherwise exciting power, of those physical conditions that have been described. But that such communication may be possible, the artificial means of communication must be developed. Letters, books, and newspapers are indispensable agents. On the other hand, these artificial means of communication are by no means necessary to the rapid and wide extension of a contagious and violent social action of the sympathetic type; witness such uprisings as the Crusades, Wat Tyler's Insurrection, the Peasants' Revolt, and the Reign of Terror.

(2) *Association: the Crowd*. — The character of association, however, may annul the effect of knowledge, and give full play to ignorance and emotional excitement.

Neither external physical conditions, nor states of the individual mind, could produce the full effects so often witnessed in impulsive social action, if there were not added to the combination a strictly social condition also, namely, the massing of men in crowds.

It is the crowd that reveals possibilities of unreason, fear, fury, and insatiable cruelty, from which even ignorant and superstitious individuals in their calmer moments would shrink back appalled.

The crowd curiously resembles the undeveloped mind of the child and of the savage. Naturally, men in crowds are subject to a swift contagion of feeling that would be impossible were they dispersed, and able to communicate only slowly and with difficulty. For the same reason they are extremely sensitive to suggestion and to unnoticed influences. In crowds, men are even more likely to think in terms of symbolic images, catch words, and shibboleths, than when by themselves. This, of course, is because others are continually calling their attention to symbols, and, with emotional fervour, repeating the fetichistic phrases. With the critical faculty in abeyance, men in crowds are in a state of mind to be easily deceived, to believe any wild rumour that is started, and even to become subject to hallucination. The crowd is devoid of the sense of responsibility, because, when lost in the mass, the individual loses his own feeling of responsibility, and acquires a sense of invincible power, and so gives way to impulses, which, if he were alone, he would control. Like the savage and the child, the crowd is intolerant of anything interposed between its desires and their realization; and it always manifests a tendency to carry suggested ideas immediately into action. Crowds, therefore, are mobile, and with changing excitants they are generous, heroic, or pusillanimous.

3. *Development of Coöperation.*—As compared with instinctive like-mindedness, the contribution of sympathetic like-mindedness to the development of the complex activities is varied and large.

Cultural ideas it enriches on every hand.

To language it adds innumerable words and expressions of symbolic and suggestive quality. To the development of poetic and plastic ideas it brings a warm and fine imagination, and contributes most of those fresh, genuine, spontaneous conceptions which are the content of all the most genuine and effective art; a content not yet subdued by criticism, but one which the purely critical mind could never create. To religious ideas it adds many more or less grotesque products of imagination, and yet, on the whole, it raises religious conceptions much above the level of that rudest fetichism found in primitive groups of the ideo-motor type. Symbolism in general, the use of images and totemistic emblems, are products of the sympathetic

like-mindedness. Even scientific ideas receive some additions from analogical reasoning. The whole scheme of primitive magic is the creation of sympathetic like-mindedness.

In cultural activity sympathetic like-mindedness finds a wide field which it enjoys with unrestrained abandon.

Convivial pleasures of every description are developed to their utmost power of affording excitement. Religious activities become exciting, and often widespread, revivals, characterized by contagious emotion and hypnotic trance, by pilgrimages, and by impressive ceremonial worship.

Economic ideas cannot be developed into scientific conceptions of utility, cost, and productive labour, by the co-operative efforts of a merely sympathetic like-mindedness, but they can be expanded by comparison and analogical reasoning.

Economic activity, in like manner, under sympathetic like-mindedness can be developed into direct coöperation on a comparatively large scale.

Examples are afforded by hunting and fishing, planting, harvesting, and building.

The most important manifestations of sympathetic like-mindedness in economic activity are found, however, only in a more advanced industrial system than the sympathetic type of coöperation of itself could create. When the advanced industrial system has been created by the more highly rational modes of like-mindedness, the sympathetic like-mindedness which survives in all societies, however highly evolved, can from time to time manifest itself in widespread economic speculations, industrial "booms," financial panics, and contagious strikes.

The chief contribution of sympathetic like-mindedness to the development of juristic ideas is a great expansion of the conception of collective sanctions, of every kind.

Especially characteristic of sympathetic like-mindedness are the sanctions of common sentiment, common ridicule, general boycotting,

mobbing, and lynching. In the actual enforcing of these sanctions are found the characteristic moral and juristic activities.

Political ideas and activities are in a small, but positive, measure developed by sympathetic like-mindedness.

The preferred mode of resemblance, in so far as the socius or citizen is conceived as an actual type, is likely to be found in economic conduct rather than in cultural attainment. The preferred ideal type is the convivial man, and the preferred attainment of the community is prosperity. Conceptions of ways and means are likely to include the thought of an extension, and further organization by federation or consolidation, of originally small communities, and of various forms of patronage or bribery as means of maintaining social cohesion. They include, furthermore, a very important development of the names and symbols of all institutions, customs, territory, and other possessions, into social emblems and shibboleths of great controlling effect upon individual minds.

Political activities, as developed by the sympathetic like-mindedness, commonly take the form of crusades, riots, insurrections, or of intensely emotional political campaigns. The degree of socialization which sympathetic like-mindedness can produce is, on the whole, low. Its motive hardly rises above the mere love of companionship or an ideo-emotional sympathy. The method is usually that of incitement by suggestion, combined with the social coercion characteristic of instinctive like-mindedness.

4. *Evidences and Extent of Sympathetic Like-mindedness.*—Evidences of the relative amount of sympathetic like-mindedness in the community should be looked for in the frequency and extent of emotional contagion and impulsive action; especially of revivals, panics, sympathetic strikes, riots, and insurrections, and of the number of persons participating in or affected by them.

The sympathetic mode of like-mindedness is characteristic of exogamous hordes of savages, and in modern populations of relatively ignorant, though not the most ignorant neighbourhoods in rural and city communities, and of more cultivated sections of the social population when labouring under great excitement. Examples of the

sympathetic type of coöperator are the religious shouter, the striker, the "heeler," and the revolutionist. They are found in the cluster of hordes, the camp meeting, the "gang," the crowd, and the mob.

Dogmatic or Formal Like-mindedness.—More complex than sympathetic like-mindedness is the like-mindedness that is dogmatically radical or dogmatic and formal—traditional, customary, and conservative. The minds of many individuals are simultaneously occupied with new and absorbing dogmas, which may be of the most radical description; or with beliefs, precepts, maxims, and facts of knowledge that have been handed down by preceding generations to the present, and which offer obstinate resistance to innovation in thought or conduct. In connection with a mere occupation of the mind with these things is a simultaneous like responsiveness to them, taking the form of attempts to put a radical programme into operation, or the form of a daily obedience to inherited precepts or rules.

1. *Subjective Factors of Dogmatic Like-mindedness.*—The like-mindedness which is here described is thus either radical or conservative, while yet, in all cases, dogmatic in type, because its essential element is belief, and belief may be either new and innovating, or traditional and obstructive. In either case it is assertive, impatient of criticism, and little disposed to be conciliatory. To some extent, however, knowledge is combined with belief in dogmatic like-mindedness. A further subjective factor of dogmatic like-mindedness is the habit of deductive reasoning, without criticism of premises.

(1) *Belief.*—Between belief and knowledge there is a fundamental difference which, not infrequently, is of vital consequence in the practical affairs of human life. Belief is not to any important extent a product of critical thinking or of the process of arriving at rational judgments, but is rather a form of emotion.

Belief is so far separated from knowledge that not infrequently the most positive beliefs are affirmations of alleged truths which, upon investigation, prove to have no foundation in fact.

Knowledge, on the other hand, is truth that cannot be overthrown by any process of testing or criticising. The man of scientific knowledge can always say, "This proposition is true, not merely because I believe it, or because any other man believes; it is true because any man who disbelieves it, can, if he will, subject it to any sort of test or criticism without being able to overthrow it."

The cause of belief is a well-established correlation in the human mind between effort and success, between desire and satisfaction, between hope and its realization, between vivid ideas and a corresponding reality. Effort may fail, but it does not usually fail. Desire or hope may be disappointed, but it is not usually disappointed. Vivid ideas may be misleading phantasms, but in general they are approximately true reflections of fact. Therefore, until we contract a counteracting habit of asking sceptical questions, we expect as we attempt; as we hope or imagine, we believe.

The proof is simple. All efforts, desires, and hopes are immediately or remotely associated with the fundamental appetites of hunger, the sex instinct, and intellectual curiosity. If, in the vast majority of instances, these appetites were not gratified, and the hopes that have grown out of them were not realized, both the individual and the race would perish. The mere fact that life exists is the sufficient proof that effort, desire, and hope usually terminate in satisfaction. It follows that a confident expectation that desire or hope will be realized is the normal habit of our minds.

Again, if usually we have succeeded in our undertakings, it is certain that, in a majority of instances, our ideas of the things to be achieved, and our theories of the best way of achieving, have, on the whole, been sound. Consequently, we have acquired the same self-assured confidence in our own ideas that we have in our own power to achieve success. In the absence of a critical habit of putting our ideas and theories to severe tests, we unthinkingly assume that our ideas of events or things are true pictures of them, and that

theories or explanations which appeal to us are true accounts of the facts. And all this is as true of our interpretations of the past as it is of our forecasts of the future.

This, then, is the nature of belief. It is the confident expectation that what we desire will come true; that what we find to be extremely interesting in accounts of the past is true; that ideas and theories which stand forth clearly in our minds undoubtedly are true. And this confidence we feel because, in a majority of instances, the things that we have desired and striven for have been realized; and the ideas and theories that we have acted upon in our striving have turned out to be sufficiently accurate for practical purposes. Consequently, the habit of our minds is this: in the absence of criticism, whatever we ardently desire, we confidently expect; whatever we vividly imagine, we believe to be true.

Belief, accordingly, is analogous to reflex action and response to suggestion. We have seen that, in the absence of any intervention of the higher thought centres,—of any inhibition of action by a critical deliberation,—stimulation is followed by a nervous discharge and muscular movement. In like manner, in the absence of critical investigation, desire and imagination pass immediately and without obstruction into belief.

From the foregoing account of belief, it appears that belief is more closely associated with the sympathetic, emotional, and imitative modes of mental activity than with the rational and deliberative modes. In fine, belief is merely a further stage in the development of the emotional and imaginative states of the mind, which has resulted from subjecting them to a series of practical experiments, in which success has, all in all, been more frequent than failure.

(2) *Deductive Reasoning.*—Next in importance to belief as an element in dogmatic like-mindedness is that habit of deductive reasoning which already we have seen to be a characteristic of the dogmatic type of mind.

No longer satisfied with superficial analogy, much less with guess-work, the dogmatic mind has acquired the art of exact deduction from given premises. Its perception of the certainty of its logical processes, and consequently of its conclusions if the premises are sound, is probably the chief influence establishing the uncompromizing assertiveness, in a word, the dogmatism of this intellectual type. Unhappily, the premises which satisfy this type are in nearly all cases mere beliefs, and not facts of inductively established knowledge. Consequently, an essentially emotional state of mind — belief — is habitually combined with a mode of reasoning that in itself is perfectly accurate. Thus arises the notorious peculiarity of the dogmatic mind, namely, a tendency to feel perfectly certain of its conclusions in precisely those cases in which its conclusions are quite as likely to be wrong as right.

2. *Objective Factors.* — The creation from these elements — of belief and deductive reasoning — of a dogmatic or formal like-mindedness in the community is made possible by certain further developments of the objective factors, communication and association.

(1) *Communication: Common Beliefs.* — The tendency of the mind to accept as true whatever is vividly imagined or ardently desired if no critical activity of the reason intervenes, is enormously strengthened when the thing believed, or that the mind tends to believe, is already believed by other persons in whom the individual has personal confidence.

In the account of sympathetic like-mindedness it was shown that any spontaneous emotion or impulse awakened in the mind by an emblem or shibboleth is enormously strengthened by knowledge that other persons also are moved by it. In like manner, the tendency of the mind to believe anything is strengthened by the knowledge that other persons already believe. In short, the consciousness of kind is a powerful element in the growth of popular belief.

All this, however, depends upon the extent of communication. It depends, also, much more than might be supposed, upon the mode of communication. Emphatic and

impressive assertion by word of mouth is far more effective in the propagation of belief than is a colourless written or printed statement.

The modern newspaper, however, is an exceedingly efficient agency for the propagation of baseless or questionable beliefs. Ignorant minds attach an unwarranted importance to newspaper reports. Impressive head-lines, and indeed the mere printed word in any form, affect them much as does the spoken word of a strong personality. Newspaper statements are, moreover, made with dogmatic authority. The exact conditions under which information has been obtained are not reported, and verification by the reader is practically impossible. The striking, the dramatic, the sensational elements, are magnified, and the whole endeavour is to make a readable story which will be accepted at its face value without criticism.

Thus impressively communicated from mind to mind, innumerable beliefs of individuals become common beliefs, undoubtingly accepted by entire populations.

On the whole they have a practical justification. Most of them relate to objects of practical endeavour, to conditions of individual and social existence, and to methods of individual and social activity by which practical success in life is attained. And in the experience of the community, as in that of the individual, conduct guided chiefly by imagination and emotional belief has more often than not achieved a measure of real success in practical undertakings.

Yet further is the tendency to believe strengthened by the knowledge that not only one's contemporaries believe, but that preceding generations for ages past also have believed.

The presumption in favour of the truth of the belief has become enormous, not only because its antiquity is an impressive fact appealing to imagination, but because if the critical intelligence begins to question, it is likely to be easily satisfied by the reflection that if the belief were untrue, its falsity must long ago have been discovered and exposed.

Common beliefs so handed down from age to age, and combined with many shreds and scraps of actual knowledge, become the great body of Tradition. Questioned only by the few, and in fact to a great extent a true record of human experience, tradition acquires all the tremendous force of authority.

Authority is a moral power that constrains man's will without his knowing or being able to find out why.¹ It is born of emotion and belief rather than of reason, which is ever asking the wherefore and the why. Nevertheless, since reason and rational self-control are of slow growth, the authority of tradition serves a useful end in helping to maintain social order.

Not less important, therefore, than the extent and the means of communication in the development of dogmatic like-mindedness is the continuity of communication from the distant past. Here, however, as in connection with the extent of communication, the means by which the continuity has been maintained are of some significance. Generally tradition by word of mouth is a more effective means of preserving the unquestioned authority of early beliefs than is any form of writing or printed record. An interesting exception is, however, possibly to be made in the case of sacred books, to which a peculiar authoritativeness has always attached.

(2) *Association: Authoritative Instruction.* — Forms of association, as of communication, are important objective factors in the development of dogmatic like-mindedness. As the crowd is the form of association peculiarly fitted to develop sympathetic like-mindedness, so is the formal and deferential association of the young with the old, especially in the relation of pupil to preceptor, peculiarly fitted to the development of dogmatic like-mindedness, which is, in truth, very largely a product of direct teaching and discipline.

Tradition is imposed upon the child by his parents and elder acquaintances. He is directly taught that the traditional beliefs are true, and that it is even wrong to doubt their truth and author-

¹ See "Democracy and Empire," Chapter ii, "The Ethical Motive."

ity. Disbelief is often punished, and disobedience of traditional precept is punished usually. Not only so, but through the intimate association between tradition and the everyday activities of life the child insensibly associates the practical activities with its traditional background. In his cultural and in his economic life, in his legal relations and in his political activities, he can take no single step without practically accepting most of the traditional system. Daily life thus becomes a ceaseless discipline and drill in activities which openly or tacitly assume the truth and sufficiency of tradition.

In general, it may be said that while occasional events, and especially the dramatic events of life, produce sympathetic like-mindedness, the routine of habitual activity, the teaching and the discipline of life, continually tend to produce formal like-mindedness, including conformity to established customs.

3. *Development of Coöperation.*—The chief contribution of dogmatic like-mindedness to the development of the complex activities is found in its conversion of the body of common ideas into differentiated traditions, and of common activities into Customs.

Under the influence of formal like-mindedness the cultural, the economic, the moral, and the political ideas, which for the most part are inherited beliefs, are converted into four great groups of traditions.

The cultural traditions become distinctly differentiated as the linguistic, the animistic, and the scientific.

The linguistic tradition is enriched by the addition of many terms for faiths, beliefs, and dogmas. The animistic tradition is clearly differentiated into the artistic and the religious, and the artistic into the poetic and the plastic. This, however, is largely a product of the development of logical distinction, because the dogmatic type of mind is not artistically creative, while it is strongly religious in tendency. Poetic and plastic ideas, therefore, are not multiplied or enriched by formal like-mindedness, but, on the other hand, religious conceptions are developed to a relatively high type. It is dogmatic like-mindedness which first creates out of the mass of early animistic ideas distinct conceptions of anthropomorphic gods, and develops a dogmatic religious creed. Scientific ideas are not developed in the

direction of verification by formal like-mindedness, but they are enriched by speculation. The dogmatic mind is ambitious to account for the universe, and out of its material of religious and scientific notions it constructs by deductive logic great systems of theology and metaphysics.

The economic tradition, so far as it is developed by formal like-mindedness, is largely animistic rather than scientific in character.

The animistic ideas relating to economic interests are less crude than the magic, which is an important element in the economic system developed by sympathetic like-mindedness, but they are yet largely religious and theological. Prayer and sacrifice are prescribed as indispensable means of securing rain and sunshine, abundant crops, and the health and fruitfulness of flocks and herds.¹

The moral tradition is differentiated by formal like-mindedness in such wise as clearly to mark off the legal or juristic tradition from the rules of private morality.

In the juristic tradition, ideas of rights become more clearly formulated, and a distinct desire is disclosed on the part of the community to substitute formal trial and punishment by social authority for private vengeance. A distinct theory of proof is formulated, consisting of belief in the probative value of oaths, compurgations, and ordeals.

The political tradition as developed by dogmatic like-mindedness shows a great multiplication of the ideas possible to the merely sympathetic type of mind.

So far as mental and practical resemblance, irrespective of kinship, is accepted as the basis of association, the resemblance sought is that which is expressed in moral beliefs and conduct rather than in economic standards. The ideal socius is the austere rather than the convivial man, and the preferred distinction of the community is ceremonial purity, righteousness, or justice. Conversion is regarded as an especially important means of maintaining social cohesion, and

¹ See "The Economic Ages," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. XVI, No. 2, June, 1901.

coercion as a legitimate means, if actual conversion cannot be achieved. The list of possessions and properties to which the community attaches importance is lengthened, but chiefly in the category of divine personages, legendary heroes, sacred and historic places, and traditional ceremonies.

Turning from the development of ideas, and their incorporation in traditions, to the development of outward activity, we find throughout an insistence by dogmatic like-mindedness upon customary forms.

Spontaneous convivial pleasures are discouraged, and such amusements as are allowed are highly ceremonial and formal in character. Religious worship becomes either severely simple to the point of barrenness, or elaborately ritualistic. Concerted economic activity, in like manner, is formal and solemn, with an incorporation of religious ceremony. Dogmatic like-mindedness, however, including, as it does, a development of the logical faculty, is capable of greatly developing economic activity on the strictly practical side beyond the economic system possible to sympathetic like-mindedness. There can be a considerable extension of agriculture, manufacture, and trade. Juristic activity, like economic, is formal and solemn. Formal trial and execution are substituted for impulsive lynch law proceedings. In tribal societies the development of formal like-mindedness brings with it the creation of the clan as the social organ of rights and juristic procedure. In civil societies the appearance of formal like-mindedness is followed by the creation of courts of justice. In political activity formal like-mindedness is persistent and often fanatical, in its regulation of association, in its attempt to mould the socius or citizen to the austere type of character. It is, nevertheless, efficient, capable of creating in gentile society the tribe as an organ of military activity, and in civil society a true military system. It stands for a relatively high degree of socialization, its political motives are dogmatic interests, utility, love of power, and sense of duty. It tries to convert, but failing to convert, resorts to coercion.

4. *Evidences and Extent of Dogmatic Like-mindedness.*—The prevalence of dogmatic like-mindedness in any community is measured by the frequency and extent of reform

agitations of a fanatical sort, by strong partisanship, by the deference to tradition and authority, and by reliance on governmental power to regulate private conduct.

The dogmatic mode of like-mindedness is found in gentile society that is sufficiently developed to be organized by clans and tribes, and in civil society wherever dogmatic emotional masses or parties are found. True examples of the dogmatic type of coöperator are found in the reformer and the political partisan.

Deliberative Like-mindedness. — The highest and most complex mode of concerted volition is deliberative like-mindedness, which is characterized by critical thinking and moderate, well-coördinated action.

1. *Subjective Factors.* — The essential subjective factors in deliberative like-mindedness are criticism, argument, discussion, and constructive reasoning, based upon inductive research, all combined in public opinion.

(1) *Public Opinion.* — No error is more common than one which confounds popular beliefs with the social judgments that constitute true Public Opinion. Public belief, as has been shown, is essentially emotional; while judgments are a product of critical thinking, and are essentially intellectual. Where two or more individuals, each of whom is capable of subjecting his ideas and inherited beliefs to a critical examination, come to the same conclusion, so that their critically tested judgments are identical, the result is a rational like-mindedness, and is properly to be spoken of as public opinion.

Another way of stating the same truth is to say that public opinion comes into existence only when a sympathetic like-mindedness or an agreement in belief is subjected to criticism, started by some sceptical individual who doubts the truth of the belief or the wisdom of the agreement; and an opinion is then thought out, to which many communicating minds can yield their intellectual assent.

It is obvious that not all members of a community are equally competent to share in the creation of the critical judgments that

constitute true public opinion. Yet nearly every individual of ordinary intelligence may share in it to some extent. All that is necessary is that his beliefs shall be assailed by doubt and that, after passing through the experience of questioning and uncertainty, he shall arrive at judgments for which he can give reasons rather than at convictions which he merely feels.

The process by which doubt is created, criticism is instituted, and judgments are arrived at in society, is called discussion. In discussion, conflicting beliefs are compared, analyzed, and subjected to argument.

So long as men accept as true everything that they hear repeated, or that they are themselves prone to believe, their talk is not to be described as discussion. It becomes discussion only when some one disputes or denies, and thereby compels those who assert to give reasons or advance arguments in support of what they affirm.

(2) *Inductive Research*.—The office of doubt and of criticism is to impeach error and to disturb the easy-going self-satisfaction that too many minds take in incomplete knowledge. Doubt should never result in a merely negative state of mind. Sound judgment in the long run is positive, and true public opinion is both positive and constructive. The substantial basis of all constructive reasoning and of positive public opinion is the well-verified knowledge that is accumulated by inductive research. As deductive speculation is a large element in the evolution of popular beliefs, so is the progress of inductive science and the enlargement of knowledge a chief factor in the evolution of constructive public opinion.

2. *Objective Factors*.—That the subjective factors of criticism and discussion may combine with constructive reasoning in true public opinion, there must prevail, not only a highly developed system of communication, but also perfect freedom of speech and of public meeting.

(1) *Communication: Freedom of Speech*.—Since, then, public opinion develops in any community just to the ex-

tent that free discussion develops, just to the extent that men are in the habit of asking searching questions and compelling one another to prove their assertions, it can exist only where men are in continual communication, and where they are free to express their real minds, without fear or restraint.

Wherever men are forbidden by governmental or other authority to speak or write freely, or wherever they stand in fear of losing social position, or employment, or property, if they freely speak their minds, there is no true public opinion; there is only a mass of traditional beliefs or outbursts of popular feeling.

(2) *Association: Freedom of Meeting.*—Equally necessary is freedom of meeting upon the initiative of private individuals.

If men are forbidden by governmental authority to assemble in an orderly manner, or if—as was true in England until down nearly to the nineteenth century—they can assemble only upon the call of some public functionary, there can be no perfect discussion, and therefore no true public opinion.

No less essential, however, to deliberate social decision is the alternation of meeting and discussion with separation. The crowd must occasionally disperse. Its individual members must be brought under new influences.

This truth is simply a more complicated case of that psychological fact, already noted, that rational thinking consists in the interposition of new ideas between stimulation and the consequent muscular action. The tendency of the crowd, as we have seen, is to react instantly as a unit upon any suggestion, just as the tendency of non-rational man is to expend his nervous energy in reflex action. In the individual, this process is interrupted by any new idea or suggestion. In the crowd, it is interrupted when dispersion and separation bring the individual members under new influences.

3. *Development of Coöperation.*—In the account of dogmatic like-mindedness, it was shown that men believe

that their ideas are true, and that their desires will be realized, because, in actual experience, their ideas have turned out to be sufficiently near the truth for practical purposes, and most of their desires have been fulfilled. This amounts to saying that most of the beliefs of mankind have been true, or have contained a large measure of truth. Consequently, critical discussion which, from time to time, modifies popular belief, seldom succeeds in completely overthrowing or annihilating it. There is continually taking place an amalgamation of critical judgments with tradition; and the result is a number of important products of the social mind, all of which may be described as combinations of tradition with new thought. These products are known as tastes, faiths, creeds, standards, codes, social or political ideals and values, and policies.

(1) *Cultural Tastes, Faiths, Creeds.* — The artistic tradition, both poetic and plastic, in combination with current criticism and modified by it, is Taste. The product of traditional religious beliefs and current religious ideas is a Faith. The modification of the theological tradition by current conceptions is a Creed. The modification by current speculation of the metaphysical tradition created by deductive reasoning out of an imperfect science is an "ism."

The modification of the strict scientific tradition by fresh discoveries, has, and needs, no special name; for science makes no compromises between the old and the new. Whatever of the old is verified by later research is retained; whatever is disproved is rejected. The supreme cultural achievement of deliberative like-mindedness is the development of inductive science by the coöperation of the best minds of all nations and of all ages.

(2) *Economic Ideas and Standards.* — Deliberative like-mindedness develops the crude economic ideas of sympathetic and dogmatic like-mindedness into strictly scientific

and highly complex products. True notions of utility, cost, value, and economic law are evolved.

An important product of the combination of such economic thought with the economic traditions transmitted from the past, is the general Standard of Living of the community.

This term has been loosely used by economic writers. The commodities that a labouring class consumes are not its standard of living; they are merely an index of its standard. Still less is mere desire a standard. The labour agitator has not necessarily a higher standard of living than his followers have, if he fluently discourse of refined wants which they do not feel. The real standard of living is a certain conception of economic life, which regulates desire and controls conduct. It is constituted of traditional beliefs and new ideas in varying proportions, and changes as these factors change. It is not because the Hungarian is satisfied with food and lodging that would disgust an American, that the Hungarian's standard of living in the coke-burning districts of Pennsylvania is lower than the American standard. The Hungarian is so easily satisfied, because the economic traditions and ideas that compose his standard of living are lower.

(3) *Moral and Juristic Ideas : Legal Evidence : The Legal Code.*—Deliberative like-mindedness works great transformations in the realm of moral ideas by its substitution of critically formed judgments for emotionalism and dogma. For mere traditional beliefs about right and wrong it substitutes rational conceptions of goodness or "the good," and, by implication, of their opposites, badness or evil.

"Goodness" is a quality of things, acts, experiences, or character which appeals to the judgment, rather than to sensation or emotion. Among possible pleasures, there are some of which the judgment may not approve. Goodness, then, is not coextensive with the pleasing or the pleasure-giving; much less with self-sacrifice, abnegation, or humiliation for its own sake. "The good" consists of all that upon which we have passed a critical judgment of approval, as distinguished from utilities that we accept and enjoy uncritically.

An exceedingly important achievement of deliberative like-mindedness is the substitution, in all judicial proceedings, of true objective evidence, obtained by inductive methods, for oaths, compurgations, and ordeals, as the basis of legal proof.

The oath survives as a form, however, long after it has ceased to have any sacredness or probative value; and after a sharp punishment of liars for contempt of court would be more effective than threatened, but unenforced, penalties for perjury.

The combination of jural tradition with new law is the Legal Code.

To what extent the public opinion of the hour, not yet enacted into statute, is an element in new law, is a question upon which jurists disagree. It is admitted that public opinion influences the interpretation of law; and in a republic public opinion is the real law-enforcing power back of all nominal powers.

For the purposes of theory and practice, all authoritatively declared law is held to be law until it is authoritatively repealed. But as a phenomenon of the social mind, a rule of conduct that public opinion refuses to enforce is already undergoing repeal.

(4) *Social or Political Values.* — Deliberative like-mindedness transforms the political ideas of sympathetic and dogmatic like-mindedness into highly complex Social Values.

Value, in the subjective sense of the word, is a purely intellectual estimate, a judgment of the utility, or goodness, or dignity, or importance, of any object, act, or relation. Like material commodities, all social elements, all social acts and relations, are more or less useful. A critical judgment pronounces them more or less good, more or less important, more or less worthy of respect. All, therefore, may be described as social utilities; positive or negative. Under this description, then, fall all those objects of political thought which have been enumerated: the socius, actual or ideal, the distinction or attainment of the community, the bonds of cohesion, the extent and composition of the political aggregate, and the community's varied posses-

sions. Critically reflecting upon all these social utilities deliberative like-mindedness passes judgment upon them, values them, and arranges them in a scale of value. In short, it converts all political ideas into complex political valuations.

Highest in value, it ranks those objects for which society exists, namely: the concrete living individuals who compose the community; the social type or ideal socius; and the attainment of the community. Lower in the scale of values are placed all political relations and possessions, which are but means to the attainment of social ends.

Which type of the ideal socius, or citizen, which attainment or distinction of the community, is supremely valued, and what extent and mode of organization, and what possessions are thought chiefly important as means,—these depend upon the experiences of the society and the degree of its development, always assuming that it has attained to some degree of deliberative thought.

Communities in which a tradition of kinship survives in full force, even if they have become in a high degree rational, continue to attach a great value to the modes of like-mindedness that are closely related to kinship and are aristocratic in spirit. Where, however, the demotic composition is varied and the practical resemblance that is irrespective of the degrees of kinship, is chiefly valued, the society is oligarchic or democratic in spirit; and according to its circumstances and degree of development will it value the expression of practical resemblance in cultural creeds and conduct, in economic standards and conduct, in juristic beliefs and conduct, or in political beliefs and conduct.

Expression in political beliefs and conduct is supremely valued by the most advanced deliberative communities. In these communities, too, the ideal socius is the rationally conscientious man, rather than the austere man developed by dogmatic like-mindedness, or the convivial man developed by sympathetic like-mindedness; and the supremely valued attainments of the community are liberty, equality, and enlightenment, rather than a merely ceremonial purity or a purely formal justice.

In the earliest developments of civilization, however, liberty, including freedom of discussion, and an unrestrained criticism, are possible, even as ideals, only within the sphere of individual life, that is, in the relation of individuals to one another. They become possible in the relations of individuals to the state only in the most progressive communities of modern times. In the sacred books of ancient civilizations we find deliberation, criticism, and discussion described as incumbent upon kings and counsellors of state, and as necessary elements of a happy domestic life, but never suggested as possibilities in the relations of subjects to the sovereign. Criticism of the sovereign is a modern phenomenon.

(5) *Public Policy*. — Social values become the grounds of social choice and the basis of Public Policy, which is formed by combining current political opinion, including political values, with the inherited body of political tradition, and which in itself is a plan or programme of legislation and administration.

In quiet times, when a party or government has long been entrenched in power, the element of tradition predominates. Often have political parties suffered defeat and passed into temporary or permanent obscurity because of inability to vitalize their policy with fresh issues. In times of disturbance, or when new interests clamour for attention, the predominant element in policy is current opinion.

(6) *Activity as Deliberative*. — A deliberative like-mindedness restores to cultural activity the spontaneity and freedom characteristic of sympathetic like-mindedness — which formal like-mindedness to a great degree destroys — but holds it nevertheless within bounds of moderation under the control of reason. It converts the sacrificial economy of a dogmatic like-mindedness into a purely business economy, conducted on utilitarian and scientific principles. It creates a complex commercial, industrial, and agricultural system. In legal activity it develops formal trial and execution, with ever stricter reference to considerations of social utility, which is step by step substituted

for both collective and private vengeance. It differentiates and coördinates the courts of positive law. In political activity it is deliberative like-mindedness only that can create the tribal federation out of a group of related tribes, that can later create the ethnic nation and still later the civic nation; that can clearly discriminate the fact of sovereignty and create positive institutions and develop definite policies of socialization.

Deliberative like-mindedness only, can respond to the highest motive of socialization, the desire, namely, for personal development, and can apply the highest method, that of discussion and education. It evolves the critically-rational type of coöperator, the highest example of which is the citizen.

4. *Evidences and Extent of Deliberative Like-mindedness.* — Deliberative like-mindedness is found to some slight degree in tribal federations and in ethnic nations. Chiefly, however, it is to be looked for in civilization, and its highest manifestations only in the most advanced modern nations.

The evidences of deliberative like-mindedness on a large scale as affecting the life of great communities, the sociologist must look for in a free criticism applied to religion and theology, in the development of inductive science, in the existence of a scientific system of political economy, in the substitution of objective evidence for oaths and ordeals in legal procedure, and in the unmolested criticism of governments by the body of citizens who organize and obey them.

TABLE XLII.—SUBJECTIVE FACTORS OF CONCERTED VOLITION

- | | |
|---|---|
| M | 1. Like Response: Prompt. |
| M | 2. Like Response: Slow. |
| M | 3. Like Response: Intermittent. |
| M | 4. Like Response: Persistent. |
| M | 5. Imitativeness: Slight. |
| M | 6. Imitativeness: Great. |
| M | 7. Consciousness of Kind: Imperfect. |
| M | 8. Reciprocal Consciousness of Kind: Quick. |

- M 9. Suggestibility: Quick.
- M 10. Susceptibility to Emblem and Shibboleth: Great.
- M 11. Contagious Emotion: Potentially Great and Easily Aroused.
- M 12. Minds Dominated by Emotionally Formed Beliefs.
- M 13. Habitual Mode of Reasoning: Deductive.
- M 14. Deference to Tradition: Great.
- M 15. Reverence for Authority: Great.
- M 16. Intolerance: Strong.
- M 17. Minds Dominated by Critically Formed Judgments.
- M 18. Habitual Mode of Reasoning: Inductive.

TABLE XLIII. — COMMUNICATION: JOURNEYS MADE

- | | |
|------------------|--------------------|
| M 1. Daily. | M 3. Occasionally. |
| M 2. Frequently. | M 4. Never. |

TABLE XLIV. — COMMUNICATION: LETTERS RECEIVED AND SENT

Columns as in Table XLIII.

TABLE XLV. — COMMUNICATION: TELEGRAMS RECEIVED AND SENT

Columns as in Table XLIII.

TABLE XLVI. — COMMUNICATION: TELEPHONE MESSAGES RECEIVED
AND SENT

Columns as in Table XLIII.

TABLE XLVII. — COMMUNICATION: NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES
READ

Columns as in Table XLIII.

TABLE XLVIII. — ASSOCIATION: INFORMAL GATHERINGS ATTENDED

- | | |
|--------------|--------------------|
| M 1. Daily. | M 3. Occasionally. |
| M 2. Weekly. | M 4. Never. |

TABLE XLIX. — ASSOCIATION: FORMAL MEETINGS ATTENDED

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------|
| M 1. Frequently and Regularly. | M 3. Occasionally. |
| M 2. Frequently, but Irregularly. | M 4. Never. |

Much information relative to the modes and frequency of communication can be obtained from various statistical reports of the Post Office Department, the telegraph and telephone corporations, and from the census of newspaper circulation, supplemented by privately published newspaper directories. More exact information must be obtained by individual inquiry, and this is the only

means of obtaining information upon the forms and frequency of association, except as fragmentary material may be gleaned from works of travel and local histories.

TABLE L. — CULTURAL THOUGHT: AS PRIVATELY DEVELOPED

Section I. — Lingual Ideas:

- | | |
|---|---|
| M 1. Simple and Few. | M 4. Include many Philo-
sophical and Scientific
Terms. |
| M 2. Include many Emblems
and Shibboleths. | |
| M 3. Include many Terms for
Beliefs, Faiths, Dogmas. | |

Section II. — Animistic Ideas: Æsthetic:

- | | |
|--|--|
| M 1. Simple and Primitive, but
often Strong and Genu-
ine. | M 3. Formal, Conventional, Tra-
ditional. |
| M 2. Fine in Imaginative Power. | M 4. Critically developed Taste. |

Section III. — Animistic Ideas: Religious:

- | | |
|-------------------|----------------------------|
| M 1. Lowest Type. | M 3. Relatively High Type. |
| M 2. Low Type. | M 4. Highest Type. |

Section IV. — Scientific Ideas:

- | | |
|--|---|
| M 1. Include only Ideas of sim-
ple Counting, Measur-
ing, Weighing, and
Classifying by Super-
ficial Analogy. | M 2. Formal, Speculative.
M 3. Qualitatively Precise
(True Classification).
M 4. Quantitatively Precise and
Highly Complex. |
|--|---|

Section V. — Frequently participate in Discussion of:

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| M 1. Lingual Ideas. | M 3. Animistic Ideas: Reli-
gious. |
| M 2. Animistic Ideas: Æs-
thetic. | M 4. Scientific Ideas. |

TABLE LI. — CULTURAL THOUGHT: AS DEVELOPED BY
PUBLIC AUTHORITY

Section I. — Ideas authoritatively Defined:

- | | |
|---------------------------|----------------------------|
| Y 1. Lingual? | Y 3. Animistic: Religious? |
| Y 2. Animistic: Æsthetic? | Y 4. Scientific? |

Section II. — Certain Ideas Proscribed or Prescribed :

Columns as in Section I.

Information for the foregoing tables must be obtained from observations and records made by individual observers.

TABLE LII. — CULTURAL ACTIVITY : AS PRIVATELY DEVELOPED**Section I. — Participate in Ceremonial Development of Manners :**

M 1. Frequently.

M 3. Seldom.

M 2. Occasionally.

M 4. Never.

Section II. — Participate in Ceremonial Use of Costume :

Columns as in Section I.

Section III. — Participate in Ceremonial Festivities :

Columns as in Section I.

Section IV. — Participate in Choral Music and Dancing :

Columns as in Section I.

Section V. — Participate in Social Games :

Columns as in Section I.

Section VI. — Participate in the Development of the Poetic Arts :

Columns as in Section I.

Section VII. — Participate in the Development of the Plastic Arts :

Columns as in Section I.

Section VIII. — Participate in Usual Religious Worship :

Columns as in Section I.

Section IX. — Participate in Religious Revivals :

Columns as in Section I.

Section X. — Participate in Religious Pilgrimages :

Columns as in Section I.

Section XI. — Participate in Unusual Religious Ceremonies :

Columns as in Section I.

Section XII. — Participate in Scientific Exploration or Research :

Columns as in Section I.

TABLE LIII. — CULTURAL ACTIVITY: AS DEVELOPED BY PUBLIC AUTHORITY

- Y 1. Authoritative Examples in Language?
- Y 2. Authoritative Examples in Manners?
- Y 3. Authoritative Examples in Costumes?
- Y 4. State Festivals?
- Y 5. State Balls?
- Y 6. State Games?
- Y 7. State Encouragement of Poetic Art?
- Y 8. State Encouragement of Plastic Arts?
- Y 9. State Worship?
- Y 10. State Encouragement of Scientific Exploration and Research?

TABLE LIV. — PRESENT STATE OF CULTURAL COÖPERATION

Section I. — Active:

- | | |
|----------------------|-----------------------|
| Y 1. In Language? | Y 4. In Plastic Arts? |
| Y 2. In Manners? | Y 5. In Religion? |
| Y 3. In Poetic Arts? | Y 6. In Science? |

Section II. — Cultural Ideas converted into Traditions: Cultural Activities converted into Customs:

- | | | |
|------------------|---------------|------------------|
| Y 1. Lingual? | Y 3. Poetic? | Y 5. Religious? |
| Y 2. Ceremonial? | Y 4. Plastic? | Y 6. Scientific? |

Section III. — Cultural Ideas and Activities converted into Social Values:

- | | | |
|------------------|---------------|------------------|
| Y 1. Lingual? | Y 3. Poetic? | Y 5. Religious? |
| Y 2. Ceremonial? | Y 4. Plastic? | Y 6. Scientific? |

TABLE LV. — ECONOMIC THOUGHT: AS PRIVATELY DEVELOPED

- M 1. Ideas Elementary and wholly Concrete.
- M 2. Ideas largely Animistic. Notions of Luck and Magic.
- M 3. Ideas largely Animistic. Belief in Economic Value of Prayer, Ritual, and Sacrifice.
- M 4. Ideas Scientific but Elementary.
- M 5. Ideas Scientific and Complex, including Abstract Notions of Utility, Cost, and Value, and of Economic Law.
- M 6. Frequently Participate in Discussion of Economic Interests.
- M 7. Frequently Participate in Discussion of Economic Ideas.

TABLE LVI. — ECONOMIC THOUGHT: AS DEVELOPED BY PUBLIC
AUTHORITY

- Y 1. Economic Interests authoritatively Defined ?
- Y 2. Economic Ideas authoritatively Defined ?
- Y 3. Economic Interests Proscribed or Prescribed ?
- Y 4. Economic Ideas Proscribed or Prescribed ?
- Y 5. Economic Measurements and Ratios fixed by Authority ?

TABLE LVII. — ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: AS PRIVATELY DEVELOPED

Section I. — Participate in Simple Economic Coöperation :

- | | |
|--------------|--------------------|
| M 1. Daily. | M 3. Occasionally. |
| M 2. Weekly. | M 4. Seldom. |

Section II. — Participate in Complex Economic Coöperation (under
Division of Labour and Coördination of Employments):

- M 1. Daily. M 2. Frequently. M 3. Seldom.

Section III. — Participate in Financial Excitements, in Panics or in
Strikes :

- M 1. Occasionally. M 2. Seldom. M 3. Never.

TABLE LVIII. — ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: AS PUBLICLY DEVELOPED

Section I. — Participation of the State:

- Y 1. In Agriculture: Extensive ?
- Y 2. In Agriculture: Slight ?
- Y 3. In Mining: Extensive ?
- Y 4. In Mining: Slight ?
- Y 5. In Fisheries: Extensive ?
- Y 6. In Fisheries: Slight ?
- Y 7. In Manufactures: Extensive ?
- Y 8. In Manufactures: Slight ?
- Y 9. In Commerce: Extensive ?
- Y 10. In Commerce: Slight ?
- Y 11. In Transportation: Extensive ?
- Y 12. In Transportation: Slight ?
- Y 13. In Finance: Extensive ?
- Y 14. In Finance: Slight ?

If possible substitute arithmetic values in this Table for "yes" and "no"
answers.

Section II. — Participation of Minor Public Corporations :

Columns as in Section I.

TABLE LIX. — PRESENT STATE OF ECONOMIC COÖPERATION

- Y 1. Luck Economy ?
- Y 2. Magic Economy ?
- Y 3. Sacrificial Economy ?
- Y 4. Slave Labour Economy ?
- Y 5. Trade Economy ?
- Y 6. Capitalistic Economy ?
- Y 7. Economic Ideas largely converted into Tradition ?
- Y 8. Economic Activities largely converted into Customs ?
- Y 9. Economic Ideas and Activities converted into Social Values ?

Much information upon economic activity can be obtained from official reports, statistical and other, and much information on economic ideas from ethnological writings, folk lore, epics, sacred books, and legal codes, but much must be obtained also by individual investigation. The animistic character of economic ideas in the lower grades of culture is shown in a belief in luck and in reliance on omens, signs, charms, and magic of every description in hunting, fishing, agriculture, and industrial art. For a detailed explanation of the classification of economic stages adopted in Table LIX see "The Economic Ages," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. XVI, No. 2, June, 1901.

TABLE LX. — MORAL AND JURISTIC THOUGHT: AS PRIVATELY DEVELOPED

- M 1. Elementary and wholly Concrete.
- M 2. Strongly dominated by Idea of Private Revenge.
Includes —
- M 3. Simple Notions of Rights of Property.
- M 4. Simple Notions of Marriage Rights.
- M 5. Ideas of Collective Vengeance.
- M 6. Belief in Sacredness and Binding Force of Moral and Juristic Traditions.
- M 7. Belief in Sacredness and Binding Force of Moral and Juristic Customs.
- M 8. Ideas of Decision by Judges.
- M 9. Ideas of Formal Trial.
- M 10. Ideas of Juristic Authority of Community or State.
- M 11. Belief in Juristic Value of Oaths and Compurgations.
- M 12. Belief in Probative Value of Ordeals.
- M 13. Ideas of Pledges, Fines, and Compensations.

Includes —

- M 14. Abstract and Complex Ideas of Goodness, Moral Principles, Moral Law.
- M 15. Complex Ideas of Legal Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies.
- M 16. Differentiated Ideas of Law; of Real Property, Domestic Relations, Contract, Tort, Crime, and Equity.
- M 17. Clear Ideas of Inductive Evidence.
- M 18. Ideas of the Exclusive Jurisdiction of the State.
- M 19. Frequent Participation in Discussions of Moral and Juristic Ideas, Legal Remedies, and Procedure.

TABLE LXI. — MORAL AND JURISTIC THOUGHT: AS DEVELOPED BY PUBLIC AUTHORITY

- Y 1. Moral Ideas authoritatively Defined ?
- Y 2. Juristic Ideas authoritatively Defined ?
- Y 3. Certain Moral Ideas Proscribed or Prescribed ?
- Y 4. Certain Juristic Ideas Proscribed or Prescribed ?
- Y 5. Legal Remedies authoritatively Defined and Prescribed ?
- Y 6. Legal Procedure authoritatively Defined and Prescribed ?
- Y 7. Modes of Proof authoritatively Defined and Prescribed ?
- Y 8. Rules of Evidence authoritatively Defined and Prescribed ?

TABLE LXII. — MORAL AND JURISTIC ACTIVITY: AS PRIVATELY DEVELOPED

Section I. — Participate in Moral Coercion by means of simple Sanctions, such as Approbation or Disapprobation, Favour, or Disfavour:

- | | |
|--------------------|--------------|
| M 1. Frequently. | M 3. Seldom. |
| M 2. Occasionally. | M 4. Never. |

Section II. — Participate in Private Vengeance:

Columns as in Section I.

Section III. — Participate in Boycotting, Hazing, or Mobbing:

Columns as in Section I.

Section IV. — Participate in Lynchings:

Columns as in Section I.

TABLE LXIII. — MORAL AND JURISTIC ACTIVITY: AS PUBLICLY DEVELOPED

- Y 1. Formal Trial and Execution by Clan, Council, or Tribesmen ?
- Y 2. Formal Trial and Execution before Priest, Judge, or King ?

- Y 3. Creation of Courts?
- Y 4. Assumption of Exclusive Jurisdiction by the State?
- Y 5. Complex Development of Procedure and Execution?

TABLE LXIV.—THE PRESENT STATE OF MORAL AND JURISTIC
COÖPERATION

- Y 1. Predominance of Private Vengeance?
- Y 2. Predominance of Clan or Family Feud?
- Y 3. Predominance of Unlawful Collective Vengeance?
- Y 4. Successful Assertion and Maintenance of Authority of the State?
- Y 5. General and Successful Application of Legal Remedies?
- Y 6. Moral and Juristic Ideas converted into Tradition?
- Y 7. Moral and Juristic Activities converted into Customs?
- Y 8. Moral and Juristic Ideas and Activities converted into Social Values?

The chief sources of information upon moral and legal ideas and activities are ethnological writings, sacred books, early legal codes, and modern statutes and decisions.

TABLE LXV.—POLITICAL THOUGHT: AS PRIVATELY DEVELOPED
Division I.—Primary Concepts.

Section I.—The Self-existence of the Group or Population:

- M 1. Instinctively Felt Only.
- M 2. Rationally Conceived.

Section II.—The Socius or Citizen, conceived as Concretely Actual:
The Preferred Mode of Resemblance:

- M 1. Mental and Practical Resemblance as coördinated with the Degree of Kinship: Gentile and Clannish in Type, or Aristocratic and Exclusive in Type.
- M 2. Mental and Practical Resemblance Irrespective of Kinship: Oligarchical Type.
- M 3. Mental and Practical Resemblance Irrespective of Kinship: Democratic Type.

Section III.—The Socius or Citizen conceived as Concretely Actual:
The Prevailing and Preferred Expression of Mental and Practical Resemblance:

- M 1. In Cultural Creeds and Conduct.

- M 2. In Economic Standards and Conduct.
- M 3. In Juristic Beliefs and Conduct.
- M 4. In Political Beliefs and Conduct.

Section IV.—The Socius or Citizen conceived as Ideal: The Preferred Type:

- M 1. The Powerful Man.
- M 2. The Convivial Man.
- M 3. The Austere Man.
- M 4. The Rationally Conscientious Man.

Section V.—The Preferred Attainment and Distinction of the Community:

- | | |
|-------------------------|----------------------|
| M 1. Power. | M 6. Righteousness. |
| M 2. Splendour. | M 7. Justice. |
| M 3. Pleasure. | M 8. Liberty. |
| M 4. Prosperity. | M 9. Equality. |
| M 5. Ceremonial Purity. | M 10. Enlightenment. |

Division II.—Secondary Concepts.

Section I.—Notions of Social Cohesion: Preferred or Best Accredited Means:

- | | |
|------------------------------|-----------------|
| M 1. Coercion. | M 3. Patronage. |
| M 2. Bribery. | M 4. Loyalty. |
| M 5. Rational Comprehension. | |

Section II.—Concept of the Extent and Composition of the Community: Type Preferred:

- M 1. Small, Simple, Exclusive.
- M 2. Large, Compound, Comprehensive, Expanding.

Section III.—Concepts of Social Possessions: Territory chiefly Cherished:

- M 1. Tribal or National Domain.
- M 2. Sacred Places.
- M 3. Historic Places.

Section IV.—Concepts of Social Possessions: Personages chiefly Revered, Accredited, or Cherished:

- | | |
|---------------|--------------|
| M 1. Leaders. | M 3. Saints. |
| M 2. Heroes. | M 4. Gods. |

Section V.—Concepts of Social Possessions: Customs chiefly Cherished:

- | | |
|-------------------|---------------------|
| M 1. Language. | M 6. Plastic Arts. |
| M 2. Manners. | M 7. Worship. |
| M 3. Costumes. | M 8. Education. |
| M 4. Amusements. | M 9. Economic Arts. |
| M 5. Poetic Arts. | M 10. Morals. |

Section VI.—Concepts of Social Possessions: Institutions chiefly Prized or Accredited:

- | | |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|
| M 1. The State. | M 5. Contract. |
| M 2. Family and Marriage. | M 6. The Labour System. |
| M 3. The Church. | M 7. The Legal System. |
| M 4. Property. | M 8. The Form of Government. |

Section VII.—Concepts of Social Policy: Policies of Maintenance or Growth: Means chiefly Favoured or Accredited:

- | | |
|----------------|----------------|
| M 1. Forceful. | M 2. Rational. |
|----------------|----------------|

Section VIII.—Concepts of Social Policy: Policies of Maintenance or Growth: Mode chiefly Favoured or Accredited:

- | | |
|-------------------|-----------------------|
| M 1. Socialistic. | M 2. Individualistic. |
|-------------------|-----------------------|

Section IX.—Concepts of Social Policy: Policies of Modification of Type (Socialization): Means chiefly Favoured or Accredited:

- | |
|--|
| M 1. Coercion: Enforcement of Coöperation. |
| M 2. Incitement. |
| M 3. Conversion. |
| M 4. Discussion and Education. |

Section X.—Concepts of Social Policy: Policies of Modification of Type (Socialization): Mode chiefly Favoured or Accredited:

- | | |
|-------------------|-----------------------|
| M 1. Socialistic. | M 2. Individualistic. |
|-------------------|-----------------------|

Division III.—Participation in Political Discussion.

- | | |
|------------------|--------------------|
| M 1. Daily. | M 3. Occasionally. |
| M 2. Frequently. | M 4. Never. |

TABLE LXVI.—POLITICAL THOUGHT: AS DEVELOPED BY PUBLIC AUTHORITY:

- Y 1. Political Ideas authoritatively Defined?
- Y 2. Certain Political Ideas Proscribed?
- Y 3. Certain Political Ideas Prescribed?

TABLE LXVII.—POLITICAL ACTIVITY: AS PRIVATELY DEVELOPED.

Section I.—Participation in Occasional Voluntary Coöperation (Aggression or Defence) relating to Maintenance or Growth of:

- M 1. Existence of the Group or Population itself, as a Body of Concrete Individuals.
- M 2. The Social Type: The Citizen, Actual or Ideal.
- M 3. The Attainment or Distinction of the Community.
- M 4. Social Cohesion.
- M 5. The Extent or Composition of the Community.
- M 6. Territory.
- M 7. Important Social Personages.
- M 8. Customs.
- M 9. Institutions.
- M 10. Social Policies.

Section II.—Participation in Occasional Voluntary Coöperation (Aggression or Defence) relating to Modification of Type (Socialization), and directly Affecting:

Columns as in Section I.

Section III.—Participation in Occasional Voluntary Coöperation (Aggression or Defence) relating to Modification of Type (Socialization): Motives of Socialization:

- M 1. Intolerance, toward Differences.
- M 2. Sympathy, with Potential Likeness.
- M 3. Love of Companionship, Ideo-Emotional Sympathy.
- M 4. Dogmatic Interest.
- M 5. Utility.
- M 6. Love of Power.
- M 7. Sense of Duty.
- M 8. Desire for Development of Personality.

Section IV. — Participation in Occasional Voluntary Coöperation (Aggression or Defence) relating to Modification of Type (Socialization): Methods of Socialization:

M 1. Coercion: Enforcement of Coöperation.

M 2. Incitement.

M 3. Conversion.

M 4. Discussion and Education.

Section V. — Systematic Voluntary Coöperation by Means of Political Parties, Clubs, Agitations, and Campaigns, relating to Maintenance or Growth of:

Columns as in Section I.

Section VI. — Systematic Voluntary Coöperation by Means of Political Parties, Clubs, Agitations, and Campaigns, relating to Modification of Type (Socialization), and directly Affecting:

Columns as in Section II.

Section VII. — Systematic Voluntary Coöperation by Means of Political Parties, Clubs, Agitations, and Campaigns, relating to Modification of Type (Socialization): Motives of Socialization:

Columns as in Section III.

Section VIII. — Systematic Voluntary Coöperation by Means of Political Parties, Clubs, Agitations, and Campaigns, relating to Modification of Type (Socialization): Methods of Socialization:

Columns as in Section IV.

Section IX. — Violent or Unlawful Private Political Action: Riots, Insurrections, Rebellions, Revolutions, Participation in:

M 1. Frequent.

M 2. Occasional.

M 3. Infrequent.

TABLE LXVIII. — POLITICAL ACTIVITY: AS PUBLICLY DEVELOPED.
AUTHORITATIVE AGGRESSION OR DEFENCE BY THE STATE

Sections and Columns as in Table LXVII., with substitution of Y for M.

TABLE LXIX. — PRESENT STATE OF POLITICAL COÖPERATION

Section I. — Private:

Y 1. Activity General?

Y 2. Activity Keen, Intense?

- Y 3. Activity Violent, Explosive but Lawful?
- Y 4. Activity Violent, Unlawful?
- Y 5. Activity Systematic and Lawful?

Section II. — Public:

- Y 1. Activity Violent, Military, Coercive?
- Y 2. Activity Peaceful, Legislative, and Administrative, but Dogmatic and Coercive?
- Y 3. Activity Peaceful, Legislative, and Administrative, Deliberative, Reasonable, Educative?

Section III. — Degree of Synthesis of Ideas and Activities:

- Y 1. Political Ideas converted into Traditions?
- Y 2. Political Activities converted into Customs?
- Y 3. Political Ideas and Activities converted into Social Values?

Section IV. — Degree of Socialization:

- | | |
|--------------|---------------|
| Y 1. Lowest? | Y 3. High? |
| Y 2. Low? | Y 4. Highest? |

TABLE LXX. — PREDOMINANT MODE OF LIKE-MINDEDNESS

- | | |
|-------------------|--------------------|
| Y 1. Instinctive? | Y 3. Dogmatic? |
| Y 2. Sympathetic? | Y 4. Deliberative? |

Laws of Concerted Volition

Doubtless most of the laws of concerted volition, formulating its more complicated phenomena, remain to be discovered by precise inductive study. From such crude inductive studies as have already been made by statisticians, historians, and psychologists, certain rather general laws may provisionally be formulated.

The Extent and Intensity of Impulsive Social Action. — Imitation, as has been shown, is an important subjective factor of sympathetic like-mindedness, and imitation tends to spread in a geometrical progression; therefore impulsive action tends to spread according to the same law.

In the same progression also it intensifies.

The individual who starts a movement is at the outset subject only to the original stimulus acting upon his own mind. When, however, he has communicated it, the emotional excitement of a second mind reacts upon the first. When they in turn have communicated it to two more, the emotional reaction of three minds has begun to act upon each of the four. When those four in turn have communicated it to eight, the emotional excitement of seven has begun to react upon each of the eight, and so on indefinitely.

Thus the law of the extent and intensity of impulsive social action is as follows:—

Impulsive social action tends to extend and to intensify in a geometrical progression.

The Restraint of Impulsive Social Action.—The only restraint that can hold in check the tendency to impulsive social action is deliberation,—critical, comprehensive thinking. Deliberation, however, must have become a habit of mind in order to exercise much restraining influence upon social impulse. It becomes a habit of mind only in connection with its employment in practical activity, and this happens when the practical activities of life are so complex that it is impossible to achieve success by those direct, apparently obvious, but really futile means, which suggest themselves to a bright but childlike mind.

To the bird that has flown into a room, the obvious way to get out seems to be by vainly beating its wings against the window-pane. Only by accident does it discover that by the indirect method of flying down to the space below the raised sash can it gain the desired freedom. This lesson, that many of the most vital achievements in life depend upon indirect means is, all things considered, the most important lesson of human experience. The discovery of indirect means is possible only through reason and deliberation. Little by little, as such discoveries are made and added to human experience, and as the habit of obtaining results by indirect means is acquired, there is a stimulating reaction upon the development of reason itself, and a slow growth of the habit of deliberation; and this habit, as has been said, is the only means that can be relied upon to hold impulsive social tendencies in check.

The law, then, of restraint of impulsive social action is : —

Impulsive social action varies inversely with the habit of attaining ends by indirect and complex means.

The Controlling Force of Tradition. — Because it is emotional and imaginative, and in its genesis closely allied to motor processes, belief compels its adherents to assert it vehemently, to teach it zealously, to try to make others accept it, and to compel conformity to its precepts. Knowledge, on the other hand, or verified scientific truth, never tries to compel allegiance. Essentially intellectual and contemplative, it waits to be accepted by those who have the intelligence to discover and to appreciate it.

From the foregoing facts, it follows that when the social mind assumes the mode of belief, it becomes an active social force, tending to compel acceptance and conformity.

This control by belief is reënforced by the influence of antiquity, chiefly because mere venerableness is impressive and has much of the effectiveness of emblem and shibboleth.

Accordingly, the laws of the social force of tradition are : —

First, *tradition is authoritative and coercive in proportion to its antiquity.*

Second, *tradition is authoritative and coercive in proportion as its subject-matter consists of belief rather than of critically established knowledge.*

Social Choice, Preference. — When the conditions favourable to rational social choice exist, the choice itself is determined by the scale of social values, just as individual choices are determined by the scale of ethical and economic values in individual minds.

Preference is determined chiefly by the ideal of personality and of the distinction or attainment of the community.

Life is a struggle for existence and a survival of the fit. Power, courage, efficiency, are more essential than pleasurable indulgence. The rewards of life, nevertheless, must in large measure be enjoyed, or vital power itself ceases, and the race perishes. Self-restraint, in turn, must be developed or indulgence destroys. And finally, self-restraint must be subject to enlightened reason, or growth ceases. It follows that in every great population we may expect to find more men valuing the primitive virtues of power, courage, and ability, in every form, than valuing the virtues and ideals later evolved.

Assuming that inductive investigation will prove that such is, in fact, the distribution of preference, the law of preference is formulated as follows:—

In all social choice, the most influential ideals are those of the forceful man, the powerful community, of virtue in the primitive sense of the word; second in influence are ideals of the convivial man, the prosperous and pleasure-loving community, the utilitarian or hedonistic virtues; third in influence are ideals of the austere man, the righteous or just community, the Stoic or Puritan virtues of self-restraint; fourth in influence are the ideals of the rationally conscientious man, of the liberal and enlightened community, of the virtues of reasonableness, broad-mindedness, and charity: but if mental evolution continues, the higher ideals become increasingly influential.

Social Choice, Combination, and Means.—While a population, like an individual, shows marked preferences in its estimation of the qualities of the ideal socius or community, and in its estimation of ends to be achieved, in real life it is always necessary to make many combinations of choices, many modifications, and to decide upon the best means of realizing the preferred ends. In these attempts to make combinations and to select means, certain characteristics of choice appear which we are in the habit of speaking of as conservative or radical. Some communities, like individuals, are loath to displace one object of value by another,

to disturb existing relations, or to resort to any extreme means in order to achieve desired ends. Other communities, like individuals of a different type, are eager to sweep away the old, to indulge in radical experiment, and to try any means that give promise of success. These tendencies, however, are not fortuitous: they are strictly governed by law.

In choosing our pleasures, we have to modify some indulgences so that they will combine well with others; or, failing to do that, we have to sacrifice some pleasures altogether.

As a rule, many moderate pleasures that combine well will make up a larger total of satisfaction than a few pleasures, each of which is intense. Therefore, it is necessary to correct each subjective value as individually considered, by reference to its probable relation to other values.

Again, in subjective valuations by the individual, immediate good is not necessarily the only element considered.

Further corrections may be made for the future good or ill that must result from the choice contemplated, including reactions on the personality, the self-development, and the self-activity of the chooser.

As soon as the individual has acquired the intellectual power to make such corrections, he attempts to bring his subjective values into a consistent whole; but the composition of the whole and his success in making it harmonious throughout depend very much upon his own experiences.

If his experiences have been of few kinds, and each has often been repeated, his consciousness has become identified with a total of subjective values that is thoroughly consistent, so far as it goes, but that is very simple in its make-up. His few pleasures are relatively intense, and he pursues each further than he would if they were varied.

If now some new element or new mode of good is introduced into his life, — a new pleasure, more intense than any that he has hitherto enjoyed, — or if suddenly he sees opened to him possibilities of many new modes of good, which, however, are more or less incompatible with those to which he has been accustomed, his group of subjective values becomes at once larger and more complex than it was before, but also less organized.

A long time will elapse before the readjustment is made. It will involve many sacrifices and self-denials. Meanwhile, the chances are that he will choose crudely and radically. He will substitute oftener than he will combine. He will destroy when he might conserve. He will go wholly over to the new way of life, enjoying as before a few modes of experience intensely, instead of learning that he might get a greater total of satisfaction from a large number of less intense experiences harmoniously put together.

Let these principles now be applied to a population. It is usual to speak of the elements, modes, and means of good collectively as interests. A population map of a country may be made, showing the distribution of the people according to their interests. In one region is discovered a marked predominance of those who have lived for generations in a circumscribed way — the people of narrow experiences and of few interests. In another region are discovered large numbers of those who have suddenly found themselves face to face with possibilities of which they had not dreamed. Elsewhere are discovered those who have so long enjoyed varied experiences and have cultivated manifold interests that their subjective values make up totals that are highly complex, and yet, at the same time, harmonious.

The people of these different regions in their industry, their law-making, their educational and religious undertakings, and their organization of institutions, choose,

select, or decide, strictly in accordance with the mental characteristics that these different experiences have developed.

The law of combination and of means which their choices exemplify is as follows:—

A population that has only a few interests, which, however, are harmoniously combined, is conservative in its choices. A population that has varied interests, which are as yet inharmoniously combined, is radical in its choices. Only the population that has many, varied, and harmoniously combined interests is consistently progressive in its choices.

PART III

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE AND FORMS OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

Permanence of Coöperation

MANY of the activities in which individuals combine their efforts are continued or repeated until they have become habitual; and the coöperating individuals in these cases sustain relatively permanent relations to one another. Habitual relations of the members of a society to one another, and persistent forms of coöperative activity, collectively are called the Social Organization.

Public Sanction

When coöperation has become permanent and the relations of coöperators have become stable, a further evolution of social organization results from a concurrence of concerted volition in its general or public phase, with the concerted volition that is partial and private.

The relations themselves that men sustain to one another, and the forms of coöperative activity, spring up as a result of individual suggestion and practical convenience. Relations that are accidentally formed prove to be interesting, agreeable, and useful, and therefore are permanently maintained. Forms of coöperation that are invented for a temporary purpose prove to be so successful that they, too, are persisted in. In all this we see nothing but the spontaneous action

of resembling and sympathetic minds pursuing their own immediate practical interests through concerted volition of a purely private sort.

When, however, these spontaneously formed features of social organization have become so well established or so conspicuous that they challenge the attention of every member of the community, they become subjects of universal discussion and of general approval or disapproval. Subjected then to analysis and criticism, they finally are pronounced good or evil, or doubtful, by the concurrent opinion of the society. Their further development thenceforward is tolerated or encouraged by the state, or they are stamped out, and the individuals who attempt to maintain them are punished.

The essential basis of social organization in every stage of its history is like-mindedness, the agreement of the thoughts and feelings of many individuals which makes practical coöperation possible. All social organization, accordingly, is an expression of like-mindedness in the population.

As will be explained presently, peculiarities in the development of social organization are to be accounted for partly by the passion of like-minded people to perfect and to extend like-mindedness itself; that is, to make the community more and more homogeneous in mental and moral qualities; partly by a developing appreciation of the value of unlike-mindedness as a means of variation and progress; and partly by the combination and reconciliation of these two motives.

Forms of Organization

In every community social organization assumes certain great forms. These are, namely, (1) the Private and the Public, (2) the Unauthorized and the Authorized (Institutions), (3) the Unincorporated and the Incorporated, (4) the Component, and (5) the Constituent.

Public and Private Organization.—The difference between public and private organization is essentially the same as that between concerted volition in its public and in its private aspects, which already has been explained. Public organization is coextensive with the state, includ-

ing local divisions of the community that exercise public authority. It is a manifestation of that will of the entire society which we call sovereignty; it carries and transmits the coercive power of the state. The private organization, on the other hand, can put the coercive power of the state in motion only indirectly. If it requires the assistance of legal or military force, it can obtain it only by applying to a court or to some public executive authority.

The commonwealth is not the only public organization. Lesser public organizations are created by the state. For example, a municipality is a public organization that has received from the state the authority to organize a police, to make arrests, and to use force in other ways if necessary to maintain public order. All this it can do in virtue of the authority originally conferred upon it, without being obliged, when the emergency arises, to ask special permission, or to seek the special assistance of any higher power.

Institutions.—Closely connected with the distinction between public and private organization is that between social arrangements that are institutions and others that are not. An institution is a social relation that is consciously permitted or established by adequate and rightful authority, that is, in the last resort, by sovereignty.

There is no word in any language that is more carelessly used by writers who should know better, than this word "institutions." Those forms of organization, those relations and arrangements, which the social mind in its public capacity has reflected upon, which it has accepted, and which through the organs of the state it has allowed or commanded,—and those only,—are institutions. Any social organization or relation that has grown up unperceived by the public becomes an institution when the attention of the state is called to it, and the state then permits it to exist, thereby authorizing it. A band of robbers may be an organization, but it is not an institution. The social arrangements of a community of savages are modes of organization, but they are not institutions.

Incorporated and Unincorporated Organizations.—Social organizations that have become institutions may be in-

corporated or unincorporated. The incorporated organization is an institution that not only is authorized, to the extent of being tolerated by the state, but that also is established by a definite creative act of the state. Its plan of organization has been described by law; its powers have been fixed by law, and likewise its responsibilities. It has the rights and duties of a legal personality.

The incorporated organization may be either public or private. Municipalities are public corporations; manufacturing and trading companies are private corporations. A further characteristic of private corporations usually is a limited liability of their individual members.

All unincorporated organizations are private associations. A village, if unincorporated, is merely a private body. In civilized communities innumerable societies for all conceivable purposes have no legal status, and depend entirely upon the voluntary support of their individual members.

The Social Composition.—In every community that is larger than a single family, there is a grouping of individuals that brings together both sexes and all ages in those small organizations that we call families; brings families together in villages, towns, or cities; brings towns or cities together in provinces, departments, or commonwealths, and combines the latter in national states. This plan of organization may be called the Social Composition.

The chief characteristic of the social composition is the capacity of each of the component groups, whether it be a commonwealth, a city, or merely a family, to live an independent life, and to perpetuate human society if it were cut off from relations with all other communities in the world.

Containing, as each component group does, both sexes and individuals of more than one generation, it has all the elements necessary for the perpetuation of the race, and therefore for the growth of population and for the evolution of social relations.

All component societies, except families and unincorporated villages, are public organizations.

The Social Constitution.—A very different form of grouping and organization, found in each component society larger than a single family, may be called the Social Constitution. This is an organization of the individual members of the community into associations or groups, for carrying on special forms of activity or for maintaining particular interests. Each of these groupings may be called a constituent society.

Such associations are: business partnerships and corporations, political parties, churches, philanthropic societies, schools, universities, and scientific associations. Constituent societies — which more often than not include individuals of one sex only, though not necessarily so, and are organized only for the special purpose of carrying on some form of business, political, or intellectual activity — have in themselves no natural power of self-perpetuation, and can exist, therefore, only as subdivisions of component societies.

Most constituent societies are private organizations. Chief among exceptions is the state, the supreme political organization.

TABLE I. — EXISTING FORMS OF ORGANIZATION

Y 1. Public?	Y 5. Incorporated?
Y 2. Private?	Y 6. Unincorporated?
Y 3. Authorized?	Y 7. Component?
Y 4. Unauthorized?	Y 8. Constituent?

CHAPTER II

THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION

Resemblance in Component Societies

A COMPONENT society is wholly or partly a genetic aggregation. The smaller component groups, including families and, sometimes, villages, may be products of genetic aggregation only. Such larger component societies as cities and commonwealths are products of genetic aggregation and congregation together.

Whatever the degree of their kinship, the members of a component society share as much mental and moral resemblance as is necessary for practical coöperation. If they are of widely different origins, their potential resemblance enables them, through assimilation, to approach a common type.

In many particulars, however, the members of a component society are unlike. In addition to differences of sex and age and, in the larger groups, of nationality, there are differences of ability, character, and taste.

It is possible to discover what resemblances are essential in a component society, and what differences are tolerated.

Tribal component societies insist upon kinship. Civil component societies highly value a common blood, but do not demand it; instead, they require potential likeness. All component societies require mental and moral likeness; but, within the limits of a common morality,

there may be no insistence upon any one point of mental or moral similarity, so long as the aggregate of resemblances remains large and varied. Subject to these conditions, the mental and moral differences among the members of a component society may be of any imaginable kind. So far, then, as mental and moral traits are concerned, no particular resemblance, but the amount of resemblance, — the number and variety of points of resemblance, — is characteristic of the component society.

Within the same integral society any one component society, conceived in its entirety, is usually, in structural type, more like another component society of similar size and composition, and a part of the same integral society, than the individual members of either component society are like one another in mental type.

The people of two towns, or counties, or commonwealths, within the same national state, when each group is viewed collectively, are likely to be of the same race and speech; they may have each about the same proportion of farmers, tradesmen, mechanics, and professional men; they may have the same religious beliefs and the same political preferences. Nevertheless, in each group, we probably find men of widely different political preferences, widely different religious beliefs, most unlike occupations, and of different nationalities.

Since each component group has the same characteristics as any other group of similar composition and dimensions, and lives in much the same way, it follows that component societies mutually aid each other in power and in mass, rather than by a division of labour.

The combination of two or more commonwealths in a federal union produces a more powerful state, precisely as the combination of two or more regiments of infantry produces a more powerful fighting force. The advantage, moreover, is purely one of power and mass, and not of the sort that is derived by combining infantry

with artillery and cavalry. The advantages due to a division of labour we owe to the organization of constituent societies.

While two component societies of the same grade are more nearly alike in structural type than the individual members of either are in mental type, the individual members of either are more like one another than they are like the individual members of any other group.

So long as perfect freedom to go from place to place and to choose one's residence exists, individuals or families that find themselves out of sympathy with the population in which they happen to dwell are in the habit of going elsewhere and seeking more congenial neighbours. Accordingly, there may always be discovered a sifting and segregating process, which is tending to bring together the potentially alike, to convert potential into actual resemblance, and to eliminate those inharmonious elements that cannot be reconciled with the prevailing type of character and habit.

Consequently, in the component society, there is always found a persistent tendency toward homogeneity. With respect to moral and mental likeness apart from kinship, however, this tendency takes the form of a multiplication of the points of resemblance rather than of insistence upon any one point in particular.

Types of Social Composition

Viewed from the standpoint of social composition, societies are of two great types, the Ethnic or Tribal, and the Civil or Demotic. Ethnic societies in turn are of two types, the metronymic and the patronymic. And finally, any component society, ethnic or civil, metronymic or patronymic, may be endogamous or exogamous.

Ethnic and Demotic Societies.— Ethnic societies are genetic aggregations. A real or fictitious blood kinship is their chief social bond. They are otherwise known as tribal societies, and include all communities of uncivilized

racess which maintain a tribal organization. Demotic societies, while in some degree products of genetic aggregation, are largely congregate associations. They are groups of people that are bound together by habitual intercourse, mutual interests, and coöperation, emphasizing their mental and moral resemblance, and giving little heed to origins or genetic relationships.

There still survive, in various parts of the world, savage and barbarian communities of such varied stages of social organization that every form of social composition may still be observed and comparatively studied in actually existing communities.

Metronymic and Patronymic Societies.—A metronymic group is one in which all relationships are traced through mothers; relationships on the father's side are ignored. A patronymic group is one in which all relationships are traced in the male line through fathers.

Every metronymic social group is named from some class of natural objects, such as a species of plant or animal, which is thought of as feminine in gender, and from which the group is supposed to have sprung. A class of objects so regarded is known among ethnologists as a totem, which is approximately its American Indian name. The totem is worshipped as possessing divine powers, and as maintaining a special protective oversight of the group; and the group in turn protects the totem from harm. Usually, no animal or plant of the totemic class can be slain or used for food; but probably there was a time when the totemic species was the usual food supply of the group that afterward abstained from it.¹

Each patronymic group is named from a real or fictitious male ancestor. Metronymy is presumably older than patronymy.

Endogamous and Exogamous Societies.—An endogamous group is one in which the men may, and usually do, take women of their own group as wives. An exogamous

¹ See Spencer and Gillen, "The Native Tribes of Central Australia," Chapter vi. and pp. 207, 467.

group is one in which men, by sacred custom, are forbidden to marry women of their own group, and to which they bring wives from other groups.

The family group is almost everywhere exogamous, although endogamous — that is incestuous — families are found in some of the lowest savage communities and occasionally elsewhere. The totemic kindred is sometimes endogamous and sometimes exogamous. Larger ethnic societies are usually endogamous. In civil societies larger than family groups restrictions of endogamy and exogamy have disappeared, although actual marriage custom remains either prevalingly endogamous or prevailingly exogamous.

The Composition of Ethnic Societies

In the composition of ethnic societies Families are combined in Hordes, hordes are consolidated into Tribes, and tribes are combined in Confederations. Family, horde, and tribe are the component groups of ethnic society.

The Family is the simplest component society. All human beings, from the lowest savages to civilized men, live in family groups. But these groups are by no means always of the kind that we are familiar with in civilized lands.

The simplest form of the human family is a pairing arrangement of short duration. Among the Mincopis, of the Andaman Islands, it is customary for the father to live with the mother until after their child is weaned, and then to seek another wife. A similar arrangement, somewhat more stable, but seldom of lifelong duration, is found among the Blackfellows of Australia, the northern Eskimo of Greenland, and the Amazonian Indians of Brazil.

When the Hawaiian Islands were first invaded by whites, a family organization was discovered which is called by its Hawaiian name, punaluan. It is constituted by the marriage of a group of brothers to a group of sisters, who, however, are not sisters to their husbands. Each woman is a wife to all the men, and each man a husband to all the women. This form still exists among the Todas of India.

The polyandrian family, in which a woman has several husbands, is usually found among tribes that have passed beyond the lowest savagery into the somewhat higher stage of barbarism.

There are two well marked types of polyandry, known respectively as Tibetan and Nair. In Tibetan polyandry, so called because it has been most carefully studied in Tibet, the husbands are brothers. This is the commoner form. In Nair polyandry, which takes its name from a district of southeastern India, the woman's husbands are not related.

Polyandry existed until recently in Ceylon, in New Zealand, in New Caledonia, and elsewhere in the Pacific Islands. It is still found in the Aleutian Islands, and in many places in Central and Northern Asia. It was formerly common among the Indian tribes on the Orinoco and in the Canary Islands. Traces of it still remain among the Hottentots of South Africa, the Damaras, the mountain tribes of the Bantu, and the Hovas of Madagascar. Polyandry, formerly prevailed among the Piets and the Irish; and there are abundant evidences of its former existence in other Aryan stocks, and throughout the Semitic and Hamitic races.

The polygynous family, in which the husband has two or more wives or concubines, has been, and still is, even more general than polyandry.

This form is often wrongly called polygamous, a term which means many marriages, and therefore really includes polyandry, or the plural marriage of one woman to two or more men, as well as polygyny, or the marriage of one man to two or more women.

Polygyny depends upon the ability of the husband to support a large domestic establishment; and it is therefore practically confined to the relatively well-to-do classes in those communities that tolerate it. It usually happens, therefore, that in polygynous societies the poorer classes are either monogamous or polyandrian. Polygyny still flourishes in China and in Turkey, and only recently ceased to be a tolerated form of marriage in one of the territories of the United States.

As societies have advanced in culture, monogamy, or the marriage union of one man with one woman, has everywhere tended to displace polyandry and polygyny. Theoretically, a monogamous marriage is of lifelong duration. Actually, however, divorce is nearly everywhere allowed for various causes; and the monogamous family is therefore sometimes unstable.

The Horde.—This is a name applied to a small social group composed of a few families and comprising not more than from twenty-five to one hundred persons in all.

No such horde is anywhere found living in absolute isolation. It is always in communication with other similar hordes of the same race, language, and culture. Under the influence of excitement or of fear, or to share an unusual food supply, or for the purpose of migration, hordes may temporarily congregate in large numbers; but they do not permanently combine with one another under the leadership of a common chief for military or political action, and there is no organization of a religious or industrial character that binds them together in a larger whole.

Examples of clusters of hordes not compacted into any larger organization are the Veddahs of Ceylon, the Mincopis of the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal, the Australian Blackfellows, the Bushmen of South Africa, the Fuegians of Tierra del Fuego, the Innuits of the northeastern and northwestern coasts of North America, the Utes of the Rocky Mountains, and the Indians of the Amazonian forests.

The Tribe.—This name is properly applied to any community in which several hordes have become welded into a larger and more definitely organized society, occupying a defined territory, speaking one language or dialect, and conscious of its unity, or in which a single horde, grown to many times its original size, has become differentiated and organized.

The smallest united and organized society that is composed of lesser social groups that are themselves larger than single families is a tribe. The word "tribe" is often used inaccurately. It should never be applied to a single horde, or even to a cluster of hordes. A tribe is always sufficiently organized to have a military leader or chief.

The members of a tribe may dwell together in a single camp or village, or they may be distributed in two or more villages. Where the tribe includes more than one village, the arrangement may point to a survival of hordes that have been combined in a larger organization, or it may indicate the beginning of a division of the tribe into two or more new tribes.

By far the best organized metronymic tribes that have as yet been studied by ethnologists are the North American Indians. The typical Indian tribe is differentiated into exogamous totemic kindreds, each of which is supposed to be distantly related to all other totemic kindreds in the tribe. Examples of metronymic tribes in other parts of the world are the two tribes of the Damaras in South Africa, the Congo tribes of West Africa, the inland Negroes, the Kasias of Bengal, the Tahitians and Tongans of Polynesia, and the Hovas of Madagascar.

Among existing patronymic tribes are the Santals of the Western mountains of lower Bengal, the Ostyaks who inhabit the dreary northern country of the banks of the Obi, the Kaffirs, the Bechuanas, and the Hottentots of South Africa. Well known historical examples of patronymic tribes were those of the Hebrews, the Greeks, the Romans, and the Germans.

The Confederation.—This is any number of tribes united for warlike and sometimes for other purposes, but still maintaining a social organization on the basis of kinship, and therefore not developed into true civil states.

The famous federation of the Iroquois Indians in the state of New York, in which five, afterward six, tribes were bound together in a powerful military league, was an excellent example of this grade of social composition in metronymic society. Other examples have been the Tongans and the Malagasy. The confederations of Frankish, Burgundian, and other German tribes that overran the Roman Empire were likewise good examples of the same grade of composition in patronymic society. A coherent aggregation or confederation of tribes is properly called a Folk or Ethnic Nation.

The Composition of Civil Societies

In the composition of civil societies Families are combined in Hamlets, Villages, or Parishes; these, in turn, are combined in Towns, Communes, or Cities; these, in their turn, are combined in Counties or Departments; counties or departments are combined in Kingdoms, Republics, or other Commonwealths; and finally kingdoms or other

commonwealths may be combined in Federal States or Empires. No description of these component societies is necessary.

TABLE II. — THE FAMILY

- A 1. Number of Endogamous Families.
- A 2. Number of Pairing Families.
- A 3. Number of Punaluan Families.
- A 4. Number of Polyandrian Families.
- A 5. Number of Polygynous Families.
- A 6. Number of Monogamous Families.

TABLE III. — THE HORDE

- | | |
|-------------------|--------------------------------|
| Y 1. Endogamous ? | Y 3. Patronymic ? |
| Y 2. Metronymic ? | A 4. Total number of Families. |

Other columns as in Table II.

TABLE IV. — THE CLUSTER OF HORDES

First three columns as in Table III.

- A 4. Total Number of Hordes.
- A 5. Number of Endogamous Hordes.
- A 6. Total Number of Families.

Other columns as in Table II.

TABLE V. — THE TRIBE

First three columns as in Table III.

- A 4. Total Number of Villages.
- A 5. Number of Endogamous Villages.
- A 6. Total Number of Families.

Other columns as in Table II.

TABLE VI. — THE CONFEDERATION OF TRIBES

First three columns as in Table III.

- A 4. Total Number of Tribes.
- A 5. Number of Endogamous Tribes.
- A 6. Total Number of Families.

Other columns as in Table II.

TABLE VII. — THE HAMLET, VILLAGE, OR PARISH

- Y 1. Prevaillingly Endogamous ?
- A 2. Total Number of Families.

Other columns as in Table II.

TABLE VIII. — THE TOWN, COMMUNE, OR CITY

- Y 1. Prevailingly Endogamous ?
- Y 2. Component Subdivisions prevailingly Endogamous ?
- A 3. Total Number of Hamlets, Villages, Parishes, or Wards.
- A 4. Total Number of Families.

Other columns as in Table II.

TABLE IX. — THE COUNTY OR DEPARTMENT

First two columns as in Table VIII.

- A 3. Total Number of Towns, Communes, or Cities.
- A 4. Total Number of Families.

Other columns as in Table II.

TABLE X. — THE PROVINCE OR COMMONWEALTH

First two columns as in Table VIII.

- A 3. Total Number of Counties or Departments.
- A 4. Total Number of Families.

Other columns as in Table II.

Origin of the Social Composition

To a great extent all degrees of social composition beyond the family and the horde are products of the deliberative action of the social mind.

The federation of tribes, or of states, is effected by the social mind under the pressure of external necessities, especially those of defence and aggression. When integration has been accomplished, a certain internal necessity obliges the social mind to maintain the union after its original purpose has been achieved. The consciousness of kind is the compelling power. The social mind puts its impress on each component group and moulds it into conformity with a certain type. Thus, in a given community, every variety of the family may have existed at the outset, or may, from time to time, appear. But the social mind gives approval to some one type only, — for example, the monogamic, — and prohibits or discoun-

tenances all others. In like manner, in the commonwealth each component town, and in the federal state each component commonwealth, is compelled to conform to a type or standard.

Thus the social composition is a psychological rather than a physical fact. So viewed, it may be described as an alliance, in each component group, of individuals who in many points are alike, but who tolerate in one another particular differences; supplemented by an alliance of like types and a non-toleration of unlike types among component groups.

The Law of Development of Social Composition

Accordingly, while much actual resemblance of individuals to one another is necessary in the component group, and a greater actual resemblance of group types to one another is necessary throughout the social composition, a yet greater potential resemblance is necessary among both individuals and types.

The social composition, then, is formed by the mutual attraction of the like and non-toleration of the unlike; except to the extent that the actually unlike are so far potentially alike as to admit of continuing assimilation. As the integration of the like proceeds, the social mind becomes aware of the process, deliberately approves it, and by all possible means furthers it. The social mind does this because it develops within itself a passion for homogeneity of type, and a judgment of the usefulness of integration or federation, as a defensive and offensive measure.

We therefore may say that the social composition is produced by the reciprocal attractiveness of like for like, and is developed by the passion for homogeneity and inte-

gration, through an effort to combine the potentially with the actually alike, and to create a common type. The law of development of the social composition therefore is: —

The social composition develops in proportion to the intensity and scope of the passion for homogeneity.

CHAPTER III

THE SOCIAL CONSTITUTION

Resemblance in Constituent Societies

ANY association organized for carrying on a particular activity, or for achieving some special social end, is a constituent society. This name is descriptive because such associations collectively, when harmoniously correlated so that they supplement one another's functions, are the social constitution of the community. Collectively, they carry on the greater part of the diversified social activities. Since the constituent society has a defined object in view, it is purposive in character. Its members are supposed to be aware of its object, and to put forth effort for its attainment.

Membership in a constituent society is not an incident of birth. New members are admitted into a purposive association only by their own consent and by the permission of members. Where members seem to enter it by birth, as in a church which claims the children of members, it is not kinship, but a claim, consciously made and allowed, that is the true ground of the membership relation. Therefore, purposive associations have no independent existence. They depend on one another, and they presuppose the social composition. They are found only within a comprehensive autogenous or integral society.

The facts of resemblance to be observed in the membership of a constituent society are precisely the opposite of those observed in the membership of a component society.

Component societies are more alike in structural type than their members are in mental type. The members of a constituent society are more alike with reference to the purpose that unites them than are any two associations.

The members of a given trade union, for example, with reference to the objects of organized labour, are more alike than are any two equally accessible and efficient unions. Were this not so, the differing members would join other organizations. No two churches resemble each other so closely in feeling and belief as do the actually coöperating members of any given church. The members of trade unions collectively, or of churches collectively, resemble each other more than trade unions in general resemble churches in general. The members of business corporations collectively, or of scientific societies collectively, resemble each other more closely than the scientific societies resemble the business corporations.

Furthermore, of the three great modes of resemblance, —namely, the mental resemblance that is correlated with kinship, the mental and practical resemblance that is independent of kinship, and potential likeness, — it is the first and the third that are chiefly prominent and most insisted on in the component society. It is the second, or actual mental and practical resemblance for the time being, that is most conspicuous and most insisted on in the constituent society.

The component society, if relatively homogeneous in race and nationality, and if certain that its differing elements are undergoing assimilation to a common type, may tolerate much diversity of mental and moral traits, indeed, must do so if it is to have a social constitution and a division of labour. The passion for homogeneity which it manifests is the desire to maintain a general homogeneity of blood, or at least to assimilate the different elements of nationality and speech to a common kind, and to mould the traditional belief to a common type. It is in matters

of detail that it is willing to tolerate difference. In the constituent society it is precisely a matter of detail that is of chief concern. In constituent societies, therefore, likeness of nationality and potential resemblance may, to a great extent, be ignored; but actual agreement of mind and character upon the specific object for which the association exists is required.

Finally, as each association in the social constitution does a specific work, it may be said to have a social function. From this point of view, purposive grouping may be described as functional association. The combination of purposive associations is, therefore, a coördination; and their mutual aid is not limited by a mere increase of mass and power. It is effected, also, through a division of labour.

Types of Constituent Societies

Constituent, like component, societies are ethnic or civil in type. In membership many constituent societies are identical or nearly identical with certain component societies. In these cases the component groups are functioning as constituent associations; and to the extent that this occurs, the social constitution is not yet differentiated from the social composition. Other constituent societies are entirely distinct from component groups of every sort. Many constituent societies are secret organizations, others are open. Furthermore, every constituent society has a composition and a constitution of its own.

Ethnic and Civil Constitution. — In communities whose composition is ethnic in type the constituent associations, like the component groups, are organized on a basis of consanguinity. They insist upon those resemblances that are correlated with the narrower degrees of kinship. In communities whose composition is civil in type the constituent

associations, like the component groups, are based upon mental and practical resemblances that are independent of the narrower degrees of kinship.

Degree of Separation from Component Groups.—In certain cases the constituent society is only a component society, acting in a particular way, at a particular time, for a particular purpose; as if a village should on a special occasion resolve itself into a hunting party, or a public meeting, or a “committee of the whole,” to celebrate a great event or to enjoy a festival. Differentiation of the social constitution from the social composition is far more advanced in civil than in ethnic societies.

A great many facts point to the conclusion that in social evolution constituent societies grow out of and are differentiated from component societies through a specialization of function. Constituent associations that are separate from the social composition are always voluntarily formed purposive associations.

Secret and Open Societies.—Secrecy and a rigorous exercise of authority over members are conspicuous features of purposive associations in savage tribes, and hardly less so in the great Oriental empires of China, Farther India, and Persia. In mediæval days they marked the social organization of Western Europe; but they are now exceptional there, and are rare in the United States, if the whole number of organizations is taken into account.

Perhaps no more interesting contrast than this exists in the social systems of America and China. America is sociologically a vast plexus of free associations, most of which are perfectly open in their objects and methods. China is a social network of oathbound secret societies, whose members are under threat of mutilation or death if they reveal the mysteries of their fraternities. There is probably some close connection between such a contrast and the relative predominance of economic association in the West, and of religious, fraternal, and defensive association in the East.

The Organization of Constituent Societies.—Every purposive association, whether differentiated from the social composition or not, whether secret or open, has not only a function but also a composition and a constitution which are adapted to the performance of the function.

In the composition of purposive associations individuals are combined as persons and by categories,—for example, the categories of employer and employee in the composition of an industrial group. The composition of associations must be studied with reference to the common trait or interest that unites their members.

The constitution of a purposive association is the plan of organization of its membership. The categories of individuals which compose it are combined in accordance with some principle of subordination or coördination, and the entire membership may be divided into sub-societies, bureaus, or committees.

The Constitution of Ethnic Societies

Ethnic societies are so much smaller than civil societies, their culture is so much less advanced, and their activities are so much simpler, that their constitution is relatively simple and undifferentiated. Some of its features, however, are unique, and must be studied with much care before the history and modern organization of civil society can be understood.

Component-Constituent Societies.—This term may be conveniently used to designate those component groups that function as constituent associations, and those constituent societies that have partially but not yet completely separated from the component groups in which they have originated. The component-constituent associations of ethnic society are the Household, the Clan, the Phratry, the Tribe, and the Confederation.

1. *The Household.*—This is the primitive purposive association; it is an organization nearly but not quite

identical with the family. Its functions are cultural and economic.

The family, a unit in the social composition, is a genetic aggregation. The household is a purposive group composed of those individuals who live together in a dwelling, and who coöperate in learning their environment, in obtaining and preparing food, in manufacturing clothing, tools, and utensils, and in imparting their culture to children. Commonly, but not always, the members of a family and the members of a household are identical. Individual members of the family may leave their own household group to dwell elsewhere, and the household may include members who are not of the family kindred. Therefore, while the family is a component society, the household, strictly speaking, is a constituent society or purposive association.

2. *The Clan.* — Still more complicated in its structure and functions is the clan, the most distinctive and the most important purposive association of ethnic society. The clan is that association which includes all those kindred who bear the same totemic name or the same surname. Its functions are cultural, economic, and juridical.

The clan is a genetic organization, because all its members, in reality or nominally, are descended from a common ancestor or ancestral group. Yet it never contains all of such descendants. If the clan is metronymic, it includes all sons and daughters of the women born into the clan, but never the sons and daughters of the men born into the clan, since descent is reckoned through mothers, and marriage is exogamous, and the sons and daughters of the men, therefore, necessarily belong to the clans of their mothers. If the clan is patronymic these conditions are reversed. Thus the clan is one segment of any group of relatively near consanguini. The entire group of consanguini or "enlarged family," as it is sometimes called, consists of at least two or three, and probably of many, clans. The clan accordingly is partially identified with a component group. The identification, however, never can be complete, first, because the clan is only one segment of the component group, and secondly, because it often expels members who by right of blood have belonged to it, and adopts members of alien blood.

As a purposive association the clan cherishes a common culture, especially in religion and in amusements, it engages in many common economic activities, it enforces rights and obligations, and it preserves the juridical tradition.

The organization and functions of an Iroquois clan revealed the true characteristics of clan responsibilities and activities with great clearness. Each Iroquois clan had an elected sachem, whose duties were essentially those of a petty justice. He interpreted and administered the juridical traditions of the clan. The clan had also a council, which discussed and determined all matters of policy. All clansmen and clanswomen had the right to vote in electing or deposing the officers of the clan; all were forbidden to marry within the clan; all were bound by the obligation to help and defend a fellow-clansman, and to avenge his injuries; all shared in the right to bear the clan's totemic name, to inherit the property of deceased members, and to adopt strangers into the clan; all shared in a common horticulture, in a common storehouse, and in common rights of trade; all participated in common amusements and in common religious observances, and all had rights in a common burial place.

Similar clan organizations are found in savage and barbarian communities, in every quarter of the world. A metronymic clan is always a totemic kindred, and it is often called a totem-kin. The clan of the Greeks was called the *γένος*, and that of the Romans the gens. The latter word was used by Morgan to designate the clan in all its varieties, including the totem-kin. A later usage makes "clan" the generic word, and reserves "gens" for the clan of the Greeks and of the Romans. The word "clan" itself is Celtic. The clan of the Hindus is called the *gôtra*, and that of the Arabs the *hayy*.¹

3. *The Phratry*.—The phratry is a brotherhood of clans. Its functions are cultural and juristic.

¹ For detailed information upon the clan, the student should consult "The League of the Iroquois," "Ancient Society," and other writings of Lewis H. Morgan; Spencer and Gillen, "Native Tribes of Central Australia"; Robertson Smith, "Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia"; Henry Sumner Maine, "Ancient Law"; the Reports and Transactions of Anthropological and Ethnological Societies, and especially the Reports of the American Bureau of Ethnology.

When a clan becomes too large for the successful performance of all its functions, it normally divides into sub-clans. When, in the course of time, the sub-clans become clans, they may perpetuate the original clan organization under a new form, as a brotherhood (*φρατρία*) of clans. In this case certain functions of the original clan are continued by the phratry. Among these are the conduct of periodical festivities, in which the members of the different clans belonging to the phratry come together for a renewal of their original good-fellowship. The phratry also conducts funerals and all the more important religious ceremonies. Jurisdiction of capital crimes remains with the phratry, and to it can be taken other serious cases, on appeal, from the clan.¹

4. *The Tribe*.—Primarily a component group, the tribe, functioning as a constituent association, is a military organization, usually presided over by a council of chieftains, who have been the successful leaders of war parties.

The consolidation of hordes, in which the tribe normally originates, usually begins in a common defence or a common aggression against common enemies; the distinctive activities of the tribe, therefore, are military from the first.

5. *The Confederation*.—Primarily a component society, the confederation, functioning as a constituent association, is a political organization. Its deliberations are conducted by a council composed of leading representatives of the federated tribes.

As was explained in the chapter on Concerted Volition, political activity is a private and public coöperation in the task of socialization, including social integration. This activity in all its phases is first developed in the confederation.

For example, it is not until the confederation is formed that juristic and military affairs are brought under one common authority.

¹ It was Morgan who, when he discovered that brotherhoods of clans in Iroquois tribes were in structure and function essentially like the brotherhoods of gentes in Greek and Roman tribes, extended the name "phratry" to all such organizations. See "The League of the Iroquois" and "Ancient Society."

In the single tribe the clan is practically supreme in juridical matters, as the tribe is in military matters. The council of the confederation not only determines war and peace for all the confederated tribes, but it also adjudicates the relations of tribes and of the members of different tribes to one another, as the council of the clan adjudicates the relations of its own members. Confederation, furthermore, assimilates the slightly differing cultures of the federated tribes, especially in language.

Special Associations. — The constituent associations differentiated and separated from component groups that may be found in ethnic society are, Religious Secret Societies, Hunting Associations, Feud Associations, Military Associations, and Political Associations.

1. *Religious Societies.* — These are altogether the most important special associations found in tribal society. They are numerous and powerful.

In North American Indian tribes, they are known as Medicine Lodges, and the medicine men are a differentiated religious class.¹

2. *Hunting Associations.* — These in tribal society, though numerous enough, are little more than the indefinite beginnings of economic organization outside of the household.

They are a mere consorting of kinsmen in the longer or more dangerous expeditions. They rarely, if ever, attain to the definiteness of organization characteristic of the religious society.

3. *Feud Associations.* — Frequently met with in tribal societies are little bands of men sworn to an especially intimate brotherhood, to mutual protection, and to a redress of wrongs.

¹ There is an extensive literature descriptive of the secret religious societies of tribal communities. See especially Spencer and Gillen, "Native Tribes of Central Australia"; the writings of Lewis H. Morgan; monographs by Frank Hamilton Cushing, in the Reports of the American Bureau of Ethnology; monographs by Carl Lumboltz, in the Anthropological Series issued by the American Museum of Natural History, and a detailed work by Professor Franz Boas, "The Secret Societies of the Kwakiutl."

The brotherhood thus formed is in many respects in structure and function like the clan, and in other respects like the religious society. It is, however, distinct from both, and always is a purely voluntary and private arrangement.

4. *Military Associations*.—In the military affairs of the tribe individual initiative is carefully preserved.

The war party is a voluntary purposive association. In the Indian tribe any brave might call for volunteers from among his clansmen to follow him on the warpath. He announced his project by giving a war dance. "If he succeeded in forming a company, which would consist of such persons as joined him in the dance, they departed immediately, while enthusiasm was at its height."¹ If the expedition was successful, its leader might hope to be invested with dignity as a war chief of his clan.

5. *Political Associations*.—The one class of voluntary political organizations in tribal confederations of which we have positive knowledge is that of conspiracies to overthrow an existing order.

Bands of conspirators are probably the first voluntary political organizations to be formed. At all events, they are the first to obtain notice in historical records.²

The Constitution of Civil Societies

While in ethnic society the social constitution is on the whole incidental to the social composition, in civil society the social constitution subordinates and dominates the social composition.

Component-Constituent Societies.—Each component group of civil society functions to some extent as a purposive association; or rather, to speak with strict accuracy, each component group is nearly, but not quite, identical with some one constituent society.

¹ See Morgan, "Ancient Society," pp. 117, 118.

² See, e.g., Cæsar's account of the conspiracy of Orgetorix, "De Bello Gallico," Lib. I, cap. ii.

As in ethnic society, the household is not always precisely the same group as the family. The incorporated village, a constituent society, is never quite identical with the village as a component group, because the latter contains inhabitants who are neither voters nor even residents, in a strict legal sense. The like distinction must be made between the municipality as a public corporation and the city as a component group,—a dense centre of population. The state, in turn, is never precisely identical with the commonwealth or the nation as a component society. The latter always includes inhabitants who are neither voters nor even citizens in the state.

1. *The Household*.—The functions of the household as a purposive association in civil society are the same in kind as in ethnic society, but more developed in form and in detail.

At a certain stage in the evolution of civil society the household, patriarchal in organization, becomes a highly complex economic organization. Such was the *oikos* of the Greeks, from which our words "economy" and "economic" are derived. In later evolution, however, the household surrenders most of its industrial activities to specialized associations, while retaining and developing its cultural functions.

2. *The Municipality*.—The public municipal corporation, including under this head the incorporated town or township, and the incorporated village or borough, has, like the clan in ethnic society, cultural, economic, and juridical functions.

There are reasons for supposing that hamlets, developing into villages, themselves originated in permanent settlements of clans or sub-clans. The incorporated municipality in times past has maintained public religious rites. In many parts of the Old World it provides public amusements and festivities, and everywhere, in modern days, it maintains schools and other educational agencies, often in-

cluding public museums, libraries, and galleries of art. It maintains bridges and roads, including pavements and sidewalks, it provides sewers, and oftentimes a water supply. In earlier days it often owned and managed public fields or commons. Various European cities have municipal manufacturing industries. In recent years many municipalities, European and American, have experimented with the ownership and management of street railways and of the lighting service. A survival of the semi-communism of the clan is the municipal relief of the poor, and support of paupers. Municipal corporations always have their machinery of public order and justice, including constables or a police service, and petty justices or magistrates.

3. *The County or Department.*—There is reason to suppose that the county was originally identical with the tribe or some portion of a tribe, permanently settled on the land. The functions of the modern county, however, are chiefly economic and juristic, and not military.

The county maintains certain roads and bridges, courts, and jails, and such officers of justice as judges, justices, sheriffs, and deputies. The county often supports paupers and defectives.

4. *The State.*—The chief purposive organization of civil society is the state, through which the social mind dominates the integral community, prescribes forms and obligations to all minor purposive associations, and shapes the social composition. Coördinating all activities and relations, the state maintains conditions under which all its subjects may live, as Aristotle said, "a perfect and self-sufficing life."

(1) *The Composition of the State* includes subjects and members. All who dwell within the territorial boundaries of an independent state are its subjects, and must obey its authority and laws. Not all subjects of the state, however, are in any true sense members of it, although it is a very common error to assume that they are. Only those who share in the consciousness of the state, and who, by

their loyalty and willing aid contribute to its authority and power, are truly members. The rebel, the traitor, and the criminal are in the state, but they are not of it.

Therefore, in the composition of the state, individuals are combined by categories. These categories are, first, the subjects of authority; second, the makers of moral authority; third, the makers of legal authority; and, fourth, the agents of legal authority.

All who share in the consciousness of the state and freely contribute their thought and effort to it are makers of authority in a general sense, that is, of moral authority. It is this general or moral authority which ultimately is embodied in law and in the political organization. But not all who help to create moral authority actually help to convert it into legal forms. The makers of legal authority are those who legally exercise the franchise and by their votes authorize the legal acts of the state. The electors of the state are thus a very definite purposive association, within an association that is larger and less definite; and, as in all other purposive associations that are definite in form, new members are admitted to the electorate only by the consent of members.

The agents of legal authority are those whom the electors authorize to put their will into final form and execution. Collectively, the agents of legal authority are the government.

(2) *Constitution of the State.*—In the constitution of the state the most important subordinate bodies are the public corporations.

The state first incorporates itself, defining its territory and its membership, describing its organization, and laying upon itself the rules of procedure by which it will systematically conduct its affairs. It next, in like manner, incorporates the local subdivisions of society, such as counties, townships, and cities, and assigns to each certain

rights, duties, and powers. The remaining subordinate organizations of the state are found within the public corporations. They consist of parliamentary and legislative bodies to initiate the formulation of law; of courts to complete the formulation of law; and of executive bureaus, boards, and commissions.

(3) *The Functions of the State* are coextensive with human interests. This, at least, is what they are in fact.

From time to time, political philosophy has attempted to prove that the functions of the state ought to be limited to a comparatively narrow sphere, leaving all other things to individual initiative and voluntary organization. The sociologist is concerned with the functions of the state, however, as they actually appear in existing communities and in history.

The primary purpose of the state is to perfect social integration. To this end it maintains armies and carries on diplomacy to protect the nation against aggression, or to enlarge its territory and population; and it maintains tribunals and police to enforce peace within its own borders. The first business of legislatures, courts, and executives is to combine, defend, and harmonize social groups, classes, individuals, and interests.

Inevitably, however, the performance of this work carries the state into economic activities. All modern states coin money. To a very great extent, credit and banking operations are controlled by government. States interfere with values also by legislation and taxation, sometimes on a vast scale, as in the complicated protective tariff systems of the United States, Germany, and France. All states put the chief means of communication, namely, the postal system, under the management of the government. As yet, the railroad systems of the world are operated chiefly by private corporations. In all states, however, the business of railroads is being more and more closely regulated by the government, and in many parts of Europe railroads have become government property.

Not less inevitable is it that states should assume cultural functions. The members of the state see that social cohesion is a spiritual union rather than an external compulsion, and that it depends upon the ideas of individuals. They believe it to be as necessary to guide the minds of men as it is to suppress crime and insurrection. Rightly or wrongly, they believe also that the guidance will be inadequate or pernicious unless the state itself is the supreme guide.

Every state, therefore, maintains either institutions of religion, like the Greek Church of Russia, or an elaborate system of education, like that of the United States or of France. Occasionally a state, like England or Prussia, succeeds in maintaining side by side a state religion and a state instruction; but it is generally recognized that such a policy creates a condition of unstable equilibrium. Every state in these days recognizes obligations to literature, science, and art, and undertakes to discharge them by supporting universities, and such institutions as the French Academy and the numerous scientific bureaux of the United States, and by maintaining libraries, museums, and galleries of art.

Voluntary Associations.—The assumption that the state has only functions of defence and arbitration is not more erroneous than the common assumption that voluntary organization has only economic and cultural functions. Voluntary organization is coextensive with every mode of human activity.

1. *Cultural Associations.*—In the composition of private cultural associations, there is an alliance of persons of like beliefs, tastes, and natures. It is usually the professed purpose of cultural associations to make belief or taste the condition of membership; but this ideal is never realized. The sympathetic elements of the consciousness of kind are always present to unite some whose beliefs differ, and to sunder some whose beliefs agree. The constitution of cultural associations requires no special description. It takes the form either of corporations or of unincorporated societies, secret or open. The functions of cultural associations are linguistic, æsthetic and pleasurable, religious, scientific, and educational.

Nearly every country has associations whose object is to preserve the purity of the nation's language, or in certain particulars to modify or reform it.

Fraternal societies usually combine mutual aid with social pleasure, as do, for example, the Freemasons and the Odd Fellows. Associa-

tions for the promotion of art or music often serve no other end. Social clubs sometimes become active political organizations; but in general the chief objects of all these organizations are personal culture and social enjoyment.

The church as a voluntary organization may exist in a country like England that has an established religion; but it can attain its complete development only in a country where state and church are completely separated, as in the United States.

The religious population of a country is organized also in a bewildering number of special associations. These include the monastic orders and societies of the Roman Catholic Church, and the missionary and other societies of the Protestant denominations.

Large as is the field occupied by government scientific bureaus, state universities, and public schools, fully one-half of all scientific and educational activity is carried on through private organizations; namely, the national and local learned bodies, the private schools, and the denominational colleges. In the United States, every branch of research, from physics, chemistry, and astronomy, to philology and folklore, is fostered by an association. A large majority of the degree-conferring colleges and universities are private foundations; and the larger part of their productive funds has been given to them by individuals.

2. *Economic Associations.*—Private economic associations, as a rule, are composed of individuals of like ability and training. In economic organization less than elsewhere in society do the sympathetic, instinctive, and emotional elements of the consciousness of kind determine alliances. Intellectual agreement in notions of utility is the controlling principle.

Yet even in economic organization, race and national prejudices have their influence. In the United States they are the cause of the refusal of white artisans in both the North and the South to work with negroes, and of the practical exclusion of the negro from mechanical trades.

The categories of employer and employed do not usually enter into the composition of the same association.

They are combined in industrial groups which unite two or more associations; as, for example, in a manufacturing group that includes a partnership or a corporation as the entrepreneur, and members of several trade unions as employees.

The constitution of private economic associations takes the form of partnerships, corporations, and miscellaneous associations not incorporated.

Partnerships, with an unlimited liability of each partner, and a limited capital, are adapted only to small enterprises. To the evolution of the corporation, with its limited liability of the individual stockholder, its control of capital by the massing of individual accumulations, and its command of the services of men of superior ability, we owe the gigantic industrial undertakings of modern times.

Of unincorporated associations with economic functions, the most important are producers' and traders' combinations and the labour organizations.

Practically, every industry is controlled or affected by combinations that attempt to regulate production and prices. Some of these combinations are mere agreements, while others are somewhat elaborate organizations, with power to impose strict conditions upon individual producers, and to enforce penalties against disobedience.

Among wage-earners' associations the American Federation of Labour is a good example of complex, yet flexible and efficient, organization.

The study of the functions of private economic associations falls within the special social science of Political Economy.

The functions include the production of goods in agriculture, mining, and manufacturing, by means of industrial groups that range in complexity from the combination of the individual employer and his workmen to the association of great corporations and their thousands of organized employees acting as a unit. They include, also, the transportation and exchange of goods by means of railways, steamships, and express companies, and by mercantile partnerships and corporations; the equilibration of values through ordinary mar-

kets, through such special markets as produce and stock exchanges, and through banking organizations; the accumulation of capital and the provision against want by means of institutions for saving, insurance, and mutual aid; economic provision for the helpless and dependent; and, finally, economic aggression and defence through the mechanism of trusts and trade unions.

3. *Moral and Juristic Associations.*—Among voluntary associations for the promotion of private morals the most important are those philanthropic organizations that, to a great extent, have assumed the oversight, guidance, and encouragement of the unfortunate, the irresponsible, and the erring, which once was exercised by the church.

They are as many and as varied as human ills; and no complete enumeration of them has ever been made. Among those especially worth studying are charity organization societies, the National Conference of Charities and Correction, the National Prison Congress, and the University and other social settlements modelled more or less closely on the Toynbee Hall experiment, which was begun in East London in 1885.

Private associations that assume juristic functions are of two classes.

The largest class is composed of lawless organizations that spring into existence in the absence of legally constituted courts, or when courts fail to do their duty in protecting property and life. It is usually the lawless and violent elements in the population that enter into the composition of illegal or non-legal juristic organizations.

The other class of private juristic associations includes organizations to arbitrate disputes or to adjust pecuniary claims.

Voluntary boards of arbitration are not infrequently established to deal with disputes, of an essentially juristic character, between employer and employed. In this class of organizations, also, must be included legally incorporated associations, whose function is to

promote the enforcement of law in respect to particular classes of interests. Among such are various organizations for preventing cruelties to children or to animals, for enforcing temperance legislation, sanitary laws, and municipal ordinances.

4. *Political Associations.* — The most important of all voluntary organizations are political associations. The state, so far from being the only political organization, could not exist in a free or republican form were there not voluntary and private political associations.

In the composition of political associations, men of like views and like interests are allied. It is a great mistake, however, to suppose that a purely intellectual agreement upon specific matters of common interest is the chief bond of union in a political party. The real bond is the consciousness of kind in its entirety, including sympathies, instincts, agreement in beliefs, and other forms of emotion and prejudice that unite men in political action.

Opinion and interest are, nevertheless, important factors of political association. No political party is as homogeneous as it would be if the sympathetic and sentimental elements of the consciousness of kind were its sole animating power. In every political association there are men of unlike natures who are united by identity of opinions or by community of interests. The heterogeneity of political association is further increased by the necessary combination of leadership and following.

The constitution of voluntary political associations assumes the forms of secret societies, non-secret but exclusive clubs, and open associations.

Secret societies and cabals are characteristic of states in which liberty is imperfectly developed, and in which, therefore, all criticism of the government and all private initiative are dangerous. In lands where freedom of discussion is upheld by law, secret association in politics is

resorted to only by criminals, revolutionists, and other men who fear to fight in the open.

Non-secret but exclusive clubs, combining political with social functions, have long been a form of voluntary political organization, and have at times played an important part in public affairs.

In countries that enjoy freedom under constitutional guarantee, however, the active work of politics is chiefly carried on by those open associations called political parties, to which all voters desiring in good faith to join them are welcome.

The great political parties of England and the United States are the largest, they are also the most mobile and efficient of voluntary organizations. Each includes among its adherents men of every degree of mental evolution, of almost every nationality, and of every pursuit. Each is so perfectly distributed over a vast area that it counts voters in every hamlet of the national domain. It is exceptional when either of the leading parties of the United States fails in a presidential election to poll one quarter of the total vote of any commonwealth.

A great political party stands for a general way of looking at public affairs and of dealing with them rather than for any single interest. It is controlled more by class feeling than by political philosophy; and inasmuch as the interests of a class do not remain unchanged throughout a long term of years, a great political party is never continuously identified with a particular policy, although there is a widespread popular belief that it is.

The natural nucleus of one great political party in every country is the middle class of business men engaged in manufactures and commerce. The interests of commercialism and capitalism always dictate the policy of the party to which the business classes belong. The opposing party is quite as naturally constituted by an alliance of the land-owning, professional, and wage-earning classes.

These groupings, however, form only the core of each great political party. Only the members of a political party that are bound to it by the sympathetic and instinctive elements of the consciousness of kind,—in other words, by class instinct and prejudice,—can be depended upon to vote its ticket under all vicissitudes. The men who join it from conviction or from interest leave it from time to time as their interests change, or as the party fails to support the policy which they regard as right. Therefore, while parties are relatively enduring, majorities are the most unstable products of human combination.¹

Second in importance only to the great political parties are the minor parties that work for the achievement of particular ends.

Since by their very nature the great parties care less for principles or measures than for class interests, principles and measures have to be forced upon them from without. Consequently, two or three parties with one idea apiece are always in the field. They seldom win an election, but they often gain a hearing and concessions. They spring up suddenly, grow with astonishing rapidity, and as quickly melt away.

The evils of partisanship and of corruption in legislation, and the spoils system of administration, have called into existence numerous associations to promote patriotism, and to secure honesty in governmental affairs.

Best known among these are the Civil Service Reform Association and its branches, and important organizations in most of the great cities for promoting local municipal reforms.

In addition to all the foregoing, there are innumerable political associations to promote particular interests, to protect particular classes, or to procure particular legislation. Some of them are permanently organized, but most of them are short-lived.

¹ See "Democracy and Empire," Chapter xi; "The Nature and Conduct of Political Majorities."

The functions of voluntary political organizations may be revolutionary or legal. In the nature of things, revolution can be achieved only through voluntary associations. If not so obvious, it is just as certain, that a republican form of government can be maintained only through the tireless and infinitely varied activity of voluntary political associations that keep within the bounds of law. They initiate legislation, they criticise administration, they achieve reforms.

Every one understands that governments do not criticise and reform themselves. It is, perhaps, not so generally known that in modern times governments initiate but little legislation. A few important measures are proposed by cabinet ministers, governors, and presidents, but more are instigated by voluntary associations whose agents draft bills, procure their introduction in Legislature, Congress, or Parliament, and watch them through every stage of progress to final enactment or rejection. Without such associations there could be no republic in the true sense of the word. The alternative is bureaucracy or absolute monarchy.

TABLE XI. — COMPONENT-CONSTITUENT SOCIETIES

- A 1. Number of Households.
- Y 2. Survivals of Patriarchal Households?
- Y 3. Family Burial Grounds?
- A 4. Number of Clans.
- Y 5. Survivals of the Clan?
- A 6. Number of Phratries.
- Y 7. Survivals of the Phratry?
- Y 8. Survivals of the Village Community?
- Y 9. Survivals of the Manor?
- A 10. Number of Incorporated Villages.
- A 11. Number of Boroughs.
- A 12. Number of Cities of Third Class.
- A 13. Number of Cities of Second Class.
- A 14. Number of Cities of First Class.
- A 15. Number of Counties.
- A 16. Number of Departments.

- A 17. Number of Provinces.
- A 18. Number of Commonwealths.

TABLE XII. — SPECIAL AND VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS

- A 1. Number of Societies cherishing Language.
- A 2. Membership.
- A 3. Number of Secret Fraternal Societies.
- A 4. Membership.
- A 5. Number of Open Fraternal Societies, including Clubs.
- A 6. Membership.
- A 7. Number of Sporting Associations, Organizations for Conducting Games, etc.
- A 8. Membership.
- A 9. Number of Art Associations and Literary Societies.
- A 10. Membership.
- A 11. Number of Secret Religious Societies.
- A 12. Membership.
- A 13. Number of Church Organizations.
- A 14. Membership.
- A 15. Number of Open Religious Societies, not Churches.
- A 16. Membership.
- A 17. Number of Scientific Societies.
- A 18. Membership.
- A 19. Number of Business Corporations.
- A 20. Stockholders.
- A 21. Number of Labour Organizations.
- A 22. Membership.
- A 23. Number of Philanthropic Organizations.
- A 24. Membership.
- A 25. Number of Legal Juristic Associations.
- A 26. Membership.
- A 27. Number of Illegal Juristic Associations.
- A 28. Membership.
- A 29. Number of Secret Political Organizations.
- A 30. Membership.
- A 31. Number of Open Political Clubs.
- A 32. Membership.
- A 33. Number of Political Parties.
- A 34. Membership of Each.

Most of the information called for in this table is annually compiled for the United States by the "World Almanac." When the membership of any class

of associations cannot arithmetically be given, insert instead the approximate proportion of the whole population of the enumeration unit belonging to such societies.

Generalizations

Certain generalizations may be derived from the foregoing account of the social constitution.

The most important of these has been disclosed in the discovery that governments and private organizations duplicate each other's functions. In the social constitution either public or private associations can, at need, assume any social function.

In times of danger the government can operate fleets and railways, build bridges, manufacture goods, and transact financial operations on a vast scale, because, in times of security, it often does such things on a small scale. In times of anarchy or revolution private associations can protect life and property, administer justice, and organize a provisional government, because, in times of peace they initiate legislation, watch the enforcement of law, and hold governments to their work.

This generalization is of practical, no less than of scientific, value. It is the one adequate principle by which to judge the pretensions of socialism and of individualism. The socialists are right when they say that, if it were necessary or desirable, the state could carry on all social undertakings through public agencies. The individualists are equally right when they say that society could exist and, after a fashion, could achieve its ends, without authoritative government. Socialists and individualists are both wrong when they suppose that either of these things will happen under a normal social evolution.

The actual distribution of functions between public and private agencies is a varying one. It changes with changing circumstances.

So long as conditions are normal, movements that tend, on the one hand, to increase public activity, or, on the other hand, to enlarge the opportunities for private initiative, are self-limiting. They

are tendencies toward equilibrium. Whatever belittles the state or destroys belief in its power to perform any kind of social service, whatever impairs the popular habit of achieving ends by private initiative and voluntary organization, endangers society, and prevents the full realization of its ends.

Another generalization from the description of the social constitution is, that the various organizations of society are not only correlated, but are also subordinated, some to other organizations, and all to a general end.

The supreme end of society in general is the protection and perfecting of sentient life. The end of human society is the development of the rational and spiritual personality of its members. Only the cultural associations are immediately concerned in this function. Educational institutions, ethical, scientific, religious, and æsthetic organizations, and polite society act for good or ill directly upon the individual. To these the economic, the legal, and the political organizations are, in a functional sense, subordinate. In a functional sense, they exist for the sake of cultural organization and activity. The social mind has always perceived this truth, and by means of its sanctions has endeavoured to mould the social constitution into accordance with it. Associations and relationships are fostered or abolished with a view to cultural, no less than to protective, ends.

For both ends specialization and a division of labour are necessary. Therefore, while society maintains the homogeneity of its composition, it is obliged to tolerate and to promote differentiation in its constitution. Psychologically, therefore, the social constitution is the precise opposite of the social composition. It is an alliance in each simple association of individuals who, in respect to the purpose of the association, must be mentally and morally alike, but who in all other respects may be unlike; supplemented in the relations of associations to one another and to integral society, by toleration and coördination of the unlike.

Law of Development

Still further generalizing, we may state the law of development of the social constitution as follows : —

The development of the social constitution is proportional to the growth of an appreciation of the value of variety or unlikeness in society.

The social constitution, therefore, is the result of a desire to combine variety with homogeneity in a complex unity.

CHAPTER IV

THE CHARACTER AND EFFICIENCY OF ORGANIZATION

Coercion and Liberty

THE forms of social organization, whether component or constituent, whether public or private, whether incorporated or unincorporated, are either created by social authority or are permitted by it. Not only so, but any social organization may be an agency for the transmission of social control to its individual members. On the one hand, it may bring to bear upon them a social pressure to which they must yield, a social command which they must perforce obey. On the other hand, it may allow them the utmost freedom of thought and action, may even be a means of defending their individual liberties.

In these features we discover the general character of the social organization of a community. Organization is, on the whole, coercive, or it is, on the whole, liberal.

The Source of Liberty. — From what has been said in the chapters on the Social Mind, it is evident that social control, expressing itself either as sovereignty, — the will of the whole people manifesting itself through forms of government, — or expressing itself in those lesser degrees felt by the members of non-governmental associations, may be so coercive that no individual can successfully oppose it. If, therefore, the individual actually enjoys a high degree of liberty, it is because the social mind permits him to do so. It is because the sovereign state

creates for him immunities, and protects him in the enjoyment of them.

This is a truth of sociology and of political science which the uneducated man always finds much difficulty in comprehending. It seems to him that his liberty is born with him; that it is a matter of inherent right, and subject wholly to his own will. This is because he fails to realize how resistless is the power of his fellow-men over all his activities, and even over his life itself, if they choose to put that power in operation. If, at any time, he is so unfortunate as to fall under their suspicion, to be taken by them when they have resolved themselves into an angry mob, and to discover that he is utterly helpless in their hands, if they choose to deal with him by the methods of lynch law, he then realizes that his liberty is not the creature of his own will, and that the liberty which any man actually enjoys, he owes to the common feeling and common judgment of the community that individual liberty is, on the whole, a good thing for all.

The Laws of Liberty. — From these considerations it is obvious that the character of all social organization, including the state, and the specific character of any particular social organization of the lesser sort, is determined by the nature and development of the social mind.

It is plain, to begin with, that we might expect to see far more intolerance of individual liberty, far more coercion in general, in a community whose like-mindedness is of the sympathetic, passionate, emotional sort than in one in which intelligence predominates. We should expect also to see a much higher development of arbitrary authority in the community in which belief, formal like-mindedness, and habits of conformity predominate over discussion and rational public opinion. These presuppositions are warranted by observation and historical induction.

1. *The First Law* may be stated as follows: *Social organization is coercive in those communities in which sympathetic and formal like-mindedness strongly predominate over deliberative like-mindedness. Conversely, social institutions*

are liberal, allowing the utmost freedom of thought and action to the individual only in those communities in which there is a high development of deliberative like-mindedness.

2. *A Second Law* is of not less importance. A community may be extremely heterogeneous as a result either of conquest, or of a rapid immigration of alien elements. In this case, like-mindedness of any kind may be very slight. Under these circumstances the social organization is coercive.

In the chapter on the Consciousness of Kind it was shown that the fear-inspiring modes of impression exist chiefly where the personal elements in combination are much unlike; and that familiarity and resemblance always tend to diminish fear. In heterogeneous communities it is always some form of personal leadership, either that which grows out of fear or that which grows out of fascination, that is the nucleus of organization. Men who are not sympathetic, who do not understand each other, who therefore cannot arrive at intellectual agreement, obviously cannot coöperate of their own free initiative. Their coöperation in political, industrial, or religious matters is possible only if, in their inability to organize themselves, a leader is forthcoming who can organize them. The more heterogeneous they are, the more certainly will their obedience spring from fear, and under such circumstances the more certainly will the leader's rule be coercive.

This principle has always been clearly exemplified in ecclesiastical polity. That most democratic of organizations, the Congregational polity, has never been successful in a heterogeneous population, which can be organized only in an authoritative system. In like manner, political democracy invariably evolves the tyrant or the boss, if the population becomes extremely heterogeneous. In American cities, the old forms of deliberative government have broken down with the influx of foreign immigration; and we have adopted the theory that cities are business corporations for which even by-laws and ordinances should be made by state legislatures, and in which administration should be the one-man power of an elected dictator. Without the highly developed consciousness of kind of a relatively homogeneous population there can be no successful experiment of democracy.

Generalizing these facts, it appears that *the forms of social organization, whether political or other, in their relation to the individual, are necessarily coercive if, in their membership, there is great diversity of kind and great inequality. Conversely, institutions or other forms of social organization can be liberal, conceding the utmost freedom to the individual, if, in the population, there is fraternity, and, back of fraternity, an approximate mental and moral equality.*

The facts which the foregoing laws express are involved, and they always complicate or modify one another. Thus, in a heterogeneous community, such like-mindedness as exists is for the most part of the sympathetic kind; to a less extent, of the formal kind; and least of all, intellectual or deliberative. This is because, as was pointed out in the chapters on the Social Mind, men differ less in feeling than in intelligence; and this of course is in the highest degree true of individuals of differing races or nationalities. Men of every race are alike subjects of sensation, of physical pain, and of the primary emotions of fear, hate, and affection; while comparatively few men can arrive at perfect intellectual agreement upon complicated problems of either theoretical or practical interest.

Consequently, in the heterogeneous population, not only does the unlike-mindedness there existing necessitate coercive forms of organization in the manner that has been explained, but also such like-mindedness as there is, taking the sympathetic and conventional form, creates coercive rather than liberal types of organization.

Efficiency of Organization

Since the social constitution is purposive organization, it must be studied by the sociologist, not only from the standpoint of its plan or system, and of its character, as more or less liberal, but also from the standpoint of its efficiency as a means to the attainment of the special and general ends to promote which it exists.

Organization must Benefit the Organized. — The general condition upon which the efficiency of social organization

depends, by implication is stated when it is said that any association exists for the protection and development of the lives of its individual members.

Since an organization depends upon the loyal and earnest coöperation of its members, its efficiency depends upon their devotion to it. Their devotion, in turn, depends upon their conviction that, in the long run, they actually secure the benefits, including all possible pleasures and utilities of association. Putting it in briefer terms, we may say that, to be efficient, all social organizations must be regarded by the organized as beneficial to themselves.

Simple and obvious as this truth is, no principle in human affairs is more frequently forgotten, and no principle has been more frequently neglected in governmental policy.

We have seen that nearly every social organization has a constitution of some kind; it has either a leader, or a governing council, or administrative bureaus, which directly carry on its activities, supposedly for the benefit of the general membership. The individuals who compose these inner governing circles are prone to forget that they are the servants of the entire association. Busied with the detail of governmental work, they easily fall into the habit of identifying themselves with the interests and ends of the association; and then they easily mistake themselves for the association, and forget the interests of their fellow-members. Thus, there is always within an association a tendency to make it exist, not for the benefit of its entire membership, but for the benefit of its governing individuals.

Even where this tendency is held in subordination, there is always danger that the governing circle may mistake its own ideas of what is politic, just, or wise in administration for the ideas of the general membership, and so create divisions, and finally disruption.

Illustrations of these truths may be drawn from every form of social organization. They have been most conspicuously demonstrated in such bodies as ecclesiastical societies, trade unions, business corporations, and political parties. All history could be written from this point of view.

Moral Qualities. — If, then, to be efficient, social organization must be regarded by the organized as obviously

beneficial to themselves, it further follows that efficiency depends upon the existence in the community of so much honesty, unselfishness, and loyalty, that enough men can be found to work faithfully and unselfishly for the general good, sincerely endeavouring so to administer the affairs of the organization that employs them, or of the government in which they serve, that the general good rather than their own individual interests shall ever be kept in view as the supreme end.

The entire social organization of a community is endangered when public office ceases to be a public trust, when votes are bought and sold, when legislatures are bribed, and when administrative business is deranged and corrupted by unworthy means.

Recognition of Expert Knowledge. — The efficiency of social organization depends, furthermore, upon a general recognition of the vital importance of expert knowledge.

The entire social constitution is an expression of the great principle of the economic advantage of a division of labour. Each little association has for its special function the performance of some specific kind of social work, which could not be so well done by any other group of men. Obviously, this plan can be fully and successfully carried out only if the division of labour is real, and not merely nominal or a pretence. In like manner, in the constitution of each larger society and of the government, each particular kind of work must be performed by those who have a special aptitude for it, if there is to be any real advantage in maintaining a highly specialized social constitution at all. At the head of every branch of affairs must be the men who are most competent to deal with them.

This condition of things can be secured only if the community has some comprehension of what expert knowledge is, and is determined to secure it. In order to secure it, however, it is absolutely necessary that men shall be appointed to office solely on the ground of their fitness for the work that they are expected to do. If they are appointed because they are personal relatives of men in superior authority, or because, as political workers, they have helped to elect to office the men who appoint them, or because, irrespective of any

abilities that they possess, they have long been devoted to some particular clique or party, it is certain that the efficiency of the social organization must suffer.

Demoralization reaches its extreme limit when the practice of appointment to office for other reasons than fitness for the work to be done becomes an organized system of distributing offices as the spoils of victory over opponents in an election. The movement which is popularly known as civil service reform is the protest against all such methods of corrupting the public service in the interests of a party or a governing class. It is an organized insistence that fitness, in the sense of expert knowledge, demonstrated by the successful performance of duty in subordinate positions, shall be the sole ground of advancement to positions of larger responsibility.

PART IV

THE SOCIAL WELFARE

CHAPTER I

THE FUNCTIONING OF SOCIETY

The Ends for which Society Exists

THE final tests of the efficiency of social organization are to be looked for in the results which organization brings about in the political and the juristic, the economic, the intellectual, and the moral life of the community, and especially in the development of an improving type of human personality. Throughout the foregoing pages these results have been recognized as the objects of collective desire, for the attainment of which social relations and activities are organized. Collectively they make up the Social Welfare. The social welfare, then, is the sum of the ends for which society exists. To secure and to perfect the social welfare is the social function.

These ends, for which society exists, are of two great classes, the proximate and the ultimate.

Proximate Ends: Public Utilities.—The immediate results of efficient social organization are certain general conditions of well-being, in which all members of the community share or may share if they like, and which, though external to the individual personality, are yet necessary to its perfection and happiness. They include the security of life and of possessions, which is maintained by the political system; the liberty and the justice, which are maintained by the legal system; the material well-being,

which is created by the economic system ; the knowledge and the command over nature, which are created by the cultural system. These proximate ends collectively we may call Public Utilities.

Ultimate Ends: Social-Personality.—Public utilities themselves, however, are means to an ultimate end. We value them and strive to augment them because they serve the individual life. Life itself is the ultimate social end, but not life irrespective of form or quality. It is life in its higher developments, especially its moral and intellectual developments, that society creates and perfects. It creates the higher from the lower types by multiplying helpful variations, and subsequently selecting the best results. It slowly shapes a social nature, or personality, adapted to social coöperation and enjoyment. This Social-Personality—the moral, intellectual, and social man, the highest product of evolution—is the ultimate end of social organization.

Genetic and Functional Order

In the chapters on the Social Mind the genetic order, in which the practical activities are evolved, was presented. Appreciation appears first, then utilization, then characterization, and finally socialization. Among the generalizations relating to the social constitution, however, it was shown that the political, juristic, and economic activities of society exist in a functional sense for the sake of the cultural. It thus appears that the functional order of social activity and organization reverses the genetic. This conclusion we may expect to see demonstrated by further inductive study.

Without some cultural development there could be no more than an organic or instinctive economy, while, on the other hand, there would be no need of more than an organic or instinctive economy

were there no cultural interests to be served by higher economic methods. Without a somewhat developed economic system there could be no juridical organization, and, at the same time, no juridical organization would be needed were there no economic interests to be equitably adjusted. Without a cultural, an economic, and a juristic system there could be no political organization, and there would be no need of any if there were no juristic, economic, and cultural interests to be defended or extended.

Thus far our analysis has followed the genetic order. In the study of the social welfare it will follow the functional order.¹

¹ An interesting study of the hierarchy of social activity and organization will be found in De Greef's "Introduction à la Sociologie," Première partie.

CHAPTER II

PUBLIC UTILITIES

Security

FIRST among all the results of social activity and organization must be named Security. In the order of genesis a relatively perfect security may be the last result achieved; but in the functional order it stands at the beginning of the series. That there may be prosperity and enlightenment there must be not only security of life, but also security of territory and of institutions. There must, in short, be both international peace and domestic peace and order. To secure and to maintain these, as far as possible, is the supreme function of the political system.

This statement, so far from being in contradiction of the account given in the chapters on the Social Mind of political activity as the supreme mode of socialization, is in reality only another way of saying the same thing.

International Peace. — Socialization on the largest scale has been effected through the confederation or the consolidation of small communities into larger, and of these ultimately into great commonwealths, nations, or empires.

To a great extent this integration has been brought about through war. Intertribal or international peace has been occasional only. Yet, with each larger union achieved, the proportion of peace to war has been increased. Even when the absolute number of men engaged in war and the absolute area overrun by military forces have been enlarged, the relative number and the relative area have decreased. On the whole, security from invasion and the operations of war has increased step by step with political integration.

Domestic Peace and Order. — Socialization, in a more intensive degree, has consisted in the assimilation and amalgamation of differing racial elements in the population of the same nation or commonwealth. This, too, as we have seen, has, to a great extent, been accomplished by political activity, taking the form of legislation and administration. And this has been, on the whole, the chief means of maintaining security against domestic disorder.

The alternative means is forcible suppression of insurrection or of riot, and even this would be impossible were not a majority of the population composed of those individuals sufficiently socialized to agree in purposes and in actual political coöperation.

Equity

Next to security in functional order, and as an element in the social welfare, is Equity, a certain compromise and reconciliation of the differing interests and claims of the individuals, the racial elements, and the classes, making up the social population.

As security is a result and expression of socialization, so is equity a result and expression of both socialization and characterization. To establish and to maintain it is the function of the moral and juristic organization of society.

That there may be a compromise and reconciliation of interests, there must be a limitation of liberty.

We have seen that social organization is liberal if the social population is on the whole homogeneous, but that it is necessarily coercive if the population is exceedingly heterogeneous. Liberty then, it is clear, presupposes a good degree of mental and moral homogeneity, and of sympathy — a fact which is popularly expressed by the word "fraternity." There must be brotherhood in a large and generous sense, if free institutions are to prevail.

Liberty, thus conditioned, is essential to progress. We have seen that while fundamental unity, a general homogeneity of type, is necessary to social integration and cohesion, a toleration of minor differ-

ences is not less necessary for the development of the social constitution.

And yet liberty, entirely unrestrained, must result in the practical destruction of moral brotherhood, and in an almost chaotic heterogeneity. If the strong and the clever may without restraint assail the weak, or despoil them of possessions, or deprive them of any liberty that the strong themselves enjoy, the population is soon broken up into warring factions; differing interests become antagonistic interests. The very first step, then, in the adjustment of differing interests and claims, is necessarily some restriction of the liberty of the strong to curtail the liberty of the weak. And unless this is accomplished, liberty itself must disappear under a coercive social organization.

In principle the restriction necessary is simple and clear, in application difficult.

In principle liberty must not destroy or limit liberty, except to save or to extend liberty. Those who enjoy liberty must not fetter or enslave themselves; they must not fetter or enslave others. Practically, however, in concrete human behaviour those who have great power of any kind seldom refrain from using it in endless ways to curtail the liberty of weaker or less fortunate men.

Practically, therefore, in actual experience, only one way has been found to restrain liberty from destroying liberty. Liberty has been conserved and extended only by establishing certain modes of equality.

Subjective equality is impossible. Mental and moral equality no more exists than equality of physical health or strength. Equality of objective conditions is possible to any extent that may be necessary or desired. And an approximation to such equality is necessary in a society that would make continuing progress in liberty, prosperity, and enlightenment.

Men must have equal political rights, or those who have more will use the political organization to destroy the liberty of those who have less. In like manner they must have equal juristic rights, or the strong and the clever will despoil, or perhaps enslave, the weak. These truths have long been recognized. Agreement has not yet been reached upon the question whether men can have very unequal material possessions, economic opportunities, and cultural

advantages, without a wholesale destruction of the liberties of the economically weak by the economically strong, with a consequent disruption of society and an ultimate overthrow of liberty. In all progressive societies, however, we discover a tendency toward a public control of the economic system, in the interest of a greater equality of economic opportunity, and a tendency, also, toward a complete equality of cultural advantages.

Equity, then, as a mode of the social welfare, is the limitation of liberty by equality, and the maintenance thereby of fraternity.

Accordingly, the democratic ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity are not incompatible, as has often been argued.¹ On the contrary, they are correlative.

Liberty, which is necessary to the highest development of the individual personality and to the perfection of the social constitution, cannot exist apart from moral brotherhood—a high degree of mental and moral homogeneity. Fraternity, as thus defined and understood, necessary alike for the existence of liberty and for the maintenance of social harmony, cannot exist apart from an approximate equality of those objective conditions which are created by the public activity of the social mind.

Some of the modes of equality upon which fraternity and liberty depend, and which, therefore, must sedulously be maintained in a democratic community, are the following:—

1. Political equality: universal and equal suffrage.
2. Equality before the law: neither wealth, nor privilege, nor vice, nor ignorance, to control legislation or to receive consideration in the courts.
3. Equality of opportunity to serve the public according to the measure of ability: men of equal ability to have absolutely equal chances of appointment to office under impartial civil service rules, irrespective of party service or allegiance.
4. Equality of rights in public places and in public conveyances.
5. Equality of sanitary conditions: all streets to be equally cleaned and cared for, tenement houses to be made decent and wholesome.

¹ See especially Sir James Fitz-James Stephen, "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity."

6. Equality of opportunity to enjoy certain means of recreation and culture: in public parks, libraries, museums, and galleries of art.

7. Equality of elementary educational opportunities: through a well-administered public school system.

8. Equality of fair play: especially in all bargaining between employer and employee, and in the relations of workingmen to one another.

Concerning these modes of equality there is a substantial theoretical agreement of opinion in modern societies. Further modes of economic equality, the necessity or desirability of which is still debated, are:—

(1) An approximately equal distribution of the burden of taxation: by a progressive taxation of the rich, or by a substitution of revenues derived from franchises and natural resources for the present scheme of taxes upon real estate and personal property.

(2) Equal ownership of the surface of the earth: by means of public title in all land and water.

(3) Equal ownership of a major part of productive capital: through public title in the larger industrial enterprises.

Economy

Third in the functional order of the ends for which society exists, and as an element in the social welfare, is Economy,—the sum total of those results of material well-being which it is the function of the industrial organization of society to yield. These results are naturally and conveniently studied under the subdivisions, the Increase of Wealth, the Apportionment of Wealth, and the evolution of Social-Economic Classes.

The Increase of Wealth.—Perhaps no other one result of a highly perfected social organization is so conspicuous as is the increase of wealth.

Of all the conditions upon which the growth of wealth depends, probably no other one is so important as the capacity of the people to organize themselves in innumerable forms of association for carrying on industrial and commercial activity. Coöperation and

a division of labour can transform the most forbidding elements into prosperity. Where these are lacking, no wealth of natural resources, no accumulations of capital, no possession of ingenious machinery will enable a community to amass riches, or even to live in material comfort.

Nothing can be more pitiful than a state which is able to purchase improved mechanisms — battleships and artillery, for example — from a more ingenious nation than itself, and then is unable to handle them to advantage because of a total incapacity for social organization and discipline. Among the most important practical studies that could be made in sociology would be one to ascertain the relations between sociological and economic poverty. Whenever a commonwealth, whose people are impoverished and burdened with mortgages and other debts, is observed to appeal continually to its government to enact laws of a socialistic nature, or to undertake industrial and commercial enterprises for the benefit of a suffering population, the first inquiry made should ascertain whether that commonwealth is not really suffering from sociological poverty, — from a certain incapacity or lack of enterprise to organize those varied forms of voluntary association by which, in other communities, great economic activities are successfully maintained.

The detailed study of the increase of wealth belongs to the special social science of Political Economy.

The increase of wealth may be viewed abstractly or concretely.

In the abstract, the increase of wealth is measured in terms of value or price.

The study of the increase of wealth, thus abstractly viewed, with due attention to the laws and the causes of increase, constitutes that division of political economy which is commonly described as the study of the Production of Wealth.

In the concrete, the increase of wealth assumes the form of a relatively larger production, from year to year, of particular kinds of goods or specific utilities.

The goods produced by any given community may be chiefly raw materials, or chiefly crude manufactures, or chiefly fine manufac-

tures, or chiefly artistic products, or chiefly the utilities of knowledge, discovery, scientific achievement, and professional service.

A proper development of that division of political economy which is commonly described as a study of the Consumption of Wealth, would become a study of the increase of wealth in the concrete. The consumption of wealth is nothing else than a direction of wealth in the abstract into particular channels of concrete production. It is the ceaseless reproduction of wealth in concrete forms as distinguished from its abstract amount.

The Apportionment of Wealth.—If the total wealth of a community is more than sufficient to meet its more urgent wants, the social welfare is more vitally affected by the apportionment of wealth than by its further increase. An apportionment that concentrates enormous riches in the hands of a few owners, while leaving the many in relative or absolute poverty, is a condition that may fatally strain the social cohesion, and in any case will prevent that growth of mental and moral homogeneity upon which a normal social evolution depends.

The apportionment of wealth, like its increase, may be viewed abstractly or concretely.

In the abstract, the apportionment of wealth is a distribution, among those who have produced it, of shares theoretically equivalent to their contribution to the total product.

In any highly organized industrial society the division of labour is exceedingly complex. The final product is a result of the coöperation of many specialists, and of entire classes, whose business functions are different, but correlated. To these coöperating classes and individuals the processes of buying or selling materials and labour, of renting land, and of loaning capital, convey certain shares in the total value produced. These shares, variously known as profits, salaries, wages, interest, and rent, constitute the incomes of the producers.

The study of the apportionment of wealth, thus abstractly conceived, and with due attention to the laws to which it conforms,

constitutes that division of political economy familiarly known as the study of the Distribution of Wealth.

In the concrete, the apportionment of wealth throughout the community takes the form of a more or less unequal distribution of property,—which is a result in part of unequal incomes, in part of an unequal saving from equal incomes,—and of a more or less unequal ownership or enjoyment of the specific forms of wealth. Most important as a factor in the social welfare is the distribution of such vitally concrete forms of wealth as good housing, good sanitary arrangements, water, light, air, and open spaces.

The study of the apportionment of wealth in the concrete has not been included in political economy as usually presented. Increasing attention, however, has been given to this subject, and it has taken to itself the name Social Economy.

The Social-Economic Classes.—The division of labour in the production of wealth, and the unequal distribution of wealth, together result in a segregation of the social population into social-economic classes.

A few generations ago, in European countries, the social-economic classes were known as Gentlemen, Tradesmen, Farmers, and Labourers.

The class of gentlemen included the royal family and the nobility, knights, esquires, and all large landowners, officers of the army and navy, the clergy, lawyers, professors in the universities, and others devoted to the liberal arts and sciences, and occasional merchants who devoted their incomes freely to the interests of the king. The class of tradesmen included all the lesser business men, and the class of farmers included many of the lesser landowners, as well as those who cultivated rented land as tenants.¹

¹ A most interesting description of the social-economic classes in England in 1577, by William Harrison, is preserved in Holinshed's "Chronicle" and may be found in Hart's "American History Told by Contemporaries," Vol. I, pp. 145-148.

In democratic communities the distinction between gentlemen and other social-economic classes is intensely disliked by the body of the people, but, by whatever name they may be called, the classes exist.

In the United States a well-to-do and influential social-economic class includes, as did the class of gentlemen in England in Harrison's day, the more successful politicians and officers of state, successful professional men, and the business men who conduct large undertakings. The distinction between the class thus constituted and the smaller tradesmen has, in recent years, in all the larger cities, become as sharp as that between the tradesmen and the workers for wages.

These distinctions, founded perhaps in inevitable differentiations of a prosperous population, are inimical to that perfect fraternity upon which the highest social evolution and resulting social welfare depend.

The incidental evil can be counteracted in one way only. In the older days the class of gentlemen and ladies was distinguished, not more for its superior economic and social position, than for the quality of its manners. To a very great extent it is possible for all classes in modern democracies to cultivate the gracious manners that once were characteristic of the gentle born. It is possible for all men and women, irrespective of their position in the industrial system, to treat all humanity with an equality of courtesy. To further this equal cultivation of gracious behaviour by all social-economic classes is a chief function of such institutions as the various social settlements.

Culture

Fourth in the functional order of social ends, and as an element in the social welfare, is Culture, that product of the fundamental activities of conscious beings for the sake of which the political, the juristic, and the economic activities of society are maintained, and which, in its own turn, ministers directly to the higher development of self-conscious life.

Culture may best be objectively studied under the subdivisions, Education and the Diminution of Fear.

Education.— Education consists of acquired knowledge and of approved methods of teaching, learning, research, and discovery. Education is the sum total of the objective intellectual results of social activity and organization, as distinguished from that intellectual capacity and ability of individual minds which is a purely subjective fact.

Little need here be said either of the importance of education as a social phenomenon, or of the methods to be followed in an inductive study of the educational development of any community. The importance is too obvious to call for discussion, for exact scientific knowledge is man's most priceless possession. It gives him his control over nature, and command of himself. The methods of studying educational development are extremely simple, inasmuch as every modern nation publishes fairly complete and detailed educational statistics.

The divisions, however, under which the statistical study of educational developments should be distributed may be named. They are: 1. Laboratories, Libraries, and Circulation of Books. 2. University and Professional Education. 3. College Education. 4. High School Education. 5. Grammar School Education. 6. Primary School Education. 7. Illiteracy. These divisions indicate the high differentiation and specialization to which education has been carried in modern times.

The Diminution of Fear.— The cultural results which flow from an efficient social organization are not all summed up, however, in knowledge and in educational methods. Security, prosperity, and knowledge work profound changes in that emotional nature which finds expression in æsthetic and religious activity. An objective aspect of these changes is a diminution of fear in the social population.

When men live in isolation, cut off from the coöperation of their fellows, they are relatively helpless, not only in their relation to

enemies of their own species, but even more in their relation to the physical elements. Against fire and flood and tempest and famine the individual man has little power.

The isolated man is also inevitably the victim of ignorance and of superstition. The knowledge that the single individual can acquire in his short lifetime is infinitesimal as measured by the limitless domain of nature and of history—the totality of things to be known. Only as his own discoveries can be supplemented by communicated knowledge, obtained by his fellow-beings, can he have any real command over nature and life.

As a helpless creature of ignorance and superstition, man is almost wholly a creature of emotion, and his dominant emotion is fear. Consequently, as we have seen, populations in which there is no systematic communication, no continual exchange of knowledge, and no discussion of principles, are subject to impulsive social action. They seldom exhibit a calm and firm restraint of passion. They know little of that deliberately planned conduct which is a product of the critical intelligence.

An efficient social organization transforms these conditions. Disciplined coöperation establishes security; systematic communication diffuses knowledge and stimulates critical inquiry. Knowledge and investigation give command over natural forces. Those nations in which social organization is highly developed, are emancipated from superstition and from fear; they are able to rise superior to emotion and impulse; they believe in scientific investigation; they have habits of calm and disciplined action.

TABLE I.—INTERNATIONAL PEACE

- A 1. Number of Wars Experienced.
- A 2. Duration of Wars, Years.
- A 3. Number of Men engaged in Each.
- A 4. Total Losses of Men in Each.
- A 5. Estimated Cost of Each.

These columns can be indefinitely subdivided to show distributions by geographical sections, nationalities, religions, and occupations.

TABLE II.—DOMESTIC PEACE AND ORDER

- A 1. Number of Insurrections and Riots Experienced.
- A 2. Duration in Days, Months, or Years.
- A 3. Number of Men engaged in Each.
- A 4. Estimated Cost of Each.

TABLE III. — LIBERTY

- Y 1. Survivals of Chattel Slavery ?
- Y 2. Survivals of Serfdom ?
- Y 3. Constitutional or Legal Restrictions of Religious Liberty ?
- Y 4. Numerous Restrictions of Individual Liberty by Moral and Sumptuary Legislation ?

TABLE IV. — EQUALITY

- Y 1. Universal Suffrage, Men ?
- Y 2. Universal Suffrage, Women ?
- Y 3. Partial Suffrage, Women ?
- Y 4. Legal Equality ?
- Y 5. Equality of Property ?
- Y 6. Constitutional or Legal Restrictions of Inequality of Property ?
- Y 7. Limitation of Economic Inequality by the Scheme of Taxation, or Other Means of Public Revenue ?
- Y 8. Increasing Public Ownership of Land ?
- Y 9. Increasing Public Ownership of Industrial Enterprises ?
- Y 10. Common School Privileges freely Open to All ?
- Y 11. Higher Educational Advantages freely Open to All ?

TABLE V. — THE INCREASE OF WEALTH IN LAST TEN-YEAR PERIOD

- A 1. Total Increase of Values.
- A 2. Increase in Value of Raw Materials.
- A 3. Increase in Value of Manufactures Primarily Utilitarian.
- A 4. Increase in Value of Manufactures Primarily Artistic.
- A 5. Increase in Value of Professional Services.
- A 6. Increase in Value of Personal Services.

TABLE VI. — THE APPORTIONMENT OF WEALTH

- A 1. Total Annual Profits.
- A 2. Total Annual Interest.
- A 3. Total Annual Rents.
- A 4. Total Annual Salaries.
- A 5. Total Annual Wages.
- A 6. Total Property.

- A 7. Number of Individuals estimated Worth More than One Hundred Million Dollars.
- A 8. Number of Individuals estimated Worth Fifty Million Dollars, and Less than One Hundred Million.
- A 9. Number of Persons estimated Worth Twenty-five Million Dollars, and Less than Fifty Million.
- A 10. Number of Persons estimated Worth More than Ten Million Dollars, and Less than Twenty-five.
- A 11. Number of Persons estimated Worth More than Five Million Dollars, and Less than Ten.
- A 12. Number of Persons estimated Worth More than One Million Dollars, and Less than Five.
- A 13. Number of Persons estimated Worth More than Five Hundred Thousand Dollars, and Less than One Million.
- A 14. Number of Persons estimated Worth More than One Hundred Thousand Dollars, and Less than Five Hundred Thousand.
- A 15. Number of Persons estimated Worth More than Fifty Thousand Dollars, and Less than One Hundred Thousand.
- A 16. Number of Persons estimated Worth More than Twenty-five Thousand Dollars, and Less than Fifty Thousand.
- A 17. Number of Persons estimated Worth More than Ten Thousand Dollars, and Less than Twenty-five Thousand.
- A 18. Number of Persons estimated Worth More than Five Thousand Dollars, and Less than Ten Thousand.
- A 19. Number of Persons estimated Worth More than One Thousand Dollars, and Less than Five Thousand.
- A 20. Number of Persons estimated Worth Less than One Thousand Dollars.
- A 21. Number of Incomes Less than One Thousand Dollars.
- A 22. Annual Expenditure on Housings.
- A 23. Annual Expenditure on Housings of Wage-earners.
- A 24. Annual Expenditure on Sanitation.
- A 25. Annual Expenditure on Sanitation directly affecting Wage-earning Classes.
- A 26. Annual Expenditure for Water.
- A 27. Annual Expenditure for Light.
- A 28. Annual Expenditure for Parks and Open Spaces.

TABLE VII. — THE SOCIAL-ECONOMIC CLASSES

- A 1. Number of Professional Men and Women.
- A 2. Number of Wealthy Business Men.

- A 3. Number of Not Wealthy Tradesmen.
- A 4. Number of Farmers.
- A 5. Number of Mechanics.
- A 6. Number of Labourers.

TABLE VIII. — EDUCATION

- A 1. Number of Scientific Laboratories.
- A 2. Value of Scientific Laboratories.
- A 3. Number of Libraries.
- A 4. Value of Libraries.
- A 5. Number of Volumes.
- A 6. Total Annual Circulation of Books.
- A 7. Number of Persons who have had a University Education.
- A 8. Number of Persons now taking a University Education.
- A 9. Number of Persons who have had a Professional Education.
- A 10. Number of Persons now taking a Professional Education.
- A 11. Number of Persons who have had a College Education.
- A 12. Number of Persons now taking a College Education.
- A 13. Number of Persons who have had a High School Education.
- A 14. Number of Persons now taking a High School Education.
- A 15. Number of Persons who have had a Grammar School Education.
- A 16. Number of Persons now taking a Grammar School Education.
- A 17. Number of Persons who have had a Primary School Education.
- A 18. Number of Persons now taking a Primary School Education.
- A 19. Total Number of Illiterates.

Most of the information called for in the foregoing tables can be obtained from the statistical publications of government departments. Data for approximate estimations of the distribution of wealth, and for the classification of the commercial population into wealthy business men, and not wealthy tradesmen, is contained in the directories issued by credit agencies.

CHAPTER III

THE SOCIAL PERSONALITY

Final Results

THE supreme result of efficient social organization and the supreme test of efficiency is the development of the personality of the social man. If the man himself becomes less social, less rational, less manly; if he falls from the highest type, which seeks self-realization through a critical intelligence and emotional control, to one of those lower types that manifest only the primitive virtues of power; if he becomes unsocial, — the social organization, whatever its apparent merits, is failing to achieve its supreme object. If, on the contrary, the man is becoming ever better as a human being, more rational, more sympathetic, with an ever-broadening consciousness of kind, — then, whatever its apparent defects, the social organization is sound and efficient.

Analysis of Personality

From the earliest times the human personality has been analyzed into certain phases, or groups of phenomena. The facts of mental life have been discriminated from those of the merely physiological life. Within the realm of mental life moral qualities and activities have been distinguished from the totality of ideas, emotions, and volitions as a peculiarly important part of the whole. And, finally,

within the realm of moral phenomena, the social ideas, feelings, and volitions have been marked off as a part of yet greater practical importance. There is good scientific ground for these old and familiar distinctions. Mental life is in a certain sense a function of physical life and is conditioned by it. Moral ideas and activities are a differentiated part of the mental life, and social ideas and activities are a differentiated part of moral phenomena. We therefore may accept this analysis as far as it goes, and give precise names to the four groups of phenomena which it recognizes. We shall designate them respectively as Vitality, Mentality, Morality, and Sociality.

In all these phenomena the functioning of society works changes which must now be further examined. The normal result of the changes is the evolution of a harmonious social nature.

Vitality. — The phenomena of vitality include the degree of bodily vigour enjoyed by the individual, including his brain power, the longevity of the population, and its rate of reproduction. No exact statistical measurements of bodily vigour exist. Indirect measurements are found in statistics of weight, height, girth, and muscular force, and in statistics of sickness. The other phenomena of vitality are measured by statistics of birth rates and death rates.

Vitality in all its phases is directly and profoundly affected by association. Security, prosperity, and culture act upon birth rates, death rates, and bodily vigour in ways that have been closely studied in large and varied collections of statistical data.

The general conclusion from these data may be summed up in the statement that social evolution tends to diminish the birth rate, to prolong individual life, and to increase the higher forms of bodily power, especially brain power.

Vitality Classes. — The inherited inequalities of vitality to be observed in any social population are multiplied by the unequal effects produced by association.

By no possibility can it happen that all can share so equally in the benefits of economic coöperation that all shall obtain equally good nourishment. Even if a socialistic communism were established, and a sincere attempt to distribute wealth equally among all were in good faith carried out as far as possible, equality of nutrition could not in fact be maintained. It would happen that some supplies of food materials would be better than others; that the sanitary condition of some houses and streets, notwithstanding the attempt to make them all alike, would, in fact, on account of greater difficulties to be overcome, be always inferior to others; and that these differences, combined with differences of bodily constitution at birth, would make great differences of vitality in adult life, just as they do now.

Even among these differences, however, resemblances may be noticed, and they may therefore be grouped in classes or kinds.

The primary distribution of the population according to vitality is into Normal Persons and Defectives.

1. *The Physically Normal.* — That part of the population which is of physically normal constitution and power is further distributed into three vitality classes, which may be designated as the High, the Medium, and the Low.

(1) *The High Vitality Class* is composed of those individuals who have a high birth rate, a low death rate, and a high degree of bodily vigour and mental power.

The high vitality class roughly corresponds to the better sort of farmers, — that part of the rural population which is well-to-do, and both owns and tills the land that it occupies. It is this population that chiefly maintains the physical vigour and that insures the growth of the community. It is this population that is continually sending vigorous, energetic, and resourceful men to the towns and cities to engage there in business occupations and the learned professions. The high vitality class includes also large numbers of individuals living in towns and cities and engaged in business or

professional life, or employed as mechanics or even as labourers. But all these together make up only a minority of the high vitality class. The great bulk of the class is found in the rural and land-owning parts of the population.

(2) *The Medium Vitality Class* is composed of those individuals in the population who have a fair degree of bodily vigour, an unusually high degree of mental vigour, — the result of an especially fine development of the brain and nervous system, — a rather low death rate, and a low birth rate.

The medium vitality class roughly corresponds to the business and professional men of the large towns and great cities. These men are continually engaged in exhausting brain activity, and, as a rule, their families increase slowly notwithstanding their low death rate, which is kept down by intelligent attention to sanitary conditions and to hygienic living.

(3) *The Low Vitality Class* is composed of those individuals in the population who, while they may and usually do have a high birth rate, have also an extraordinarily high death rate, a low degree of bodily vigour, and only a low degree of mental power.

The low vitality class roughly corresponds to the ignorant, uncleanly, shiftless, and thriftless part of the rural population, and to the ignorant and uncleanly part of the slum population of the cities.¹

2. *The Defective.* — That part of the social population which is defective only or chiefly in body, as distinguished from the mentally defective, to be mentioned later on, includes (1) the *blind*, (2) the *deaf* and *dumb*, and (3) the congenitally *deformed*.

These classes are usually enumerated in census reports as well as in the official vital statistics of cities and commonwealths.

¹ On this question of the distribution of vitality classes see Hansen's noteworthy work, "Die drei Bevölkerungsstufen," and in the statistical journals a considerable literature of criticism and rejoinder. See also Weber, "The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century."

Mentality.—The phenomena of mentality as affected by association include both the higher intellectual, and the more complex emotional, developments.

Among the higher intellectual powers are always included the powers of persistent attention and of generalization. These mental attainments the individual owes chiefly to association with his fellow-men.

Power of attention is acquired through those experiences of association which fix attention for long periods together upon the same fact, such as an interesting event, a common danger, or an exciting strife. These experiences gradually strengthen attention, until it can be sustained under less stimulating circumstances also.

The power of abstract thought, including generalization, presupposes a perception of uniformity. Such perception grows out of the habit of noticing resemblances, and thousands of observations of resemblance must be accumulated before those uniformities that are the basis of science can be discovered. Such accumulations cannot be made by any one man, or even by any one generation. Generalization, then, and the abstract thought of science, are possible only in society. They depend upon the influence of one mind upon another, upon communication and coöperation.

Not only is this true, but also the scientific habit of mind itself, the love of scientific occupation, is produced chiefly by the influence of one mind upon another; it is produced by example, by suggestion, by direct teaching, by sympathy, and by the love of approbation.

Originality of thought also, is a product of social relations. Original thought is possible only when one's beliefs admit of modification. Traditional beliefs are modified by those new and varied experiences which afford us new points of view and discoveries of facts not before

known by mankind. But these varied experiences, in their turn, we owe chiefly to association with our fellow-men.

The continual movement of population, in emigration, in travel, in exploration, colonization, war, and conquest, are the means by which the mental horizon of humanity is widened, by which old beliefs are subjected to new criticism, and new beliefs are established as a result of fuller experience.

The power to combine clear perceptions and abstract reasoning in sound practical judgments upon the important affairs of everyday life, is altogether a social result. Practical judgments must always keep touch with the average thought of the community.

If, on the whole, the individual's opinions on concrete matters are in agreement with those of his fellow-men, and with the results of the common experience of those who compose the social group, we say that he is a man of good or sound judgment. If, on the contrary, his views are very unlike those of men in general, he at once becomes an object of curiosity or of suspicion. If, for any reason, the community suspects that his notions are superior to those of the average man, he is regarded with a certain degree of respect, or even of veneration. This, however, cannot happen unless, from time to time, his novel opinions turn out to be right, as demonstrated by some practical test. In the long run, experience is accepted by communities as the test of good judgment. If the individual's judgments, differing from those of the average man's, prove in experience to be bad, that is, if they often bring him and others into needless trouble or ridicule, he is tabooed as a crank or dangerous person, more or less unfit for coöperation with his fellow-men in any practical matter.

A complex emotional development is almost wholly determined by association and the social system.

The relations of cause and effect are here so obvious as to be a matter of the most familiar knowledge. Fear, courage and fortitude, cheerfulness and moroseness, anger and good nature, love, jealousy and hate, increase or decrease under changing conditions of

association with mercurial swiftness and delicacy, impossible of measurement.

The problem of chief scientific importance growing out of the relations of emotion to association is that of normal emotional stability. This problem admits of statistical investigation.

Mentality Classes.—The inherited inequalities of mental development, like the inherited inequalities of vitality, are multiplied by the unequal effects produced by association.

No attempt to distribute equally the mental benefits of association through free education, free libraries, museums, and schools of art can perfectly succeed. Some teachers are better than others, and their pupils gain an advantage over pupils that are badly instructed. Some readers, from their earliest days, fall in with good books and good advice, and store their minds with useful knowledge and their imaginations with forms of beauty; while others have the ill fortune to acquire early a taste for reading that makes them hopelessly commonplace.

But as among the inequalities of vitality, so among the inequalities of mentality, there are resemblances and groupings, and, consequently, mentality classes.

The primary distribution of the population according to mentality is into Mentally Normal persons and persons Mentally Abnormal, or defective.

1. *The Mentally Normal.*—That part of the social population which is mentally and emotionally normal, is further distributed into three mentality classes, which may be designated as the Low, the Medium, and the High.¹ These gradations correspond to degrees of mental mass and complexity.²

¹ The vitality classes are graded from High to Low, and the mentality, morality, and sociality classes from Low to High, because such roughly is the order of genesis. The medium vitality class is derived from the high, and the low is derived from the medium and the high. All other classes are developed, in the main, from the low through the medium to the high.

² See an article by Herbert Spencer on "The Comparative Psychology of Man" in *Mind*, Vol. I, No. 1, January, 1876.

(1) *The Low Mentality Class* is composed of the stupid, but not mentally unsound.

Deficient imitative and acquisitive power, as well as deficient inventive power, is characteristic of this class, which has, of course almost no power of generalization.

(2) *The Medium Mentality Class* includes all those men and women who, on the whole, are imitative rather than inventive, but who are by no means wholly devoid of the inventive faculty, and who are otherwise characterized by the ability to acquire knowledge and by common sense.

While the individuals composing the medium mentality class are in no way remarkable, they are in no way defective. They have no foolish delusions; they understand and can appreciate the enormous advantage of being guided in the practical affairs of life by the advice of genius; but they accept this advice in an independent, self-respecting way, and always are capable of making up their own minds upon any question that directly concerns themselves.

(3) *The High Mentality Class* includes geniuses and men and women of talent. This class is relatively small in numbers. Its distinctive characteristic is mental mass and complexity, manifested in true originality, including generalizing and inventive power.

The great majority of human beings imitate far more than they invent; but here and there is found the individual whose whole life is occupied in devising new combinations, of ideas or of methods, that prove to be of the utmost value to his fellow-men. Those poets, artists, and musicians, those statesmen, professional men, and business men, and those mechanical inventors, who have the gift of originality to create new products, or to devise new and better ways of doing the things in which they are interested, belong to the highest mentality class.

2. *The Mentally Abnormal*.—That part of the social population which is mentally abnormal comprises (1) the *neurotic*, including the emotionally unbalanced, the hyster-

ical, the epileptic, and the suicidal; (2) the intellectually unbalanced, that is, the *insane*; and (3) the *idiotic*.

The last two of these classes and sections of the first class—the epileptic and the suicidal—are enumerated in the official social statistics of most countries.

All of the mentality classes make cross classifications with the vitality classes.

Morality.—Objectively viewed, morality consists of that “walk and conversation” which the community as a whole approves. It includes not only acts, well adapted to the achieving of those ends that on the whole are held to be good, but also outward expressions of thought and feeling, so far as these also are approved. Subjectively, morality is self-respect, and that desire for the good opinion of others, and that endeavour to deserve it, which Mr. Spencer has called ego-altruism.

The opposite of morality is *viciousness*, that degree of variation from the prevailing practical resemblance in matters of conduct, which the community disapproves, and *informally* punishes.

The social nature and origin of morality, conceived as a coöperative development of characterization, and, by implication, the functional relation of society to morality, have already been presented in the chapter on Concerted Volition.

The Morality Classes.—Inherited inequalities of self-respect and of desire for the good opinion of mankind are, of course, multiplied and grouped by the unequal effects of association, quite as much as are the inherited inequalities of vitality and of mentality. Consequently the social population is distributed into morality classes. The primary distribution is into the Moral and the Immoral.

1. *The Moral*.—That part of the social population which is on the whole moral in motive and conduct is

further distributed into three morality classes which may be designated as the Low, the Medium, and the High.

(1) *The Low Morality Class* consists of those individuals whose conduct for the most part is outwardly correct, but whose motives — of self-respect and desire for approval — are weak.

The motives of this class are instinctive rather than rational, and its conduct is more a matter of unconscious habit than of intelligent choice.

(2) *The Medium Morality Class* includes those individuals whose conduct is always correct so far as a merely traditional morality goes, and whose moral motives are strong, but altogether concrete.

A state of mind that might be described as moral vanity is characteristic of the medium morality class. Its desire to be thought well of is often intense, but the desire relates to the good opinion of particular individuals or classes of individuals, and to a sensitive dread of neighbourhood gossip.

(3) *The High Morality Class* includes those individuals whose conduct is above reproach, and whose strong moral motives are in a good degree abstract.

This class has a "sense of duty." It is sensitively conscientious.

2. *The Immoral.* — That part of the social population which must be described as immoral comprises, (1) those who are ordinarily called *immoral* because their conduct is in general disapproved, although it is not pronounced deeply evil; (2) the *vicious*, those whose conduct is regarded as seriously and habitually evil; and (3) the *depraved*, those whose conduct and character are regarded as hopelessly or almost hopelessly evil in the deepest degree.

There are practically no statistics of morality, with the exception of very imperfect figures of "disorderly conduct," including drunkenness.

All morality classes make cross classifications with mentality classes and vitality classes.

Sociality.—As the name itself implies, sociality comprises those qualities of mind and character, of disposition and conduct, which are eminently and characteristically social.

Objectively viewed, sociality is a cheerful and efficient participation in the normal comradeship and coöperation of society.

Subjectively viewed, sociality is altruism — thoughtfulness for others, sympathy with others, kindness and helpfulness toward others, even at some cost in self-sacrifice, and happiness in the companionship of one's kind.

It is especially in its sympathetic and positively helpful quality that sociality differs from ordinary morality and rises above it.

Sociality, or the social nature, then, includes the mental and moral qualities developed by association, and also the sympathetic, kindly qualities which may be lacking in a merely "respectable" individualistic morality.

The opposite of sociality is *criminality*, that degree of variation from the prevailing practical resemblance in matters of conduct, which the community disapproves and *formally* punishes.

The true social nature is susceptible to suggestion, and imitative, and thereby capable of learning from fellow-beings. This capacity is sufficient to make the social individual desirous to live at least as well as the fairly successful members of his community. He desires to enjoy what others enjoy, to do what others do, and to act as others act.

The social nature, however, is to some extent originative. It not only learns from others; it also teaches others. It makes new combinations of imitations; it makes inventions in the sphere of thought and conduct, and sets new examples. This it is enabled to do, because, by varied contact with many phases of life, made possible by

wide association, it enjoys many different experiences which inevitably combine in peculiar ways and with peculiar results in the life of each separate individual.

The social nature is judicious. It is satisfied that, on the whole, the average judgments of mankind are justified by experience. It cannot, to be sure, be perfectly satisfied with any judgment, much less with all judgments. It is at all times ready to criticise, to direct, or to devise; but this it does in no cranky, captious, or Quixotic way. It assumes that, for the purposes of social unity and co-operation, men must respect one another's judgments; and that new beliefs can be made practically available only as large numbers of men are converted to them. The individual, protesting alone against the opinions of his fellow-members of society, may possibly be right, and they may possibly be wrong; but not until they are convinced of error can he wisely and rightly undertake to put his views into practical operation.

The social nature is tolerant. It has learned through social experience to give the same opportunities, immunities, and enjoyments to others that it claims for itself. And not only as a matter of judgment has the social individual decided that toleration is wise, he has learned also to feel as an experience of his emotional nature that it is desirable and agreeable.

The social nature, however, is not merely tolerant in the negative sense of being non-aggressive; it is positively sympathetic, companionable, and helpful. It enjoys comradeship, communication, social pleasure, and coöperation. It would be unhappy in isolation and dissatisfied if at work in an absolutely individual way, without relation to the industry and patriotism of other men.

The vitality and mentality classes, and even the morality classes, are created by the reactions of society upon its individual members in their capacity as individuals. Merely as individuals they become more or less vigorous, more or less intellectual, more or less well-adjusted to their environments. Sociality is created by the reactions of society upon its individual members in their capacity as socii, as resembling individuals behaving in like ways under like conditions, cultivating acquaintance, and enjoying association.

The Sociality Classes.—Not all men associate habitually with the same individuals, or associate with any individuals in the same degree. Association, therefore, develops the social nature of different individuals in different degrees. It more or less fits them to be satisfactory and useful members of the community.

These different reactions produce in the population inequalities and gradations of social nature. They create sociality classes.

The primary distribution of the population, according to social nature, is into the Social and the Unsocial.

1. *The Social.*—That part of the population which is positively social in character and conduct is further distributed into three sociality classes, which may be designated as the Low, the Medium, and the High.

(1) *The Low Sociality Class* is composed of those in whom the social nature, though positive, is not fully developed. They are *imperfectly socialized*. Relatively they are *non-socialized*, and may be so called. Their disposition is to cling to a narrow and sometimes selfish individualism. They do not care for, or participate in, any higher social organization than that of their own families and immediate business enterprises, and especially they have no part in altruistic organization.

They are by no means destitute of sympathy, of comprehension of others, or of the desire for recognition; but their consciousness of kind, while normal and sound as far as it goes, is not wide or strong. They are, however, self-supporting. They pride themselves upon their independence and their habit of minding their own business. They are disinclined to accept favours, and not much inclined to give them. Their preference is to be let alone. This is the primordial social class. From it all other social classes are directly or indirectly derived.

(2) *The Medium Sociality Class* is composed of those in whom the social nature is highly developed. They are

socialized. They care for and participate in the general forms of social organization, especially in altruistic organization. Their consciousness of kind is wide in its scope and strong in its intensity.

This class does not furnish the leaders of social reform, but it is interested in endeavours to perfect social relations, to develop the methods of coöperation, to add to the happiness of mankind by improving the forms of social pleasure, to preserve and defend the great social institutions of the family and the state. To all these endeavours it freely lends support.

(3) *The High Sociality Class* is composed of those in whom the social nature is developed in the highest degree. They are not only socialized, but also *individualized* and distinguished. They not only participate in general, and especially in altruistic, organization, but they also plan and direct it.

To this class the entire population turns for help, inspiration, and leadership, for unselfish loyalty and wise enterprise. It includes all wise philanthropists, all true reformers, whose zeal is tempered by common sense and sober patience, and all persons who give expression to the ideals and aspirations of the community for a larger and better life. It is a gifted and originaive class, a true natural aristocracy among men, to which alone that name can be applied when artificial political distinctions have been abolished.

2. *The Unsocial*. — That part of the population which must be described as unsocial comprises (1) the *deindividualized*, (2) the *desocialized*, and (3) the *degraded*.

(1) *The Deindividualized* are those who contribute nothing to society, but are dependent upon it. Their consciousness of kind is degenerate, and they lack or have lost self-respect.

The deindividualized are a pseudo-social class. They simulate the qualities of the social, and pose as victims of misfortune. In reality, they have not even the virtues of the non-socialized. They desire only to live as parasites.

Most of the deindividualized are congenital and habitual paupers. Some are mendicants, who contrive to maintain their "respectability" by living on soft-hearted friends or acquaintances or philanthropic strangers. Among those whom the law classes as paupers, however, there are always some true victims of misfortune, who, therefore, do not belong to the deindividualized or pseudo-social class.

(2) *The Desocialized* are those who are hostile to society in its higher developments and who forcibly prey upon it. Their consciousness of kind is narrow and atavistic, sometimes approaching extinction, and in particular instances extinct.

The desocialized are practically an anti-social class. They detest society and all its ways. They make no pretence of social virtues, and prefer to live by open aggression upon the social. They do not desire the coöperation of the social in maintaining their rights or interests, and prefer to avenge personally any real or fancied wrongs that they suffer.

Practically all of the desocialized are criminals, instinctive or professional; but among those who by law are classed as criminals there are many who have not become altogether anti-social, and who perhaps could be saved from the anti-social class.

(3) *The Degraded* are those who are both deindividualized and desocialized. They have lost both social instinct and self-respect.

The degraded are alternately paupers or criminals, according to circumstances. They are scattered here and there as isolated households in neglected rural districts, and they are the habitual frequenters of Salvation Army, Magdalen, and other slum missions.

There are social causes of deindividualization and desocialization. In all progressive communities the forms and the work of coöperation and the forms of social organization are undergoing changes that are, on the whole, developmental. In addition to these, other changes are occurring that perhaps are merely disturbing. War alternates with peace, and industrial depression with industrial prosperity. Often, therefore, great numbers of men are

displaced, and often the displaced fail to find their way back into useful activity in the social system before they have become discouraged and demoralized. In general, either social reorganization or any disturbance of the normal functional activity of society causes both desocialization and deindividualization.¹

There is an important relation between the development of the pauper and the criminal classes and the growth of wealth. Criminal and pauper aggregation occurs where the secondary sources of subsistence are accumulated. Great cities always have more criminals and paupers in proportion to their total population than the poorer parts of the commonwealth. This is because, in the centres of wealth, there is not only an abundance of food and clothing upon which the worthless elements of the community may subsist, but also a large number of sympathetic people, who are willing to give to all who ask, without taking the trouble to learn whether they are deserving.

All sociality classes make cross classifications with the morality, mentality, and vitality classes.

TABLE IX.—THE NON-SOCIALIZED

SECTION I.—Sociality: Altruism

M 1. Low.

SECTION II.—Morality: Ego-Altruism

M 1. Low.

M 3. High.

M 5. Vicious.

M 2. Medium.

M 4. Immoral.

M 6. Depraved.

SECTION III.—Mentality: Complexity and Power

M 1. Low.

M 3. High.

A 5. Insane.

M 2. Medium.

A 4. Neurotic.

A 6. Idiotic.

SECTION IV.—Vitality

A 1. Birth Rate.

A 3. Longevity.

A 5. Deaf and Dumb.

A 2. Death Rate.

A 4. Blind.

A 6. Deformed.

¹ See "Democracy and Empire," Chapter v, "The Costs of Progress."

TABLE X. — THE SOCIALIZED

SECTION I. — Sociality: Altruism

M 1. Medium.

Other sections and columns as in Table IX.

TABLE XI. — THE INDIVIDUALIZED

SECTION I. — Sociality: Altruism

M 1. High.

Other sections and columns as in Table IX.

TABLE XII. — THE DEINDIVIDUALIZED

SECTION I. — Sociality: Altruism

- A 1. Number of Male Paupers in Alms or Workhouses.
- A 2. Number of Female Paupers in Alms or Workhouses.
- A 3. Number of Male Paupers receiving Outdoor Relief.
- A 4. Number of Female Paupers receiving Outdoor Relief.

Other sections and columns as in Table IX.

TABLE XIII. — THE DESOCIALIZED

SECTION I. — Sociality: Altruism

- A 1. Number of Occasional Criminals, Males.
- A 2. Number of Occasional Criminals, Females.
- A 3. Number of Professional Criminals, Males.
- A 4. Number of Professional Criminals, Females.
- A 5. Number of Instinctive Criminals, Males.
- A 6. Number of Instinctive Criminals, Females.

Other sections and columns as in Table IX.

TABLE XIV. — THE DEGRADED

SECTION I. — Sociality: Altruism

- A 1. Estimated Number of Degraded Men.
- A 2. Estimated Number of Degraded Women.

Other sections and columns as in Table IX.

CHAPTER IV

THE INTERACTION OF SOCIETY AND PERSONALITY

The Evolution of Personality

THE developed personality, itself the highest product of social evolution, reacts upon society,—influencing concerted volition, moulding the social organization, and in various ways modifying the social functioning. Society and the social personality are thus in continual interaction. Society creates personality, and personality, with conscious intent to perfect itself, shapes and perfects society. A complete study of the functioning of society, therefore, must include an examination of the give-and-take relations of personality and its social medium.

Association and Personality.—Immediately antecedent to personal development are the cultural products and activities. Back of these are the other public utilities, and yet further back is the social organization. Coefficient with the public utilities, and especially with culture in its immediate bearing upon personal evolution, is association, that continuing comradeship and interchange of sympathies and of ideas, which, though not the primordial or the simplest, is an almost universal factor, in social phenomena.

The association of men may be an association mainly of presence or mainly of activity. There is seldom an association of presence that is not also in some degree an association in activity, and there can be little association in activity without some association of pres-

ence. Yet either presence or activity is at any given time the relatively important fact.

Although the chief phenomena of human society are those of associated activity, the mere association of presence has played an important part in the mental and moral evolution of man. Even when there is no exchange of thought by actual conversation, the presence of fellow-beings is a continuing suggestion of varied thoughts and feelings, an inhibition of others, a stimulation to certain modes of conduct, and a discouragement to other modes. It carries with it, moreover, the lingering memories of associated activity, and a consciousness that it may again at any moment become, through concerted volition, a positive coöperation. Whether passive or active, then, association is immediately instrumental in developing personality.

The Unity of Personality.—The mental and moral results of association in their various specific phases have already been examined. These results have a consensus. They are fused in an organic unity. That unity is the personality, the self, that gathers up the impressions of sense, the waves of feeling, the images, the cognitions, and the habits of will, which constitute the shifting phenomena of mental life, and blends them in a self-conscious whole, which, as a unifying power, acts more and more effectively in modification or in control of each specific phase of will or thought.

Personality is a unity, but it is not indivisible or undecomposable. It is a resultant of many forces, which are of varying persistency and strength. As its factors change and shift, increase or diminish in intensity, combine and recombine, personality changes in tone or in character. It is more powerful than any of its conscious states and it normally controls them, but its control is analogous to that of a meeting over the individuals that compose it.

The blending of the varied elements of personality into a more or less consistent unity, is effected by the social medium.

So far as the problem is one of heredity, it is evident that social conditions determine, in the first place, what elements shall combine through sexual union in the birth of new individuals,—that is, what possibilities of variation shall exist,—and in the second place, what new types shall survive. So far as the problem is one of the modification of the organism within the brief span of individual life, it is certain that social conditions determine for each individual what elements of his personality shall be played upon by the influences that strengthen or weaken; what suggestions shall consciously or unconsciously give direction to his thought, quality to his feeling, and so, at length, determination to his will.

Psychical Determination.—Personality, thus created, is not a passive consensus of mental states. Though composite in its origin, and decomposable, it is a unity while it persists, and an active unity. It reacts on all its emotional and intellectual factors.

In every sensation and perception, in every act of attention and of reasoning, in every phase of feeling, personality, the unified resultant of all past and present feeling, is itself a factor, making every process of thought and feeling peculiar and incommunicable. This reaction of the coördinated whole upon the parts is especially distinctive of the psychology of man; it differentiates his conscious life from the conscious life of lower animals.

The synthesis of passive and active phases of personality is the phenomenon of internal or psychical determination. The states of mind are determined, but mainly through the mental processes themselves, and through character, which is the product of all that now is and ever has been in the mind itself.

Psychical determination is still called “self-determination” in many books on psychology. This term has a metaphysical history, and is misleading in its connotation, even when not purposely employed as a term to juggle with. An explicit statement of exactly what is meant by the term “psychical determination,” here substituted, is, therefore, in order.

Psychical determination has antecedents in the external world, of which it never becomes independent. This is true, whether the external world is a reality transcending knowledge, or only an order of perception.

Most of the external antecedents of internal changes, however, are *remote* rather than *immediate*. Each new impression of the external world upon the mind is made through the medium of thousands of internal results of previous impressions. The internal process, therefore, is different from the external process, and it reacts upon the external process.

Psychical determination, then, is simply the immediate determination that proceeds through the infinitely complex internal process — conditioned at every step by the mental factors that enter into it — as distinguished from an ulterior determination that proceeds more remotely from that external world lying outside of “the stream of thought.” Psychical determination is the free exercise of will — not the exercise of free will — in so far as volition is the expression of one’s own mental constitution, — from hereditary tendency and present sensation up to reason and conscience. It is an internal or psychical, as distinguished from external and physical, necessity.

Cumulative Happiness. — The evolution of personality is a result to which we are not indifferent. It is accompanied by feelings of pain or of pleasure. There is no growth without some disintegration, some breaking up of the old relations, that the new and larger relations may be made possible, and this is painful. But life itself, spontaneous activity, expansion of opportunity, and increase of power, — these are pleasurable, and the more perfect the organism, the larger and fuller the life, the greater is the pleasure. Moreover, this pleasure is of the kind that does not bring with it reactions against itself, as do the pleasures of excess. It stimulates; it enhances the capacity for pleasure. Personality, then, experiencing and including in itself all the satisfaction of its own activity and growth, is normally accompanied by a cumulative happiness.

To understand the nature of cumulative happiness it is necessary to remember that either pain or pleasure may immediately accompany our activity as an instant reaction, or may follow later, as a remoter consequence.

Failure to remember this simple and perfectly familiar fact is at the bottom of most ethical controversies. Intuitionists tell us that pleasure-seeking is essential evil and the source of moral wrong. Pleasure, they say, is no test, or measure, or verification, of right. Utilitarians, on the other hand, admitting that duty and pleasure do not always coincide, argue that they coincide usually, or in the long run. Suffering, they say, is evil in itself; pleasure is good in itself. Suffering, as an incident of duty, is justifiable only on the presumption that the way of duty leads to a larger and completer pleasure. That which has pain for its normal end cannot be duty.

If we examine their arguments more closely, however, we find that the intuitionists habitually think of the pleasure that immediately accompanies activity and of the pains that come later, in remoter consequences, reacting upon the person who, in activity, had found momentary satisfaction. The utilitarians, on the contrary, think of the remoter pleasure and the present pain. Their pain is the pain of effort, their pleasure a deferred reward.

A complete view of the relations of happiness to personal evolution—a view which can be obtained only through sociological study—reveals the absurd one-sidedness of these conflicting moral systems. The well-ordered life does not abstain from activities that yield immediate pleasure, and it certainly does not choose such activities only. All normal activities of body and mind normally yield instantaneous reactions of pleasure. All the rational “joy of a right understanding,” all personal love, friendship, and devotion, all gladness of self-sacrifice, are satisfactions immediately and inseparably connected with conscious activity itself, apart from any anticipated pleasurable or painfulness of remoter reaction. At the same time, the ulterior reactions also may and should be pleasurable. Those modes of immediately pleasurable activity and those degrees and prolongations of it that sooner or later are followed by bodily or intellectual decay, by misery or by shame, usually may be avoided. Those painful efforts and sacrifices that come to naught, that yield nothing but suffering in the present and nothing but failure in the future, need never be endured except through error of judgment or untoward

accident. It is possible habitually to choose those kinds and degrees of activity that are satisfying while they last and life-serving at the end. In a word, it is possible to create and to enjoy an ever cumulating happiness.

Volitional Association

Let now the possibilities of psychical determination and of cumulative happiness be combined. The result is a larger synthesis, which is nothing less than a conscious policy and a factor in social evolution. Knowing that personality depends upon conditions that are established only by association, and knowing that we have the power to react on our environment, we seek to increase our satisfactions by perfecting our social relations. Thus the social function, the evolution of personality, reacts on social cohesion and structure. Accidental association is supplemented by an association that is volitional in its origin and in its conduct.

Forms of Volitional Association.—Volitional association is not to be identified with purposive association or contrasted with natural society. Purposive association is of course volitional, but so also, to a great extent, is all natural society. Volitional association must be contrasted with those rudimentary beginnings of society which are more or less accidental and unconscious. Mere like response to the same stimulus falls far short of volitional association. But when simultaneous like response becomes a concerted volition, or when, through a developing consciousness of kind, a merely accidental association, repeated or continued, is consciously and deliberately maintained, volitional association has begun.

The union of the sexes, which autogenous society presupposes, is volitional association in its primordial form. The further evolution of the social composition is effected mainly through volitional asso-

ciation; federation and consolidation are usually accomplished by deliberate acts. But the social composition, as at any given moment existing, is a volitional association to a certain degree only. To the extent that it persists by mere force of habit, a thing of tradition and custom, — a perfectly unconscious acceptance by unreflective men of what is and has been, — it is not a volitional association. The evolution of reflective thought, however, is one of the inevitable results of social growth; and when reflection has become in a measure the habit of most men, it is turned upon every relation of social life. If, then, after mature reflection, men continue unrebellingly to live in membership of the social body into which they were born, and in which they have been reared, it is because they will to do so. To the extent, therefore, that the social composition is deliberately maintained by reflecting men, it is a volitional association.

The social constitution, by its very nature a product of conscious coöperation, is a volitional association throughout.

The Growth and Reactions of Volitional Association. — Volitional association develops step by step with the evolution of self-conscious personality, and step by step with its own growth it reacts upon the forms, the character, and the efficiency of organization.

The mere beginnings of volitional association are possible to very simple minds. To choose to consort with one another demands only intellect enough to perceive the pleasure or the advantage of comradeship. But for concerted volition a perception of complicated relations is required; and a certain steadiness of character also is necessary, if the concerted volition is to develop into a continuing coöperation.

For the highest developments of volitional association qualities of personality are required, which can combine social relations and activities in most complicated products, but without destroying liberty.

The simplest coördinations of social activity, as we have seen, are automatic. In the simultaneous like-response of many individuals to the same stimulus, each may act without the slightest reference

to the acts of others. Conscious coördination, in its most indefinite and transient form, begins in imitation and is continued through suggestion and sympathy. Each individual now acts with conscious reference to the like acts of others, and yet each individual is controlled almost absolutely by the collective impulse. He is not independent in his volition.

A more definite coördination results from individual superiority of intellect to plan and of will to execute. In consequence of the relations of parenthood and sonship, every individual has both the instinct to rule and the instinct to obey. Therefore, among individuals unequal in personal power there is coördination through leadership. Hence follows the possibility of slavery and serfdom no less than the possibility of voluntary allegiance. Directive intelligence, combined with arbitrary power, creates the one; combined with a strong, but not arbitrary character, it creates the other.

Voluntary allegiance is a true volitional association, which, therefore, may attain to a relatively high development when personality has been sufficiently evolved in any community to afford, on the one hand, efficient leadership, and, on the other hand, an appreciation of its value.

Any deference to leadership, however, involves some inequality and, therefore, usually some loss of individual freedom. Perfect volitional association consequently is possible only among men who can coördinate their social relations and activities through the highest mental processes, namely, those of intellectual and sympathetic comprehension. While on its physical side, life is an adjustment of internal relations to external relations, on its conscious side it is much more than an adjustment. It is a comprehension by each mind of some portion of the thought and feeling of all other minds. In this phenomenon lies the possibility of a perfect social coördination without the sacrifice of individual freedom. The possibility becomes reality just to the extent that men can fully think one another's thoughts, appreciate one another's feelings and understand one another's motives, and just to the extent that a genuine, unforced agreement in thought and feeling becomes the ground of a substantial unity of purpose.

The developed minds to whom the higher forms of volitional association are possible employ it to perfect the forms of social organization, and especially to make it

liberal in its character, since liberty is absolutely necessary to the perfection of personality itself.

They strive, accordingly, to make the social composition so homogeneous in race and in mental and moral qualities that, with a secure basis of fraternity, liberty may be assured. They strive so to develop the social constitution that security and equity, prosperity and culture, shall continually minister to the mental and moral and social nature of each individual member of the community.

Degree of Association. — With varying developments of the public utilities and of personality, volitional association varies in degree of intimacy and in degree of definiteness, and corresponding variations are seen in the reactions of volitional association upon personality.

Intimacy may be either physical or mental, or it may be both. Whether physical crowding results from conditions of industry and wealth distribution, over which individuals have little personal control, or is a consequence of deliberate choice, it has a serious significance. Most of the communistic schemes proposed since Fourier's day have involved a physical intimacy in the association of daily life that has been so far distasteful as to prevent the general adoption of arrangements that offer economic advantages over the individual household. The earliest distribution of the farming population of America illustrates the same reluctance to live too much with one's neighbours. The first settlements were made in villages; but when emigration from these began, it was the self-sufficing farm homestead, and not the compact farm village of the Old World, that for a time became characteristic of our rural populations.

In older communities, however, where crowding has been produced by economic conditions, an acquired fondness for intimate association with fellow-beings may become pathological through an impairment of physical and moral vigour. It is extremely difficult, for example, to divert the tenement-house population of city slums to wholesome rural environments, even when definite occupation and good wages are promised.

When the physical crowding of wage-earners in factory towns and city tenements has once been effected by economic causes, a secondary sociological factor enters into the feelings of the well-to-do and

intensifies their own dislike of close association in daily life. It has become a mark of class differences. It therefore happens that, just when land becomes most valuable, and the need of more room, light, and air, for the multitudes, most imperative, the wealthy attach the greatest importance to the ownership of separate homes in city and country, and to laying field to field in enlargement of their country estates.

Mental intimacy, and a certain definiteness of association that goes with mental intimacy, are conditioned by physical propinquity when the means of communication are imperfect, but when these are highly developed, it may exist between persons widely separated in space. To a great extent they depend upon an association of activity, while physical intimacy is a phase of the association of presence. Mental intimacy varies to a considerable extent with race and nationality. In the same society it varies with purposive association, with class characteristics, and with town and country residence.

Extent and Duration of Association. — In all association there are latent forces of dissociation, which at any moment may become active, destroying the bonds that hold the social groups together, and dispersing the elements of social activity for reunion in new relations.

The dissolution of assemblies and corporations, the disbanding of armies, the desertion of cities once teeming with restless populations, heresy and schism, rebellion and secession, have not been less conspicuous or less fateful than the slowly evolved associations that they have destroyed.

These dissociations that always limit association are psychologically analogous to the process by which the individual mind in perception rejects some elements of sensation, and in reasoning rejects some elements of perception. A community of feeling or an intellectual agreement is destroyed when social groups are sundered.

Association of great extent means either that the bonds of thought and feeling are many and strong, or that the purpose of the association is strictly limited to a single definite object. If from 50,000,000 to 100,000,000 individuals hold together in a strongly united political society, innumerable spiritual bonds have become marvellously interwoven. Yet in a particular work, as, for example, in relieving a district that has been ravaged by famine, thousands of individuals of different nationalities, beliefs, and interests may coöperate with

no other bonds of union than a common knowledge and a momentary sympathy.

The strength of the social motives that is measured by the extent, is measured also by the permanence, of association which is ever growing stronger or weaker. If stronger, it is because the consciousness of kind is becoming both deeper and more comprehensive, because knowledge is ripening and thought is becoming more catholic, because the purposes of men are becoming more serious, and their ideals nobler. No nation that has lowered its aspirations or discouraged the spirit of inquiry has grown stronger through the centuries.

The Reactions of Institutions upon Personality

The most definite forms of volitional association are positive institutions, and opinions have differed concerning the value of authoritative institutions to the individual personality.

It is true that the development of the individual depends on wide opportunities for self-activity. An institutional life, so ordered that authority crushes liberty, is fatal to the full development of rational life. And yet, if the highest qualities of human personality are to appear, or even if that liberty on which personal growth depends is to exist, there must be some stability and some continuity in human life, and, besides the elementary security that the simplest association affords, there must be some systematic restraint of brutality and some systematic regulation of social relations. All experience has shown that it is only in institutional life that the needful combination of stability, continuity, and liberty is secured.

In human history there has been no other political liberty than constitutional liberty. There has been no individual freedom but under government and law.

Whether institutional or not, however, the social life and the social mind must be embodied in articulate form. The mature man is moulded into individuality, not through deliberate exercises of mind and will, undertaken for their effects, but through the daily struggle to fulfil the duties that pertain to his position in an organized community.

In a word, the medium in which the highest development of personality is possible, is a society that has a specialized constitution and that presents many degrees of composition. The individual must have a definite part in the division of labour, and in the common life of the nation, the local community, and the family.

Whether his daily duty identifies him with productive industry, or with directive functions, or with the extension of knowledge, or with the spiritualization of life, the individual is affected by all of these interests if there is no derangement of the social organization. The division of labour may have its evil side, but those economic writers are mistaken who see only an economic gain in the division of labour, and deny that it can be morally and mentally beneficial to individuals. The division of labour gives a definite aim to life. It insures a definite discipline and that minute thoroughness which every investigator knows is one of the essential conditions of a rational mental habit. At the same time, it releases men from their tasks to enjoy more hours of leisure than they could otherwise command.

It is neither the life of humanity in its vast entirety, therefore, nor the life of unorganized masses of men, that chiefly develops the individual. He is developed by the life of definite groups, in which he shares the common interest. The ideals and aspirations of the nation, which awaken the enthusiasm of patriotism; the common interests of the city or commune, in which one feels the pride of citizenship,—these have always been necessary to perfect character, and without them there has been neither literature nor art. As for the family life, however its form may change from time to time, some definiteness and continuity of home life, and therefore of the relations between man and woman, and between parents and children, are indispensable to the development of human nature in its completeness. It is these relationships that create forethought, that soften dispositions, that suggest self-sacrifice, that pass on the acquirements of one generation to the generations that come after.

Thus, so far as volitional association has to be accounted for by a *raison d'être*, it has a complete explanation in its reactions upon the ethical and mental phases of individual

life. Volitional association is functional in maintaining the conditions necessary to the highest personal evolution.¹

Community and Competition

Since the tendencies toward both cohesion and dispersion are persistent, the social system simultaneously exhibits phenomena of combination and of competition, of communism and of individualism. Neither order of phenomena can ever exclude the other, but at any given time one or the other order may be ascendant, and there may be a rhythm of alternating ascendancy of combination or competition, communism or individualism.

The individual, therefore, is not prior to society, or society to the individual. Community is not precedent to competition, or competition to community. From the first, competition and community, society and the individual, have been coördinate. Society and the individual have always been acting and reacting upon each other; competition and community have always been limiting each other.

¹ The psychological aspects of the give-and-take relations between personality and the social medium are examined in detail by Baldwin, "Mental Evolution in the Child and the Race."

PROBLEMS

PROBLEMS

1. Regard the United States as a natural society to be investigated. Take the forty-five states as enumeration units. Choosing any one of the foregoing tabular forms, have it filled out for the forty-five enumeration units by as many different individuals as possible, each working independently of the others. Selecting any one entry in a column, as made by any one person, compare with it the corresponding entries as made by all other persons engaged in the work. Ascertain the mean variation of these entries. Proceed in like manner with the entries in each column, for each enumeration unit.

2. In like manner have each of the foregoing tabular forms filled out for the forty-five enumeration units of the United States, and, proceeding as before, ascertain the mean variations of the entries.

3. Choosing a New England town, a Western township, or a Southern county or parish, as a community to be studied, take the school districts or other neighbourhood divisions as enumeration units. Proceed as in Problem 1.

4. Choosing a block of tenement houses, and taking households as enumeration units, proceed as in Problem 1.

5. By means of tabular records, made in each case by many observers, and with due regard to mean error of observations, determine for each nationality and for the native born of each distinctive geographical region, and for the membership of each religious denomination or sect, (1) the motor types, (2) the emotional types, (3) the intellectual types, (4) the type of disposition, (5) the type of character, (6) the type of mind. See Appendix I.

6. In one thousand persons of different nationalities ascertain the number of persons of each nationality. Selecting a point of mental resemblance, ascertain how many times resemblance in this point is found between individuals of the same nationality, and how many times between individuals of different nationality. Compare the distribution so obtained with the distribution given by the equation of probability.

7. Proceeding as in Problem 6, observe the distribution of resemblance in various points.

8. Choosing any column marked A in any table, fill it out for as many enumeration units within contiguous territory as possible. Foot the column and call the sum the "Column Total." Find now the total population of each enumeration unit and the total population of all the enumeration units collectively; and calculate the number of hundreds, thousands, or millions into which the population of each enumeration unit will divide, and into which the total population of all the enumeration units collectively will divide. Now divide the "Column Total" by the number of hundreds, thousands, or millions in the total population of all the enumeration units collectively. The quotient is the *average arithmetic value* of the phenomenon under investigation per one hundred, one thousand, or one million of the same total population. Next, divide the arithmetic value found in the column against any enumeration unit, by the number of hundreds, thousands, or millions contained in the population of that enumeration unit. The quotient is the average arithmetic value of the phenomenon under investigation per one hundred, one thousand, or one million of population in that enumeration unit. Proceed in like manner with each enumeration unit. From the data thus obtained calculate The Standard Deviation,¹ for the phenomenon.

9. Choosing any column marked M in any table, fill it out for as many enumeration units, within the same contiguous territory, as possible. Count and note down the number of large majorities recorded in the column. Divide the sum by the whole number of enumeration units. Place the denominator equal to one hundred and find the corresponding numerator. The resulting ratio is the average number of large majorities per one hundred enumeration units for the entire area investigated. Now combine enumeration units into approximately symmetrical groups of approximately equal population. Count and note down the number of large majorities recorded in the column for any one of these groups, and divide the sum by the number of enumeration units in the group. Place the denominator equal to one hundred as before, and find the corresponding numerator. The ratio so obtained is the average number of large majorities per one hundred enumeration units for the group in question. Proceed in like manner with each group. From the data thus obtained calculate the standard deviation of large majorities for the phenomenon under investigation. Proceed in like manner for small majorities, for large minorities, and for small minorities.

10. Whenever upon superficial examination the results recorded

¹ See *ante*, p. 22.

in any column of any table appear to be correlated with the results recorded in any other column of the same or of any other table, proceed with such columns as in Problem 8 or Problem 9. From the data so obtained determine the Coefficient of Correlation, using Galton's or the algebraic method.¹ A diagrammatic method devised by E. B. Tylor² and simpler than Galton's is sufficient in many cases.

11. When numerous coefficients of correlation have been determined, many standard deviations calculated, and exceptional deviations noted, examine such data for the verification or correction of provisionally formulated laws, for the determination of conditions, and for the possible discovery of causes.³

¹ See Bowley, *Elements of Statistics*, Part II, § 6.

² "On a Method of Investigating the Development of Institutions ; Applied to the Laws of Marriage and Descent," *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, February, 1889, p. 245.

³ See *ante*, p. 14.

APPENDIX

I

TYPES OF MIND IN THE UNITED STATES

BEFORE undertaking investigations of the types of mind found in any social population, in accordance with the tabular schemes presented in the chapter on Mental and Practical Resemblance and the instructions of Problem 5, the student may advantageously consult a memoir by the author entitled, "A Provisional Distribution of the Population of the United States into Psychological Classes," to which foot-note references have been made.¹ Details of procedure are there shown, and tables are presented, showing the assignment of mental type to the native-born whites of native parents in each geographical section of the United States, to each nationality of foreign-born whites and native-born whites of foreign parents, and to the membership of each religious denomination enumerated in the Federal Census. The distribution by nationalities results in these percentages: Ideo-motor 2.9% of the total population of 62,622,250 given by the Eleventh Census; Ideo-motor to Ideo-emotional, 8.1%; Ideo-emotional, 29.2%; Ideo-emotional to Dogmatic-emotional, 33.5%; Dogmatic-emotional, 19.3%; Dogmatic-emotional to Critical-intellectual, 6.3%; Critical-intellectual, 1.6%. The distribution on the basis of religious preference results in percentages as follows: Ideo-motor to Ideo-emotional, 7.6%; Ideo-emotional, 29.9%; Ideo-emotional to Dogmatic-emotional, 35.8%; Dogmatic-emotional, 20.8%; Dogmatic-emotional to Critical-intellectual, 6.1%. The close correspondence of these percentages does not prove that the provisional distribution is absolutely the right one, but it indicates a distribution approximately right, which may be made a basis for further investigation. The general conclusion that "the mental mode of the American people as a whole is ideo-emotional to dogmatic-emotional," may probably be accepted as established.

A distribution of the American population into types of character,

¹ *The Psychological Review*, Vol. VIII, No. 4, July, 1901, pp. 337-349.

on the basis of data mentioned on page 84, would show a concentration of the Forceful type along the seaboard — Atlantic and Pacific — and the Great Lakes; along the Appalachian, Rocky, and Sierra mountain chains, and on the great plains west of the Mississippi River. It would show a mingling of the Convivial type with the Forceful in all the foregoing regions, and a very even distribution over the South Atlantic and South Central States; a distribution of the Austere type in a broad belt westward from the Atlantic coast into Iowa and Kansas, and a concentration of the Rationally Conscientious type at scattered points in all parts of the country, that is to say, in the great cities. The accompanying Map I provisionally and very roughly shows this distribution of the character types.

II

DEGREE OF SYMPATHY IN THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES

The formula for degree of social sympathy, given on page 110, can be filled out with numerical values for the United States from data given by the Federal Census, and we can get approximately accurate tables of degrees of resemblance, and therefore of social solidarity.

For the values of k (mental and practical resemblance as coördinated with the degrees of kinship) we have the statistics of the native born of native parents, the native born of foreign parents, the foreign born, and the coloured.

The values of m (mental and practical resemblance irrespective of kinship) may be obtained by combining religious, political, and industrial statistics. For example, one phase of mental and moral resemblance is shown in religious beliefs. An approximate value of m , therefore, may be obtained by making the number of Protestants equal m' ; the number of Protestants plus the number of Roman Catholics equal m'' ; the number of Protestants plus the number of Roman Catholics, plus the number of nominal Christians, equal m''' ; and the number of Protestants plus the number of Roman Catholics, plus the number of nominal Christians, plus the number of all who belong to non-Christian faiths, equal to m'''' . This approximate value may be corrected by a similar use of political statistics. Finally, a last correction may be made by means of the statistics of occupations, in which the categories are: the percentage of the population employed in agriculture; the percentage employed in trade and trans-

portation; the percentage employed in manufacturing and mining; the percentage employed in professional occupations; and the percentage employed in personal services.

The value of v (potential resemblance) is approximately given in the statistics of occupation. The chief assimilating influence in a population is contact and acquaintance; therefore, trade and transportation, manufacturing and mining, professional occupations and personal services, are the occupations that insure assimilation.

In the following tables and maps this method of determining degrees of resemblance, and thereby of sympathy, is illustrated to the extent of showing degrees of mental and practical resemblance as coördinated with kinship in the population of the United States.

The five columns of Table I have been obtained as follows:—

The column "Native White of Foreign Parents" is obtained from the Compendium of the Eleventh Census, Part I, p. lxxxviii, column 3.

The column "Foreign Born" is obtained from the same table, column 2.

In the same volume of the Compendium, p. c, is given (column 1) the percentage of whites to the total population. By subtracting it from one hundred per cent, the percentage of "All Coloured" is obtained.

The column "Native White of Native Parents" is obtained by subtracting the sum of the other three elements (*i.e.* native born of foreign parents, foreign born, and all coloured) from one hundred per cent.

The Index Number =

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{The native born of native} \\ \text{parents} \end{array} \right) + \left(\begin{array}{c} \text{The native born of native parents + the} \\ \text{native born of foreign parents} \end{array} \right) \\
 \hline
 \begin{array}{cc} 1 & 2 \end{array} \\
 + \left[\begin{array}{c} \text{The native born of native par-} \\ \text{ents + the native born of for-} \\ \text{eign parents + the foreign} \\ \text{born} \end{array} \right] + \left[\begin{array}{c} \text{The native born of native parents} \\ \text{+ the native born of foreign} \\ \text{parents + the foreign born + all} \\ \text{coloured.} \end{array} \right] \\
 \hline
 \begin{array}{cc} 4 & 8 \end{array}
 \end{array}$$

The relations disclosed in Table I are shown also in Map II.

TABLE I

STATE	NATIVE WHITE OF NATIVE PARENTS	NATIVE WHITE OF FOREIGN PARENTS	FOREIGN BORN	ALL COLOURED	INDEX NUMBER
Alabama	52.64	1.50	0.98	44.88	105.96
Arkansas	69.23	2.10	1.26	27.43	135.51
California	35.18	26.52	30.32	7.98	101.54
Colorado	58.38	19.36	20.38	1.88	134.28
Connecticut	47.81	25.87	24.60	1.72	121.72
Delaware	64.87	10.45	7.81	16.87	135.81
Florida	47.58	4.03	5.86	42.53	100.25
Georgia	51.52	1.07	0.66	46.75	103.63
Idaho	51.43	25.07	20.69	2.81	126.48
Illinois	49.17	27.31	22.01	1.51	124.53
Indiana	77.44	13.81	6.67	2.08	160.05
Iowa	55.64	26.84	16.95	0.57	134.24
Kansas	69.52	16.58	10.36	3.54	149.19
Kentucky	75.69	6.69	3.19	14.43	150.77
Louisiana	36.85	8.62	4.45	50.08	84.57
Maine	76.61	11.17	11.94	0.28	157.93
Maryland	55.23	15.01	9.05	20.71	122.67
Massachusetts	42.51	27.09	29.35	1.05	114.55
Michigan	43.73	29.30	25.97	1.00	116.01
Minnesota	23.86	39.80	35.90	0.44	93.08
Mississippi	40.33	1.30	0.62	57.73	84.21
Missouri	69.26	16.34	8.77	5.63	148.15
Montana	40.26	23.43	32.61	3.70	108.69
Nebraska	56.08	23.65	19.13	1.14	133.16
Nevada	26.16	27.11	32.14	14.59	86.65
New Hampshire	67.33	13.28	19.21	0.18	145.09
New Jersey	48.14	25.74	22.77	3.35	122.74
New York	41.94	30.64	26.19	1.23	115.42
North Carolina	64.55	0.45	0.23	34.77	125.86
North Dakota	20.42	34.67	44.58	0.33	85.39
Ohio	63.55	21.56	12.51	2.38	143.01
Oregon	61.98	15.92	18.27	3.83	137.47
Pennsylvania	61.55	20.28	16.08	2.09	139.44
Rhode Island	39.73	27.29	30.77	2.21	110.19
South Carolina	38.66	0.93	0.54	59.87	80.99
South Dakota	38.63	33.22	27.69	0.46	111.94
Tennessee	72.61	1.88	1.13	24.38	141.26
Texas	62.96	8.30	6.84	21.90	130.62
Utah	32.48	41.04	25.52	0.96	106.50
Vermont	67.74	18.70	13.26	0.30	148.39
Virginia	58.97	1.52	1.11	38.40	117.12
Washington	52.02	19.68	25.76	2.54	124.74
West Virginia	87.85	5.38	2.48	4.29	170.90
Wisconsin	25.75	43.09	30.78	0.38	97.58
Wyoming	49.15	23.92	24.57	2.36	122.60

In Table II the states are grouped according to low, medium, and high index numbers. It will be observed that the states which are distinguished for a rather pronounced "Americanism" in politics and legislation are chiefly found, as might be expected, in the third column.

TABLE II

INDEX BELOW 110	110-129	130 AND OVER
Alabama	Connecticut	Arkansas
California	Idaho	Colorado
Florida	Illinois	Delaware
Georgia	Maryland	Indiana
Louisiana	Massachusetts	Iowa
Minnesota	Michigan	Kansas
Mississippi	New Jersey	Kentucky
Montana	New York	Maine
Nevada	North Carolina	Missouri
North Dakota	Rhode Island	Nebraska
South Carolina	South Dakota	New Hampshire
Utah	Virginia	Ohio
Arizona	Washington	Oregon
Wisconsin	Wyoming	Pennsylvania
		Tennessee
		Texas
		New Mexico
		Oklahoma
		Vermont

According to the reasoning of pages 178-181 we should look for progress and social leadership to those communities where the population is neither perfectly homogeneous nor excessively heterogeneous. From this point of view Table III, showing the relative positions of the northern states that have index numbers between 105 and 125, is interesting. The relations indicated by Table III and column 2 of Table II are well shown in Map III.

TABLE III

105	106	107	108	109	110	111
	Utah		Montana		Rhode Island	South Dakota
112	113	114	115	116	117	118
		Mass.	N. Y.	Mich.		
119	120	121	122	123	124	125
		Conn.	Md. N. J. Wy.		Ill. Wash.	

III

SOCIAL VALUES

In the accompanying scheme, page 291, are shown the relations of Social or Political Values to one another and to the historical evolution of society.

IV

VITALITY AND MENTALITY CLASSES

In the accompanying scheme, page 292, the relations of Vitality and Mentality Classes to one another, and to the distribution of population as rural and urban, are diagrammatically indicated.


With Preference for :		The Moral Type		The Distinction or Attainment of the Community	
The Socius: Actual	Potential Resemblance.	Mental and Practical Resemblance Irrespective of Kinship	As Expressed in	Enlightenment	Equality
The Socius: Ideal	Mental and Practical Resemblance Coordinated with Kinship			Liberty	Justice
Comprising, Maintaining, and Developing :		The Concrete Group		Maintained and Developed by means of :	
I. Social cohesion		Coercion. Bribery. Patronage. Loyalty. Rational comprehension.		II. Extent and composition.	
III. Possessions.		IV. Policies.		I. Self-preservation.	
II. Territory :		1. Tribal or national domain. 2. Sacred places. 3. Historic places.		III. Personages :	
III. Personages :		1. Leaders. 2. Heroes. 3. Saints. 4. Gods.		IV. Customs :	
IV. Customs :		1. Language. 2. Manners. 3. Costumes. 4. Amusements. 5. Poetic arts. 6. Plastic arts. 7. Worship. 8. Education. 9. Economic arts. 10. Morals.		V. Institutions :	
V. Institutions :		1. The state. 2. Family and marriage. 3. The church. 4. Property. 5. Contract. 6. The labour system. 7. The legal system. 8. The form of government.		VI. Social Cohesion.	
VI. Social Cohesion.		VII. Extent and composition.		VIII. Socialization :	
VIII. Socialization :		1. By coercion. 2. By incitement. 3. By conversion. 4. By discussion and education.		a. Roman tribes. b. Roman republic. c. Modern republics.	

SCHEME
OF
SOCIAL VALUES

a. Roman tribes.
b. Roman republic.
c. Modern republices.

RELATIONS OF VITALITY AND MENTALITY CLASSES

- | | |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. Country population. | 3. Suburban population. |
| 2. Population of country villages. | 4. Urban population. |



Enclosed by inner dotted line, high vitality class.


Between inner and outer dotted lines, medium vitality class.


Outside of outer dotted line, low vitality class.

Above line bc , high mentality class.

Between lines ab , bc , medium mentality class.


Below line ab , low mentality class.





A. D. Brown, Jr. L.

MAP II



MAP III

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